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PREFACE
T is a particular pleasure to present this special report from the CEPS
Macroeconomic Policy Group. On the occasion of the European Council
meeting in Copenhagen, our distinguished group of economists has come
together to produce a thorough analysis of the key implications of
enlargement which has been solemnly finalised in Copenhagen.
This special report differs from our previous regular reports (four issued to
date), which usually concentrate on macroeconomic issues, in particular
issues pertaining to monetary policy. This report deals with the longer-term
implications of enlargement for the European Central Bank. It asks how
euro-area membership by the UK will affect the way in which monetary
policy will work and what reform of the Governing Council of the ECB is
needed in light of the accession to the EU of the 10 candidates from Central
and Eastern Europe.
The difficulties the European Central Bank had in taking a position on the
latter issue is indicative of how politically sensitive this issue is. The final
decision lies of course with the European Council. Our report provides an
independent contribution to the debate, which, to our regret, has been
dominated by arguments dictated by political expediency on the part of the
large and the small countries. We also hope that our contribution will help
bring into the open an issue that has largely been discussed behind closed
doors. The public should know that important decisions are being taken these
days on monetary governance.
A special thanks again to Deutsche Bank (London) and UBS, Zürich for the
financial support they provide the CEPS Macroeconomic Policy Group. We
are also grateful to Leonor Coutinho and Ben Crum for useful comments.
Daniel Gros
Brussels
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Policy Conclusions
1. Entry of the UK into EMU will make the monetary pillar even less
reliable.
In the UK financial system, it is even more difficult to distinguish
between money and other assets than it is in the eurozone. The UK will
contribute an ill-defined and volatile mass equal to about 30% of the
money supply of the eurozone, thereby making this indicator an even less
reliable basis for monetary policy.
… but it will also increase the usefulness of careful analysis of
financial market developments.
UK consumers are more likely to be influenced both by stock markets
(via defined contribution pension systems with short-term displays of net
asset values) and real estate prices (via highly leveraged mortgages at
variable rates).
2. There is no need to change the convergence criteria, including
adherence to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), for the new
CEEC members (or the UK).
The more flexible approach currently followed in the UK might work
well at a particular time at the national level, but it cannot be a blueprint
for the euro area consisting of many countries. The only way to preserve
the credibility of the SGP is to maintain the rules and enforce compliance.
… but the basis for calculating the maximum allowable inflation rate
for a candidate for the euro area should be changed to “at most 1.5%
above the average of the euro zone”.
It is widely feared that the Maastricht criterion concerning inflation might
create problems for the candidate economies whose price levels are
catching up to that of the current EU-15. This problem is manageable
provided the technical basis for this criterion is changed from its original
formulation of “at most 1.5% above the three best performing memberTHE EURO AT 25
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countries”. This calculation made sense at the time EMU was first
constituted, but it is no longer appropriate. The larger the number of
member states in the EU, the higher the probability that the three best
performing members have extremely low values (and might actually not
be even part of the euro area). Already within the EU-15, the average of
the three best performers is often 1% below the euro-area average.
3. Despite the fact that the Governing Council of an enlarged
eurozone of 25 members would number more than 30, the
composition of the Governing Council can be maintained provided it
restricts its deliberations to the strategic orientation of monetary
policy, and leaves the day-to-day implementation to the six-member
Executive Board.
Reform of the ECB decision-making procedures is nevertheless
inevitable. The smaller group from the Executive Board, which works at
the centre of the system, is better placed to observe and react rapidly to
fast-moving financial market shocks. The continued presence of the
presidents of national central banks ensures that all countries feel
represented and that local information is incorporated into the decision-
making process.
Executive Summary
1.  UK entry: A more market-friendly euro area?
Adoption of the euro by the UK would imply major changes for EMU, as
a result of the relative size of the United Kingdom, the role played by
London in international financial markets and the economic and structural
features of the UK economy, which make it more similar to the US than
to the rest of the EU. The UK represents over 20% of EMU's GDP, while
the integration of all the other candidate countries, accounting for only
5% of the EU-12, will have a much smaller economic impact. With the
eventual integration of the UK into EMU, the euro area will look
different from a structural, economic and financial point of view. It would
then consist of 80% “old world” economies and 20% “new world”. This
should at least make it a bit more dynamic.
The integration of an economy with a very high stock market
capitalisation relative to GDP would mean that Euroland would on
average have a stronger equity culture. The enlarged euro area should
also become the world leader in the foreign exchange and derivatives
market with a daily turnover double that of the US market.POLICY CONCLUSIONS & EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Overall, UK entry should help improve the performance of the euro
relative to the dollar. The entry of the UK into the euro area will reduce
EMU’s vulnerability to oil price shocks, raise expectations of economic
growth in the eurozone and slightly lower the Euroland-wide inflation
rate. Analysis based on past data suggests that these developments should
strengthen the euro vis-à-vis the dollar. Capital flows between EMU and
the US will nevertheless continue to be the driving factor behind the
euro/dollar exchange rate. With the integration of the UK into EMU,
bilateral capital flows between the US and the enlarged EMU will
increase significantly and the euro/dollar exchange rate is likely to
become even more sensitive to trends in capital flows across the Atlantic.
The UK’s favourable regulatory environment significantly contributes to
its high degree of attractiveness to foreign investment. In terms of labour
and product market regulations, the UK is broadly similar to the US.
With the elimination of the exchange-rate risk, the UK is likely to attract
an even larger share of foreign investment flowing into the euro area.
This development could increase the pressure on other European
governments to introduce more incisive reforms in labour and product
markets, resulting finally in a reduction of the competitiveness gap with
the US.
Is this to say that there would be no downside? There is one, but it is not
of a strictly economic nature. We see a potential conflict over the
framework for monetary and fiscal policy-making in the euro area. This
conflict might arise from the perception in the UK that the EU framework
is too rigid in comparison to the one operating in the UK today, coupled
with the perception that the UK framework has so far produced a better
track record.
2.  How quickly should the CEECs join EMU?
Ten of the 13 candidate countries now have a virtual guarantee to become
full EU members by mid-2004. This implies that they would also become
eligible for membership in EMU. Although a large number of the
candidate countries have expressed a desire to join the euro area as
quickly as possible, adoption of the euro is conditional on their
compliance with the Maastricht convergence criteria. Among these
criteria is membership in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM
II) for at least two years. Hence, the earliest possible date for entry by the
CEECs into the euro area is 2006.
A brief comparison with the Club-Med countries (whose qualifications
for EMU were also long held in doubt) indicates that most of theTHE EURO AT 25
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candidate countries could be able to satisfy the conditions in the medium-
term and introduce the euro relatively quickly.
Many EU observers, however, especially those in financial circles, are
calling for prudence and a slower-track approach. Although it is
acknowledged that a monetary union can sustain income differences
among its members, too fast a compliance with the nominal convergence
criteria is often perceived as a threat to achieving real convergence.
Fulfilment of the fiscal criteria should not represent a problem for the
candidates and cannot be said to inhibit real convergence, but this is not
necessarily the case for the inflation criterion (if viewed together with the
exchange rate stability criterion). Due to the so-called Balassa-Samuelson
effect, the candidate countries may be faced with the dilemma of either
implementing restrictive policies to contain inflation during the
qualification period for EMU, or accept a delay in being able to adopt the
euro.
Our analysis suggests that these problems should be manageable,
provided that the criterion regarding inflation is adapted to the fact that
EMU now exists. The existing formulation of the price stability criterion
says that a candidate for EMU can have an inflation rate at most 1.5%
above the three best performing member countries. This original
formulation was understandable at the time EMU was first constituted,
but its application no longer makes sense in the context of a new member
joining a 12-or-more member EMU. The larger the number of member
countries in the EU, the higher the probability that the three best
performing member countries will have extremely low values (and they
might actually not even be a part of the euro area). Already within the
EU-15, the average of the three best performers is often one full
percentage point below the euro-area average.
The basis for calculating the maximum allowable inflation rate for a
candidate for the euro area should therefore be changed to “at most 1.5%
above the average of the euro zone”. This would allow the candidates to
enter EMU without having to artificially depress demand because the
1.5% margin roughly corresponds to our estimate of the Balassa-
Samuelson.
In addition, membership in the ERM II might force some candidate
countries into a vulnerable exchange rate regime, combining capital
mobility and “fixed but adjustable” exchange rates. Currency boards
should be officially recognised as full equivalents of ERM membership.
The EU could also reassess its position towards unilateral euroisation,POLICY CONCLUSIONS & EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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which has to date been extremely negative, to help eliminate some of the
risks associated with the traditional path à la Maastricht to the euro area.
3. The euro area at 25: How will ECB decision-making work?
Euro-area membership might soon expand considerably once the ten
countries that are scheduled to join the EU by 2004 qualify for the euro.
Under current rules this would imply that the highest decision-making
organ of the Eurosystem, the Governing Council, could soon have close
to 30 members – far more than any other central bank and possibly far
too many to conduct an efficient monetary policy.
Any proposal to make monetary policy decision-making more efficient in
an enlarged euro area encounters the immediate challenge of ensuring
representation for all member states, which in the ECB statutes is clearly
defined as “one member-one vote” (EU 1992, Article 10.2). This report
argues that a trade-off between efficiency and representation does not
necessarily have to be made. The solution would not be to change the
composition of the Governing Council (which could thus continue to
include the presidents from all national central banks) but to confine that
body’s remit to formulating the strategic orientation of monetary policy.
In that case, the full Governing Council would need to meet less
frequently, i.e. at most once a quarter, leaving the day-to-day
implementation to the six-member Executive Board. The members of the
latter body are better placed at the centre of the system to observe and
react rapidly to financial market shocks, whereas the presidents of
national central banks are better placed to evaluate the state of the real
economy. Hence the proposed solution, while ensuring representation, is
also the most efficient.
Unfortunately other solutions, such as rotation, are being advanced in
some circles as the appropriate response to the challenges posed by
enlargement. Provided all countries rotate equally, rotation could create a
situation where some large countries do not have a governor of their
central bank in the Governing Council. Given that the largest countries
account each for about 25-35% of the euro-12 economy, such a situation
would be awkward. How would a controversial decision of the Governing
Council be justified if it had been taken without the participation of
someone who, while not a representative of the country in question,
would at least be the best qualified to judge the state of this large part of
the euro area? Differentiated rotation, i.e. rotational schemes that
distinguish between large and small countries, might avoid this problem,
but would encourage governors of national central banks to consider
themselves as representatives and defenders of national interests.1
CHAPTER 1
THE IMPACT ON THE EUROLAND ECONOMY
OF THE UK'S ENTRY INTO EMU
1.  Introduction
Almost four years since the launch of the euro in January 1999, EMU
might experience its first enlargement to the West. Should the UK
government decide to go ahead with EMU entry – after a positive
assessment of the five economic “tests” set out by the UK Treasury in
1997 – a referendum is likely to be held in the fall of 2003.
The eventual entry of the UK into EMU will have an impact on the
structural, financial and policy features of the recently created monetary
union. Together with France, Germany and Italy, the UK is one of the
largest European economies (in 2001, the UK’s GDP accounted for about
23% of Euroland’s total gross domestic product). London is one of the
most important financial centres in the world and by far the most
developed in Europe, and the UK is actively taking part as an EU
member in the reform of the regulatory framework of European financial
markets.
The UK has experienced nine years of sustained non-inflationary growth,
the longest such expansion in more than 30 years. In 2001, despite a
deceleration of output following the global slowdown, the UK grew at a
faster rate than any other G-7 economy. In 2002, according to recent
forecasts by the EU, the UK is expected to outperform Euroland. A
strong policy framework, sound macroeconomic policies and sustained
structural reforms were the keys to this remarkable performance. The UK
resembles the American model in terms of financial structure and labour
and product market regulations to such an extent that economists often
refer to the “Anglo-Saxon” model to describe the British and American
model of capitalism as opposed to the “continental” model of capitalism.
With the eventual integration of the UK into EMU, the euro area will
therefore look different from a structural, economic and financial point of
view.
Current policy debate in the UK mainly focuses on the assessment of the
convergence of the UK’s business cycle with the business cycle in
Euroland and the “correct” exchange rate at which the UK should enter
EMU in order not to harm the British manufacturing sector. According toTHE EURO AT 25
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the most recent evidence (UBS, 2002), the convergence between the UK
economy and the other major euro area economies has increased since the
latest Treasury assessment in 1997, but it is still questionable whether the
UK could live comfortably with the euro interest rate on a permanent
basis.
This paper adopts a different approach. It investigates the likely effect of
the eventual entry of the UK into EMU on different features of the
Euroland economy. In particular, it focuses on four key issues: Euroland
financial markets, structural characteristics of the euro area, economic
policy implications and the consequences for the euro-dollar exchange
rate.
The chapter is organised along the following lines. Section 2 analyses
how the integration of the UK’s financial sector will impact Euroland
financial markets. Euroland financial markets have developed rapidly
since the launch of the new currency, and the integration of London into
EMU is going to produce several effects, including a significant increase
in depth and liquidity. In section 3, we investigate the extent to which the
UK differs from the euro area in terms of structural features and the likely
impact on the euro area. The UK integration could in fact be perceived as
a further step in the evolution of the European economy towards the
“American” economic model. Section 4 looks at the macroeconomic
effects of the eventual entry of the UK into EMU. In particular, we focus
on the implications for the transmission of monetary policy within
Euroland and the recent debate on the reform of the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP). Some have suggested in fact that the UK model should be
adopted in order to make the SGP less rigid and more oriented towards
economic growth. Finally, in section 5 we examine the potential effects
of the sterling entry into EMU on the euro/dollar exchange rate. In the
final section, we draw some conclusions.
2.  The impact of the UK's entry on Euroland financial markets: A
further boost
In the context of the major structural and policy changes occurring in
European financial markets, the eventual integration of the UK into EMU
will produce several effects. First of all, given the size and importance of
the City of London in world financial markets, euro area financial
markets will receive a further boost after the positive effects already
produced by the introduction of the euro. The international role of the
euro is also likely to be positively affected by the UK's entry. Secondly, it
will have an impact on the on-going reform process of EU financial
markets due to the stronger influence that the UK – once a member ofTHE IMPACT OF THE UK’S ENTRY INTO EMU
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EMU – will be able to exercise on other member countries. Finally, it is
likely to produce some portfolio effects similar to those produced when
the euro replaced the legacy currencies from the Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) in 1999. Before discussing these different effects in
detail, we briefly review the main changes that have occurred in Euroland
financial markets since the introduction of the euro in January 1999.
2.1 Developments in Euroland financial markets since the
introduction of the euro
In less than four years since the introduction of the euro, the effects on
European financial markets are already notable. The elimination of
exchange rate risk and the setting up of a common monetary policy
framework acted as a catalyst to trigger certain trends in European
financial markets, such as the gradual move of on-balance-sheet
financing into capital and risk markets, the increasing corporate focus on
managing the cost of capital and hedging the risks inherent in business
activities and the marked phenomenon in which wealth accumulation is
driving institutional assets.
To date, the impact of the euro on financial markets can be summarised
as follows:
•  The euro established itself as the second most important currency in
international financial markets. This is not surprising given the
relative weight of the aggregated euro area in economic and financial
terms. The euro has been more successful as a currency of
international finance (evidenced by an increase in the issuance of
euro-denominated international bonds) than of investment as
suggested by the cautious attitude of investors and asset managers
towards assets denominated in the newly created currency. To date,
the dominant position of the US dollar as the most important vehicle
international currency has not been affected by the introduction of the
new currency.
•  As a result of the elimination of intra-EMS foreign exchange trading,
the global FX market turnover decreased by nearly 20% between
1998 and 2001. In April 2001, the euro entered on one side of 38% of
global FX transactions. The dominant position of the US dollar as a
vehicle currency remains unchanged. Fears of a decrease in the
liquidity of FX markets following the introduction of the euro proved
to be unfounded, also because the effect of eliminating intra-EMS FX
trade has been compensated for by technological changes and
business concentration.THE EURO AT 25
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•  An integrated money market emerged almost immediately after the
introduction of the single currency. The fast development of an
effective euro money market provides evidence of the importance of
the existence of a unique clearing and settlement infrastructure such
as the TARGET system (Trans-European Automated  Real-Time
Gross Settlement Express Transfer).
•  Corporations have been able to raise capital in the bonds and equity
markets at a level well above the pre-EMU period. This conclusion is
supported by the strong growth of the corporate debt market and the
gradual increase in the number of companies listed on European
stock exchanges. Bank loans nevertheless still play the major role in
the financing of European corporations. According to estimations by
Morgan Stanley, in 2001 the percentage of large European corporate
borrowing mix covered through bonds was 29%, as opposed to 43%
and 52% in the UK and US, respectively.
•  The introduction of the euro supported the growth of the global
European derivative market which in 1998-2001 grew in the euro
area more than any other market in the world. The euro led to the
creation of a large and liquid market in the interest rate segment of
the derivative market. The euro-denominated swap curve has become
the new benchmark for European fixed income markets.
•  Investors and asset managers have taken a pan-European perspective
by reallocating funds on a sector basis rather than on a country basis.
The share of mutual funds with a pan-European perspective has been
constantly growing in the last few years (from about 10% in 1997 to
around 30% by the end of 2001 according to estimates by the ECB).
In sum, the introduction of the euro has decreased the home bias of
European equity investors in search of diversification once the intra-
ERM exchange risk disappeared in January 1999.
The physical introduction of the euro has also made the legislative and
regulatory barriers to financial integration in Euroland more visible. This
has raised the stakes of the reform of the European regulatory framework
currently under way at European level (the so-called Financial Sector
Action Plan or FSAP). Market segments where the existing infrastructure
was more flexible or more harmonised gained liquidity and depth very
quickly. And conversely, those market segments that rely on structures
characterised by strong national idiosyncrasies have not experienced the
same transformation. The main gaps we identified are the following:
•  The development of a pan-European collateral money market has
been hampered by different national legal and taxation frameworksTHE IMPACT OF THE UK’S ENTRY INTO EMU
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and diverging market practices. This represents a serious impediment
to the growth of a market that plays a key role in the United States in
funding the operations of corporations and favours a switch from
bank loans as the major source of financing of corporations’
operational capital.
•  The European government remains segmented. The liquidity
premium is still large, which limits this market’s capacity to perform
traditional functions, such as acting as a benchmark for pricing other
fixed income securities, and its usefulness for hedging interest rate
risk.
•  The fragmented infrastructure for cross-border clearing and
settlement of securities transactions makes direct and indirect costs of
cross-border transactions more expensive in Europe than in the US.
This particularly affects the equity market where transactions are
mainly carried out through organised exchanges rather than over-the-
counter.
2.2 The impact of the UK's entry into EMU on the international role
of the euro
By the end of 2001, sterling denominated international debt securities
(bonds, note and money market instruments) represented about 7.5% of
the total amount outstanding (Figure 1.1). Since the launch of the euro in
January 1999, there has been a gradual though relatively small decrease
in the issuance of sterling-denominated debt. This decrease might reflect
interest differentials between major economies and exchange rate
fluctuations. However, it might also reflect the competition exercised by
the euro versus the sterling in international financial markets. In fact, the
share of euro-denominated international debt issuance has been gradually
growing since 1998 and it is now almost comparable to the share of
dollar-denominated debt issuance in international markets.
Should the UK enter EMU, the euro would challenge the dollar as the
leading world currency in the international debt market. Based on June
2002 data, the announced issuance of international debt by euro area
residents (including the UK) would increase to over 45% of world total
and would surpass the share denominated in US dollars. According to a
more refined measure of the international role of a currency, i.e. the so-
called narrow measure (Detken and Hartman, 2000), the US dollar would
remain the dominant world currency with a share of total world
announced issued above 50%.THE EURO AT 25
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Figure 1.1 Sterling- and euro-denominated debt securities as a % of
world total
The currency share of international debt issuance is a good indicator of
the so-called finance role of an international currency, i.e. the extent to
which a currency is used by institutions to finance themselves. As
mentioned above, while the euro has been relatively successful as a
financing currency, its first few years of existence as an international
investing currency have been less so. The investing role of a currency
measures the appeal of its assets denominated in that currency to
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investors. It is therefore interesting to see what effect the entry of the UK
into EMU would have on the investing role of the euro. This issue is
particularly interesting in light of the argument advanced by some (Galati
and Tsatsaronis, 2002) that the weakness on the euro vis-à-vis the dollar
during 1999-2001 was also due to the  the discrepancy between the
popularity of the euro as a financing currency (which increases the supply
of euro-denominated assets) and its “unpopularity” as an investing
currency (which decreases the demand for euro-denominated assets).
One way to measure the investing role of a currency is by analysing how
international investors allocate capital between different currency areas.
A good source of information is the poll carried out by The Economist
among international asset managers about their bond and equity
investments by currency areas. Once can see quite clearly in Figure 1.2
that before the introduction of the euro, international investors shifted
funds from the US dollar and sterling areas versus euro-area bonds and
equities based on the optimistic expectations about the new currency and
its potential effects on the euro-area’s growth prospects. But the attraction
of the euro as an investing currency was short-lived and vanished very
quickly during 1999 (though the average share of euro-denominated
assets remained above the pre-changeover period). Since the second
quarter of 1999, fund allocation in euro-denominated assets has
constantly been under-weighted in comparison to its so-called neutral
position (which reflects the share of euro-denominated bonds/equities in
total bonds issued or listed shares).
On average, in the last four years sterling-denominated assets attracted
about 4% of total world fund allocations into bonds and over 9% of world
allocations into equities. One relevant difference between the UK and the
euro area is that the former is relatively more attractive for international
investors than the latter, according to its weight in world financial
markets. As a result, considering the June 2002 figures (and assuming
that following the integration of the UK into EMU the allocation of assets
in the other currency areas remain unchanged
1), the euro-area share of
international capital allocation would rise by 5% in the fixed-income
segment of the market. The effect would be much stronger in the equity
market given the high stock capitalisation of the UK: the euro share
would increase by more than 10%.
                                                                
1 Of course, this is a gross simplification. International asset investors would re-
allocate their portfolio following the integration of the UK into EMU as a result
of their search for diversification.THE EURO AT 25
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Figure 1.2 Bond and equity holdings by currency of denomination
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A final remark concerns the effects of the eventual entry of the UK into
EMU on the currency breakdown of currency reserves held by central
banks around the world. This indicator is often used to measure the
official international use of a currency. According to the IMF, the euro
was the second-most important world reserve currency in 2001 with a
share of just over 13%, well behind the US dollar (which had a share of
68%). According to the Washington-based institution, since 1999 the role
of the euro in official reserves remained almost unchanged and is now
comparable to the role played by the Deutsche mark, thereby supporting
the prevailing view among central bankers in the run-up to EMU that no
major changes in the composition of official reserves would occur in the
short term. The integration of the UK into EMU would raise the euro
share by a percentage that is quantifiable at about 4%, i.e. the 2001 share
of official reserves denominated in the British currency.
2.3 The impact of the UK’s entry into EMU on Euroland financial
markets
The City of London is the financial centre of Europe. When the euro was
launched in January 1999, it looked peculiar at the least that the leading
financial centre of an economic power such as the EU lay outside the
euro area. London has more foreign bank branches, subsidiaries and
representative offices than any other European financial centre (408 in
September 2001, as opposed to 266 in Paris and 276 in Frankfurt based
on estimations by the Bank of England). Cross-border interbank lending
represents more than 30% of total assets as opposed to less than 7% in the
major continental European countries. UK banks’ business with non-
residents is denominated 27% in euro, 42% in dollars, 16% in sterling
and 15% in other currencies.
London's market share of underwritten euro-denominated Eurobond
issuance in 2001 was over 60% and the share of secondary trading in the
Eurobond market is around 70%, according to International Financial
Services. In other words, a European company issuing debt in the
Eurobond market is likely to use a financial institution based in London
in almost two cases out of three. In more than two cases out of three, a
transaction in the Eurobond market is likely to be carried out by a trader
sitting in a financial institution based in London.
By the end of 2001, the total market capitalisation of the London Stock
Exchange was $2,176 billion, more than 50% of the market capitalisation
of all stock markets in EMU countries. More foreign companies are
currently listed on the LSE than any other exchange (464 by the end of
2001). In 2001, over 40% of equity trades reported to the LSE wereTHE EURO AT 25
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reported in euro and over 52% of global foreign equity turnover is
currently reported to the LSE.
Table 1.1 Selected financial market indicators: EMU, the UK and the US
(end 2001)
EMU UK EMU+UK US
1. Money aggregates
M3 (seasonally adjusted), $ bn 4801.3 1481.5 6282.8 8027.5
M3, % of GDP 79.7 103.3 85.3 79.6
2. Bond market
Domestic (Public Sector), amount
outstanding, $ bn
3185 411 3596 8519
Domestic (Financial Sector), amount
outstanding, $ bn
1680 289 1969 4336
Domestic (Corporate Sector), amount
outstanding, $ bn
358 220 578 2434
Domestic (All issuers), amount
outstanding, $ bn
5223 921 6144 15289
International, announced issues $ bn 335.3 102.6 437.9 208.1
International, amount outstanding, $ bn 2303.1 756.8 3059.9 2394.3
3. Equity market
No of listed companies 6,131 2,891 9,022 7323
Stock capitalisation, $ bn 4297 2176 6473 13766
Stock capitalisation, % of GDP 72.0 154.0 89.0 146.0
Value of share trading, $ bn 8669 4550 13219 22964
4. Foreign exchange
FX average daily turnover, $ bn 252 504 754 254
FX average daily turnover, % of world
total
15.6 31.1 46.7 15.7
5. Derivatives market
FX derivatives, average daily turnover, $
bn
179.4 390.3 569.7 169.1
FX derivatives, average daily turnover, %
of world total
15.1 32.9 48.0 14.2
Interest rate derivatives, average daily
turnover, $ bn
256.6 237.8 494.4 115.7
Interest rate derivatives, average daily
turnover, $ bn
37.9 35.1 73.0 17.1
6. Mutual fund industry
Investment funds, $ trillion 3522 332 3854 7024
Investment funds, % of world total 23.0 2.9 25.9 49.3
Sources: FEFSI, BIS, International Federation of Stock Exchanges and IMF.THE IMPACT OF THE UK’S ENTRY INTO EMU
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The City of London dominates the world's foreign exchange business
with nearly one-third of the global market. In the last few years, London
has lost its dominant position in the derivatives market both in exchange-
traded derivatives ( Eurex, the derivatives exchange run by Deutsche
Börse and Soffex currently dominate the European derivative market) and
in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. But the volume of business in the
derivatives market is still very large in comparison to the whole EMU.
Should the UK join EMU, Euroland financial markets would therefore
grow significantly in size. As far as the domestic bond markets are
concerned, the re-denomination of outstanding sterling-denominated
public and private bonds would increase the euro area bond market by
more than 15%. In particular, the euro domestic corporate bond market
would increase by more than 60%, because of the higher exposure of the
UK corporations to capital markets, thus further feeding the growing
trend away from banking towards capital market financing that started in
the second half of the 1990s with the launch of the euro. The US
corporate domestic market, however, would still remain by far the largest
domestic corporate bond market in the world – four times the size of the
corporate debt market in an enlarged EMU.
In the last quarter of 2001, euro-area residents were the largest issuers of
international debt – well above the UK and US. The integration of the
UK into EMU would further boost the dominance of euro-area residents
with an issuance more than double that of US residents. The stock of debt
issued by euro-area residents – as a result of the UK's entry – would
become larger than that issued by US residents.
The financial market segment where the UK's entry would have the
largest impact is the equity market. The number of (domestic and foreign)
companies listed would surpass the number of companies listed in the
New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ and the euro-area stock
capitalisation would increase by more than 50%. It would still, however,
be only just less than half the stock capitalisation of the US, where most
of the world’s largest listed corporations are located. In the foreign
exchange and derivatives market, the enlarged euro area would become
world leader with a share of the world market oscillating between 47%
and 73%, depending on which segment of the derivative market is
considered. The integration of the UK into EMU will therefore reinforce
the equity culture in continental Europe after the positive developments
already experienced during the second half of the 1990s.THE EURO AT 25
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2.4 Policy effects
One of the main features of the changes occurring in European financial
markets since the introduction of the euro is that markets that were less
fragmented at a national level have grown faster than those markets that
continue to rely on structures still characterised by strong national
idiosyncrasies. The regulatory, legal and taxation factors hampering
further financial integration in Europe are clearly identified and addressed
in the Financial Service Action Plan (FSAP). The Lamfalussy Committee
was created in 2000 to assess how the mechanisms for regulating
securities markets in the European Union could be speeded up in order to
respond in a timely manner to on-going developments in the European
financial markets. In February 2001, the Committee presented its report
highlighting that the current system is unable to respond adequately to the
challenges posed by rapidly changing financial markets.
According to the plan, the regulations concerning the securities market
within the European Union should be fulfilled by the end of 2003 and the
whole FSAP should be finalised by the end of 2005. Since the FSAP
came into effect, the Commission has remained within its self-set
timeframe in more than 90% of the cases.
2 In general, however, the
process of implementation of proposed legislative measures for financial
services is very slow – with an average period between the adoption of
the proposal by the Commission and its transposition into national law of
about three years. Recently, several officials from the ECB have drawn
attention to the lack of significant further progress in the integration of
euro-area financial markets after the initial positive developments in
1999-2000.
The eventual integration of the UK into EMU is likely to have an effect
on the on-going policy debate and the speed of the reform process. It is
true that the decision-making process about the reform of the European
financial markets regulatory framework takes places at EU-15 level and
the UK is already a very active participant in this debate. Britain's
                                                                
2 In the past 12 months alone, the EU has agreed on a common European
standard for disposing of collateral in the event of bankruptcy, defined the
boundary between legal stock market trades and illegal insider trades, agreed to
adopt a pan-European accounting standard by 2005, set rules for selling mutual
funds across borders and for the fund to invest across borders, and began taking
steps to allow pensions earned in one country to be paid out in another.
Nevertheless, delays have occurred at the level of the EU Council and the
European Parliament. A case in point is the takeover code, a bill that would have
set pan-European rules for corporate defences against hostile takeovers. After 12
months of negotiations, the European Commission withdrew the bill.THE IMPACT OF THE UK’S ENTRY INTO EMU
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decision to remain outside the Economic and Monetary Union however
does not add to its negotiating power,
3 but should it decide to join EMU
its influence within the EU is likely to grow.
The UK's competitive advantage in financial services is likely to remain
intact should the UK decide to join EMU. Actually, one might argue that
the outsider status of the UK is currently functioning as a source of
weakness in the ability of the British financial sector to attract euro-
denominated business (but there is no firm evidence supporting this
argument). Should its outsider status disappear, the UK's competitive
advantage is likely to attract additional business from minor financial
centres across the euro area and thus further reinforce the position of the
euro area in world financial markets. Once Euroland contains a global
financial centre like London, the reform of the euro-area financial market
regulation framework will become even more urgent.
2.5 Portfolio shift effects
The switch from the European legacy currencies to euro assets has not
been one-for-one because securities that were considered previously
foreign assets (because denominated in other European legacy currencies)
became domestic after 1998. In order to maintain the same allocation
between domestic and foreign assets, demand for assets denominated in
other currencies (including the dollar) increased. The effect might have
partly caused the depreciation of the euro vis-à-vis the other currencies.
Portfolio shift effects should be considered when one takes into account
the potential effects of the UK’s entry into EMU. All sterling-
denominated assets will be converted into euro, thus increasing the share
of domestic assets versus foreign assets in the funds. UK fund managers
will have to shift part of their funds into non-euro-denominated assets
thus depressing the price of euro-denominated assets. Considering the
already scarce appeal of euro-denominated assets to foreign investors and
given the relatively large size of sterling-denominated assets in total
world assets, there might be a negative effect on the euro/dollar exchange
rate.
                                                                
3 The resolution of existing conflicts within the FSAP mentioned above is also
very likely to be the result of a political compromise that might well take place
within the euro group where the UK (together with Denmark and Sweden) are
not represented. This is based on the argument that there is much greater growth
of cross-border financial transactions in the euro area than in the EU-15 area.THE EURO AT 25
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3.  Structural factors: Will the UK's entry facilitate labour and
product market deregulation across continental Europe?
In general, the UK (together with a handful of other EU members)
supports a less regulated and more market-oriented economic model
when compared to countries like Germany and France. Indeed, one of the
major arguments against joining EMU is the avoidance of excessive EU
regulation and the maintenance of a competitive advantage towards
continental Europe. According to the opponents of EMU, the UK’s
outsider status therefore represents a shield against continental Europe’s
dirigistic model of capitalism.
From this point of view,  Britain's current outsider status weakens the
liberal, market-oriented coalition in the EU at the expense of the dirigiste
front. The UK's self-imposed exclusion from EMU diminishes the
chances that EMU will work as a wedge for structural reforms that are
badly needed to take full advantage of the recently introduced common
currency.
Figure 1.3 Labour market regulation indicators
Structural rigidities in  Euroland's labour markets include working time
regulation, regulation of time-limited contracts, employment protection
legislation and minimum wage regulations. In Figure 1.3, we present an
indicator that focuses on only one of those aspects, employment
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protection legislation. This is an indicator for regulations on regular and
temporary contracts. The English-speaking countries (the UK, the US and
Ireland, plus Canada, New Zealand and Australia) are on one end of the
spectrum with relatively lax employment protection legislation systems.
On the other end we find EMU's Mediterranean countries (Spain, Italy,
Greece and Portugal). EMU's continental countries (Germany, France,
Belgium and the Netherlands) have an intermediate level of stringency in
their employment protection legislation system but still much higher than
in the US and the UK.
According to this indicator, EMU as whole has an employment protection
legislation system that is two times more stringent than that of the
English-speaking countries. The gap between the US and the UK and the
EMU countries reduced slightly during the 1990s but in 1998 – just
before the launch of the new currency – it was still significant. The
flexibility of the UK labour market is often referred to as one of the key
structural factors behind the relatively better economic performance of
this country (i.e. a higher sustainable growth rate) in the last few years.
Figure 1.4 Product market regulation indicator
Within EMU, liberalisation of product markets has been slow and uneven
among member countries. Many European governments are unwilling to
allow market forces to operate unfettered. European firms are slower than
US firm in embracing new information technologies, which have boosted
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US productivity in the last few years. Rigidities in the Euroland product
markets are clearly reflected in the product market regulation indicator
presented in Figure 1.4. This indicator is calculated by the OECD and it is
a synthetic indicator taking into account key features of product market
regulation, such as state control, barriers to entrepreneurship, barriers to
trade and investment, economic regulation and administrative regulation.
The picture that emerges from the comparison between the US and the
UK on the one side and EMU countries on the other is very similar to the
earlier portrayal of employment protection regulation. The UK, Ireland
and the US have very low scores reflecting low state control and few
barriers to entrepreneurship (the US score for barriers to entrepreneurship
is relatively higher due to some complexities in administrative procedures
and anti-trust exemptions when compared to the UK).
Among the largest EMU countries, France and Italy are those showing
the highest score in product market regulation. Italy's score is the highest
because it has both the highest state control and the highest level of
barriers to entrepreneurship. Despite large privatisations in the last few
years, state-controlled enterprises are still numerous and recourse to
“command and control” regulations and price controls in competitive
industries is still frequent relative to other countries. France has high
barriers to entrepreneurship caused by the complexity of administrative
procedures and heavy administrative burdens on business start-ups.
There is no doubt that in the last few years progress has been made at
European and national level to make the European labour and product
markets less regulated and more flexible. Nevertheless, there is the
perception that many reforms are marginal and piecemeal, aimed
primarily at removing some structural rigidities without adopting
comprehensive and broad reforms. From this point of view, it is very
likely that the perception of a never-ending “eurosclerosis” has not been
significantly affected by the recent reforms in the labour and product
markets. This explains why the current competitive position of several
EMU countries is still low and why the most innovative companies tend
to concentrate in the US and other regions of the world rather than in
continental Europe.
The entry of the UK into Euroland might be perceived as a reinforcement
of European policies aimed at deregulating labour and product markets
with a positive impact on the growth prospects of the area. One should
also take into account the competition forces that will come into play.
Should the UK join EMU without incurring an exchange-risk, it is very
likely to attract more foreign investments from companies searching for a
foothold in Euroland markets. According to the latest data on FDI fromTHE IMPACT OF THE UK’S ENTRY INTO EMU
17
UNCTAD, non-EMU European countries have lost ground in terms of
FDI inflows since the launch of the euro. Between 1998 and 2001, FDI
inflows increased in the euro area as a whole whereas they decreased in
Sweden, Denmark and England. This might be due to the uncertainty
surrounding the entry of the UK and the other two Northern European
countries into EMU and the level of the sterling-euro exchange rate.
Should this uncertainty disappear as a result of a positive decision by the
UK to participate in EMU, the growing trend might start again even
stronger than before considering the more favourable British labour and
product market regulations. This might put further pressure on European
governments to carry out broader and more incisive reforms in their
labour and product markets.
4.  Economic policy implications of the UK's entry into EMU
Much of the current debate about the eventual entry of the UK into EMU
(from the UK’s point of view) focuses on the potential impact on the UK
economy. This is not surprising given the approach of June 2003, when
the five tests set out by the UK Treasury as the basis for deciding whether
to join EMU will be re-assessed. See the box below.
Box 1.1 Five economic tests for UK entry
1. Are business cycles and economic structures compatible so that we and others
could live comfortably with euro interest rates on a permanent basis?
2. If problems emerge, is there sufficient flexibility to deal with them?
3. Would joining EMU create better conditions for firms making long-term
decisions to invest in Britain?
4. What impact would entry into EMU have on the competitive position of the
UK's financial services industry, particularly the City's wholesale market?
5. In summary, will joining EMU promote higher growth, stability and a lasting
increase in jobs?
Source: UK Treasury.
UBS has recently carried out a comprehensive assessment of the five tests
in question (UBS, 2002). In summary, the conclusions are that the level
of convergence between the UK economy and the other major euro-area
economies has increased since the time of the Treasury's 1997
assessment. The timing of the UK cycle has moved more closely into line
with that of continental Europe, whilst also remaining closely alignedTHE EURO AT 25
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with the US. The UK labour market is exhibiting clear signs of flexibility
and the differential between UK interest rates and those in EMU has
fallen substantially. However, the level of demand pressure appears to be
higher in the UK than in EMU and it is questionable whether the UK
could live comfortably with the euro interest rates on a permanent basis.
The current debate in the UK is also unsurprising when one considers the
economic performance of the UK in comparison to continental Europe.
As noted in the introduction, the UK has experienced nine years of
sustained non-inflationary growth, during which time output growth has
averaged almost 3% a year. Unemployment halved during the 1990s and
inflation is currently 2% below the EMU average.
There are three keys to the remarkable performance of the UK:
•  The decrease in overall public balance from a deficit of around 5% of
GDP at the time of sterling devaluation in the beginning of the 1990s
to a surplus of over 1% in 2001 and the adoption of a medium-term-
oriented fiscal framework have helped to boost confidence.
•  The strengthening of the inflation-targeting framework when the
Bank of England was granted operational independence and a
symmetric 2.5% inflation target.
•  And last but not least, the labour market and welfare reforms carried
out since the 1980s which favoured employment growth and a non-
inflationary fall in the unemployment rate.
From the euro area’s point of view, the eventual entry of the UK into
EMU will therefore represent the integration of a country with a higher
growth potential and an apparently more effective fiscal and monetary
policy framework. It is not surprising that in the current debate about the
appropriateness of the euro-area economic policy framework the UK's
“economic policy model” is often referred to as one of the possible
options. In particular, the adoption of a fiscal rule similar to that currently
in force in the UK – the so-called golden rule – is often mentioned as a
possible alternative to the SGP. This issue is discussed in section 4.1
below.
The eventual integration of the UK into EMU will also represent a first
test for the monetary policy framework currently implemented by the
ECB. The UK has some particular economic and financial features that
produce a monetary transmission mechanism somewhat different from
the rest of Europe. This second issue is briefly discussed in the final part
of this section (section 4.2).THE IMPACT OF THE UK’S ENTRY INTO EMU
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4.1 Is the UK-style “golden rule” a valid alternative to the SGP?
The frustrations behind the recent debate on the “stupidity” of the
Stability Pact are well captured by Figure 1.5 which describes the relative
stance of real short-term interest rates and structural deficits in EMU, the
US and the UK throughout the period 1999-2003.
4 The euro area as a
whole was running a structural deficit in 1999-2001, whereas the US and
the UK were running surplus or almost balanced positions during the
same period. In 2001, as a result of tax cuts in some euro-area member
countries, the EMU structural deficit widened marginally. Through 2002
and – according to the IMF’s estimates – into 2003, the policy stance in
the US and the UK has been loosened and will stay loose as a result of a
sizeable reduction in the interest rate and a shift in the structural budget
balance. By contrast, the policy stance in the euro area has been tightened
in 2002 and is expected to remain tight in 2003 mainly as a result of the
constraints imposed by the SGP on the European countries that have
already breached (Germany and Portugal) or are very likely (France and
Italy) to breach the 3% upper limit.
Given the current weakness in the global economy, many would argue
that it is indeed “stupid” if not dangerous from a macroeconomic point of
view to force countries to cut public spending or to raise taxes. Would it
not make sense for the euro area as a whole if Germany were to adopt a
loose fiscal stance (thus going well through the 3% upper limit) rather
than cutting spending or increasing taxes as proposed by the recently
appointed new government? Most economists would probably answer in
the affirmative considering the relatively low debt-to-GDP ratio in
Germany and the current level of interest rates in the euro area. Germany
might loosen fiscal policy to support its economy and the whole euro area
in the current global economic environment and later – once the world
economy is back on its sustainable growth path – go back to its original
stability programme aiming at a balanced budget in the medium term.
Do the current economic and fiscal circumstances prove that the SGP is
flawed and therefore needs to be revised? The SGP consists of two parts:
a) budget deficits cannot be larger than 3% of GDP (except under
exceptional circumstances) and b) each country should aim for a
medium-term objective of a budgetary position “close to balance or in
surplus”. In practice, the two rules together require that each member to
choose a budgetary target in cyclically adjusted terms and let automatic
stabilisers or discretionary actions operate. An obvious implication of the
                                                                
4 The 2003 estimates are from the latest IMF World Economic Outlook.THE EURO AT 25
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two rules is that the lower the structural budget target (with respect to the
3% limit), the wider the margins for counter cyclical policy.
Figure 1.5 Policy Mix in EMU, the US and the UK
The nature of the problem currently faced by the largest European
countries can only be correctly understood when one considers the two
rules together. During 1998-2002, Germany, France and Italy have not
fulfilled the second rule by leaving the process of fiscal consolidation
started in the first half of the 1990s unfinished. As a consequence, in the
current economic circumstances they risk going over the 3% limit and
they cannot rely on discretionary fiscal policy. The nature of the problem
is well described in Figure 1.6. Throughout the 1990s, the US and the UK
moved from significant deficits to surplus and by 2001, they were
capable of using discretionary fiscal policy to counterbalance the global
economic slowdown. Within the euro area, the largest countries have not
lived up to the rules. In 2001, their structural deficits were more or less
similar to those that existing before the launch of the new currency. By
contrast, the smallest EMU countries (expect for Portugal) have
continued their consolidation throughout 1998-2001 and they now would
have room for discretionary fiscal policy actions to support a weak
economy. Had Germany, Italy and France completed the structural fiscal
consolidation, the current debate on the need for reform of the SGP
would not need to take place.
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Figure 1.6 General government structural balances (% of GDP)
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In the current circumstances, one of the alternatives put forward by
economists is the golden rule of public finances, according to which
public expenditure excluding investments should not exceed revenues
over the economic cycle. The UK adopted the golden rule in 1997 when
the Code for Fiscal Stability was introduced by the new government to
counteract the bias against capital expenditure of the previous system. It
should be pointed out, however, that the golden rule is only one of the
two fiscal rules currently followed by the UK government. The second
rule is the so-called sustainable investment rule, according to which net
debt as a proportion to GDP will be held stable over the business cycle at
a prudent level (currently 40% of GDP). The rationale of the combination
of these two rules is, on one hand, to avoid crowding out investments by
increases in current expenditure or declines in tax revenues and, on the
other, to ensure sound public finances over the longer term.
The UK is living comfortably with the golden rule because of its low
debt-to-GDP ratio (currently around 32%) and in fact the sustainable
investment rule is currently not binding. In the context of EMU, the
golden rule would be an obstacle to both deficit and debt reduction.
Given the ratio of public investment as a percentage of GDP, the long-run
equilibrium level of government debt could be very high, especially in an
environment of low inflation. In the high-debt countries, there would be a
very slow pace of debt re-absorption whereas in the low-debt countries,
the debt ratio would rise. In addition, the application of the golden rule
would also create perverse effects because countries would have an
incentive to classify current expenditure as capital spending and would
make the multilateral surveillance process more complex.
The introduction of a predetermined limit for annual deficits in a
framework based on the targeting of a balanced budget over the cycle is
motivated by moral hazard issues. One of the main features of EMU is
that while there is a single currency and a single monetary authority, the
fiscal policy is decentralised so that individual member countries can
free-ride in terms of excessive indebtedness. When moral hazard issues
are important, credibility becomes a major factor. Should some countries
be allowed to diverge from the SGP, the credibility of the Pact would be
seriously damaged and would increase the likelihood of opportunistic
behaviour by individual countries.
The UK experience shows that its recent economic success does not
depend on the adoption of a fiscal framework based on the golden rule,
but rather on the consolidation of its fiscal deficit and the implementation
of structural reforms in labour and product markets. The main lesson to
be learnt from the UK experience is that in the current environment theTHE IMPACT OF THE UK’S ENTRY INTO EMU
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lifting of the SGP – even temporarily – would decrease the pressure on
the largest European countries to continue their efforts in fiscal
consolidation and to introduce more radical structural reforms. That is
why we recommend the maintenance of the current rules.
4.2 Transmission in monetary policy in an enlarged EMU
Asymmetries in the transmission of monetary policy depend on
differences in the industrial structure (share of manufacturing in GDP), in
the financing mix of private firms – ratio of bank loans to total liabilities
– and in the balance sheet of households – share of mortgage loan
payments out of total payments (Mihov, 2001).
The share of manufacturing in GDP is positively correlated with the
magnitude of the output response to monetary policy innovations. This is
due to the fact that the manufacturing sector produces durable goods
which are more sensitive to interest rate changes. Compared to France,
Italy and Germany, the United Kingdom has a lower share of
manufacturing in GDP. From this point of view, in the UK higher interest
rates should be required to close the gap between current and trend
output. The opposite is true in Germany which has the highest response to
monetary policy change given the higher share of manufacturing in GDP.
In the previous section we highlighted the major differences in capital
markets between the UK and some EMU countries. In particular, we
noted that the financial system of countries such as France and Germany
is centred around banks whereas in the Anglo-Saxon model firms have
access to alternative sources of financing in capital markets. A higher
dependence of continental firms on bank credit implies that monetary
policy will have a large impact via interest rates ( Dornbush, Favero and
Giavazzi, 1998). Therefore, a change in monetary policy is likely to have
a larger effect in continental firms via the credit channels than in the UK.
From this point of view, the UK economy should be more capable of
smoothing the effects of interest rate changes than its European partners.
European mortgage markets retain strong national characteristics. This is
reflected in large differences in the type of lenders, type of products
granted, type of mortgage interest rates and loan-to-value ratios. In
United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands, for example, the volume
of residential mortgage loans outstanding is equivalent to 50% of GDP or
more in contrast to other countries such as Italy and France, where it is
equivalent to less than 20%. A contractionary monetary policy in the UK
would therefore affect household spending more than in other EMU
countries where mortgage payments exhaust a smaller part of disposable
income. The United Kingdom is also characterised by a prevalence ofTHE EURO AT 25
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mortgages with variable interest rates in contrast to continental Europe
where fixed interest rate mortgages are more diffused (although this is
changing fast). According to estimates from the Council of Mortgage
Lenders, in the UK four-fifths of the outstanding stock of mortgages is
currently financed on a variable rate basis. In Germany and France – for
instance – the share of outstanding mortgages financed on a variable rate
is below 50%.
According to empirical evidence, the United Kingdom has a relatively
larger response to monetary policy innovations. Based on what was
discussed above, it looks like the main reason behind the greater
responsiveness of the UK to interest rate changes is the higher exposure
of households to floating rate mortgage lending. The eventual integration
of the UK into EMU would therefore entail a risk for the UK (and the
euro area as whole) given the current boom in the UK housing market
and the current positive interest rate differential between the UK and
EMU. Early membership of EMU could worsen the existing balance in
the UK economy.
5.  The impact of the UK's entry on the euro/dollar exchange rate
Figure 1.7 shows the quarterly movements in the bilateral nominal
exchange rates euro/dollar and sterling/dollar throughout 1995-2002. The
euro has been declining steadily vis-à-vis the dollar since the last quarter
of 1995. Before the launch of the new currency (1997Q3-1998Q4), the
synthetic euro went through a period of relative stability and, just before
the launch, it even appreciated slightly vis-à-vis the dollar. The strength
of the euro was a short-lived blip, however. Against expectations, during
1999-2001 the euro fell against the dollar by over 20%, i.e., by more than
the entire cumulated fall during 1995-98. Since early 2002, a reversal in
the long-term decline of the euro/dollar exchange rate is visible.
The experience of sterling has been somewhat different. After the
devaluation in 1992 following the exit of sterling from the ERM, the
British currency has remained relatively stable with respect to the dollar
oscillating in a range of 1.50/1.60 until the launch of the euro. Since
1999, sterling has started to fall against the dollar clearly reflecting the
strengthening of the dollar with respect to most world currencies rather
than a weakening of the British currency. However, the fall of sterling
with respect to the dollar has been relatively smaller than the fall of the
euro (around 11% which is less than half of the cumulated fall of the
euro), and during 2002, sterling appreciated more than the euro against
the dollar. In short, sterling has been a relatively stronger currency than
the euro vis-à-vis the dollar.THE IMPACT OF THE UK’S ENTRY INTO EMU
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Figure 1.7 Euro/dollar and sterling/dollar, 1995-2002
Should the UK decide to join EMU, what are the potential effects on the
euro/dollar exchange rate? Most of the recent empirical research has
focused on the effects of the eventual UK's entry into EMU on the UK
economy. Barrel (2002), for instance, using the NiGEM model, show that
EMU membership could imply more volatility in output for the UK,
mainly as a result of the fact that the UK would not be able to rely on the
interest rate to offset shocks. In terms of price stability, on the other hand,
the UK would benefit from joining EMU. In another piece of research by
Oxford Economic Forecasting (2002), similar conclusions are drawn.
All these studies are based on large macroeconomic models, which take
into account the linkages between the UK, the euro area and the rest of
the world. Given the UK's relative economic size, its integration in the
euro area is likely to alter the economic fundamentals of EMU; therefore,
a full-scale macro model comprising the euro area and the UK is in fact
required to estimate the macroeconomic effects of the eventual UK's
entry into EMU. By the same token, an estimation of the likely effects of
the integration of the UK into EMU on the euro/dollar exchange rate
would also require a large macro economic model to estimate the changes
occurring in the economic fundamentals associated with the euro/dollar
bilateral exchange rate.
But, taking into account that it is extremely difficult to find an
econometric model that is robust and consistently outperforms a naïve
random walk in predicting the behaviour of exchange rates, we will not
attempt to do that. Instead, the analysis will take a more modest approach,
which should be only taken as an indication of the potential factors that
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may play a role in affecting the euro exchange rate in the future. Based on
quarterly data during 1990-2001, we identify economic and financial
variables that have been correlated with the euro/dollar and sterling/dollar
bilateral exchange rates. These correlations have changed in the past and
could change again with enlargement, but assuming that they are
informative to some extent, one can have a qualitative idea of the possible
impact of the UK entry on the euro/dollar exchange rate by analysing
how UK integration will affect the relevant euro-area aggregates.
5.1 Economic and financial fundamentals associated with
fluctuations of the euro/dollar and sterling/dollar exchange rates
In Table 1.2 below, we present the list of variables considered in the
analysis, indicating whether they were found to be significantly
correlated with the euro/dollar and sterling/dollar exchange rate changes
(see the annex to this chapter for more details). The variables which seem
correlated (in the expected direction) both with the euro/dollar and the
sterling/dollar bilateral exchange rates are oil price changes, interest rate
differential with US, productivity differentials with US, net capital flows
into US and expected growth differentials with US.
Table 1.2 Relationship between fundamentals and euro/dollar and
sterling/dollar bilateral exchange rates (1990: Q1–2001:Q4)
Fundamentals Euro/dollar
exchange rate
Sterling/dollar
exchange rate
Coefficient Coefficient
Inflation differentials EMU-US (1) ** /
Current account balance (2) / /
Productivity differentials (3) * ** * *
Oil price (4) * ** * * ** *
Short-term interest differential (5) * **
Long-term interest differential (6) ** *
Net corporate bond flows (7) * *
Net agency bond flows (8) / *
Net corporate stock flows (9) * *
Net FDI (10) * *
Expected growth differential (11) ** **
Stock return differential (12) * **
Stock capitalisation differential (13) / *THE IMPACT OF THE UK’S ENTRY INTO EMU
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Notes to Table 1.2
* Indicates that the coefficient is correctly signed and statistically significant.
** Indicates that the coefficient is correctly signed but statistically insignificant.
/ Indicates that the coefficient is incorrectly signed. The dependent variable is the change
in the logarithm of the bilateral exchange rate euro/dollar and sterling/dollar, respectively.
The equation regresses the dependent variable on a constant and the contemporaneous
bilateral value of the economic variable. The sample period is 1990-2001.
1  Differential in the CPI growth rate between EMU/US and UK/US.
2  Quarterly change in bilateral current balances EMU/US and UK/US.
3  Differential in growth rate of labour productivity EMU/US and UK/US.
4  Quarterly change in oil price index.
5  Quarterly Change in the differential in three month interest rate EMU/US and UK/US.
6  Change in the differential in 10-year bond interest rate EMU/US and UK/US.
7  Quarterly change in net flow in US corporate bonds from EMU and UK.
8  Quarterly change in net flow in US agency bonds from EMU and UK.
9  Quarterly change in net flow in US corporate stocks from EMU and UK.
10   Quarterly change in Net FDI into US from EMU and UK.
11  Differential in expected growth according to Consensus Forecast data in US, EMU and
UK.
12  Quarterly change in the differential of stock indexes EMU/US and UK/US.
13  Differential in Stock capitalisation (as a percentage of GDP).
As found in other empirical research on the euro/dollar exchange rate
(Brooks et al., 2001, Deutsche Bank, 2002 and Meredith, 2001), other
“traditional” fundamentals, such as current account balances or price
differentials (as far as UK is concerned), do not seem to be able to
explain movements in bilateral exchange rates throughout the 1990s.
Instead, “alternative” factors such as expected growth differentials,
capital flows, stock return differentials and productivity differentials
appear to be correlated with movements in bilateral exchange rates. In the
sections below, we look at how UK membership may affect EMU’s
fundamentals, both “traditional” and “alternative”, to try to gauge its
potential impact on the value of the euro.
5.2 Oil prices
Oil price changes represent a shock to the terms of trade of a country,
potentially affecting the exchange rate via the current account balance.
The shock to the terms of trade determines a loss in terms of
competitiveness so that a depreciation of the domestic currency is
warranted to sustain exports. According to this rationale, countries that
are more dependent on oil imports would experience a larger impact on
their exchange rates.THE EURO AT 25
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A graphic analysis confirms the existence of a relationship between
increases in oil prices and the devaluation of the euro and sterling with
respect to the dollar captured by our regressions (Figure 1.8). A simple
regression (see the annex) also indicates that movements in oil prices
were more strongly correlated with movements in the euro exchange rate
than with the behaviour of sterling. This is coherent with the high
dependence of Euroland on oil imports and the net oil exporting position
of the UK. The eventual integration of the UK into EMU should – ceteris
paribus – decrease the magnitude of the negative effect of oil price
shocks on the euro/dollar exchange rate because, by integrating a net oil
exporting country, the “enlarged” EMU would be less dependent on oil
imports.
Figure 1.8 Oil price index and bilateral exchange rates
(euro/dollar and sterling/dollar)
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5.3. Expected growth differentials
If traditional exchange rate models based on trade flows and price
differentials fail to explain the recent movements in euro/dollar and
sterling/dollar bilateral rates, one has to consider alternative explanations.
Recent literature has put emphasis on capital flows and expected growth
differentials (Brooks et al., 2001). According to this orientation,
movements in bilateral exchange rates would be determined – in the
medium term – by expected growth differentials and net portfolio flows,
and the strengthening of the dollar during the second half of the 1990s
would be based on the relatively stronger economic performance of the
US compared to the Euroland.
Our regressions suggest that net capital flows and both the US and
Euroland and the US and the UK expected growth differentials could play
a role in explaining the fluctuation of the euro/dollar and sterling dollar
bilateral exchange rates during 1990-2001. Since 1995, the US economy
has outperformed Euroland and the UK, thus creating an imbalance
between demand and supply of capital. The gap between demand and
supply of capital in the US has been partly filled through an inflow of
capital from the rest of world. When the expected growth differential has
been momentarily in favour of the euro area – as occurred in the period
just before the launch of the new currency – the bilateral rate euro/dollar
improved slightly. Since the launch of the euro in 1999, however, the
expected growth differential has turned in favour of the US and the
euro/dollar exchange rate has worsened significantly.
The case of the UK is similar. Sterling appreciated vis-à-vis the dollar
during the period when the expected growth differential US-UK was in
favour of the UK (1996-98). After 1998, the expected growth differential
moved in favour of the US and sterling started to fall with respect to the
dollar. This trend slowed down only in 2001, when the expected growth
rate in the UK was higher than in the US, similar to the case of Euroland
during the same period.
Figure 1.9 illustrates the relationship between the expected growth rate
differential between the UK and Euroland and the bilateral rate
sterling/euro. The appreciation of sterling with respect to the euro is
mirrored by the better economic performance of the UK compared to
continental Europe. Except for the period just before the launch of the
new currency, when the expectation was for more economic growth in
Europe and a strengthening of the euro against the major world
currencies, the UK economy was almost constantly expected to
outperform Euroland in terms of economic growth. This could thereforeTHE EURO AT 25
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be one factor behind the appreciation of sterling in relation to the euro
throughout the period under consideration.
Figure 1.9 Expected growth differential (UK-EMU and sterling/euro
exchange rates)
What would be the effect of the integration of the UK into Euroland in
terms of the EMU-US differential in expected growth rate? We have
recalculated this differential assuming that the UK was integrated into
Euroland. Given the positive economic performance of the UK compared
to EMU in the last few years, the relative position of EMU versus the US
in terms of expected economic growth would result improved. Assuming
that the relatively better economic performance of the UK will persist –
as looks likely based on the most recent trends and forecasts – the
eventual integration of the UK into EMU might increase the expected
growth rate of the enlarged Euroland, thus strengthening the euro with
respect to the dollar.
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5.4 Capital flows
The relatively better economic performance of the US has been
associated with a large inflow of capital into the US. In Figure 1.10, we
plot the net capital inflow into the US from EMU and the UK throughout
1990-2001. In both cases, there seems to be a relationship between the
inflow of capital into the US and the strengthening of the dollar vis-à-vis
the euro and sterling. The short-lived appreciation of the euro in 1998-99
coincided with a slowdown in the inflow of capital into US assets (in
1997 there was the Asian crisis and in 1998 the Russia/LTCM crisis) and
the slowdown in the inflow of capital into the US from EMU in 2000-01
is associated with a stabilisation of the bilateral rate euro/USD.
Figure 1.10 Net capital flow to US from EMU and UK
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As far as the UK is concerned, one can note that whereas in Euroland
there is a slowdown in the outflow of capital to the US in 2000-01, in the
UK this is not the case. This might well reflect the role of the City of
London in international financial markets. Capital from the rest of world
transits through London towards its final destination (including the US).
This argument is reinforced by the very similar trend between total world
inflow into the US and UK inflow into US assets. More than a third of
total world capital inflow into the US passes through the UK's financial
centre.
Figure 1.11 Net inflow into US corporate bonds and stocks
In cursory regressions, fluctuations in the bilateral euro/USD and
sterling/USD exchange rates have shown some correlation between
capital flows into US corporate bonds and stocks. From 1997-2000, their
foreign demand increased significantly, with aggressive buying by
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European citizens. During this period, more than a third of the total
foreign demand for US corporate stock/bonds came from Euroland. It is
during this period that there is a strong appreciation of the USD against
the euro. The picture for the UK is similar, with the demand for US
Treasuries peaking in 1997-98, followed by the sudden increase in the
UK’s demand for US corporate stocks.
What would be the effect of the UK’s entry into EMU on the bilateral
capital flows between Euroland and the US? In 2001, based on US
Treasury data, the combined net capital inflows into US corporate stocks
from the UK and EMU would represent about two-thirds of world capital
inflows into the US. It is very likely, however, that a significant share of
the funds recorded as outflow from the UK to the US concerns funds
passing through London used as an offshore financial centre. This means
that – should the UK decide to join EMU – capital flows between Europe
and the US are likely to become even more important to the fluctuation of
the euro/dollar exchange rate. On the other hand, Euroland is also likely
to benefit because it would integrate a financial centre with one of the
largest inflow/outflow of capital in the world.
5.5 Productivity differentials
The US-EMU productivity differential also seems correlated with
euro/dollar exchange rate fluctuations in the 1990s. This relationship
would be coherent with popular explanations linking information and
telecommunications technology (ICT) investments in the US to a
permanent increase in labour productivity (CEPS, 2001). Productivity
increases would affect the exchange rate via the so-called  Harrod-
Balassa-Samuelson effect (Alquist and Menzie, 2002).
Since 1995, US productivity growth has exceeded EMU’s productivity
growth with a peak of nearly 5% in the last quarter of 1998. The short-
lived appreciation of the euro in 1998-99 followed a period in which the
(non-cyclically adjusted) US-EMU productivity differential turned
momentarily negative before peaking again in 1999-2000, when the euro
devalued sharply vis-à-vis the dollar.
The experience of the UK has been somewhat different. Historically, the
UK has had a lower productivity growth rate when compared to other
European countries (during the 1970s and 1980s, the UK average annual
growth rate in productivity was 1.5% as opposed to 2.3% in the
eurozone). However, according to recent research ( Oulton, 2001), the
UK’s performance in the second half of the 1990s resembles that of the
United States in terms of the contribution of information and
communications technology (ICT) to capital deepening. This hasTHE EURO AT 25
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improved the performance in productivity of the UK relative to its
European partners as clearly shown in the lower differential with the US
in the second half of the 1990s when compared to EMU-US differential.
Figure 1.12 Productivity differentials US-EMU and US-UK
Nevertheless, the magnitude of the productivity improvement in the UK
is not comparable to the performance in the US. From this point of view,
the eventual entry of the UK into EMU will not raise significantly the
productivity level of Euroland when compared to the US. However, given
that the UK is ahead of continental Europe in terms of the ICT share in
GDP, it is very likely that the eventual integration of the UK into EMU
will lead to an increase in the contribution of ICT capital to economic
growth in the enlarged EMU. In the medium term, this might contribute
to increased productivity in the enlarged Euroland as a result of the
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integration into Euroland of a country that is ahead of other European
countries in terms of ICT contribution to capital deepening.
6.  Summary and conclusions
The eventual integration of the UK into Euroland would be the first
enlargement of EMU after the launch of the euro in January 1999 and the
physical introduction of the new currency in January 2001. This
enlargement represents a major step for EMU considering the relative
size of the UK, the role played by London in world financial markets and
the economic and structural features of the UK economy that make it
more similar to the US than to continental Europe. With the eventual
integration of the UK into EMU, the Euroland economy will consist of
80% “old world” and 20% “new world”.
The first issue we investigated in this paper is the likely effect of the
integration of the UK into EMU on European financial markets. To a
large extent, the success of a currency depends on the level of
development and the efficiency of its domestic capital markets. The
integration of the UK's financial sector into Euroland financial markets
will produce several effects, some occurring in the short term and others
in the medium to long term. The short-term effect will be the
diversification and portfolio shifts that will be caused by the conversion
of sterling-denominated assets into euro. The conversion will increase the
share of domestic assets in the UK funds and will therefore produce an
additional demand for non-euro-denominated assets. As already
happened in 1999-2001 after the introduction of the euro, the enlargement
of EMU to UK might have a negative effect on the euro vis-à-vis other
world currencies.
The integration of the UK into EMU will further reinforce the
international role of the euro. Based on figures for June 2002 with the UK
into Euroland, euro-denominated issuance in the international debt
market would amount to nearly 50% of total debt issuance and would
surpass the issuance of dollar-denominated international debt. The
integration of the UK into EMU might also increase the success of the
euro as an investing currency because of the relatively higher attraction of
sterling-denominated assets (with respect to its weighting in world
financial markets). The effect would be particularly strong in equity
markets given the high stock capitalisation in UK.
The eventual integration of the UK into EMU will also have an impact on
the size and structure of Euroland financial market and the on-going
reform of the EU financial market regulation framework. By integrating
with a country with the highest capitalisation-to-GDP ratio,  Euroland’sTHE EURO AT 25
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equity culture would further be boosted after the positive effects
exercised by the bull market of the second half of the 1990s. Based on
end-2001 figures, the total number of companies listed in the European
stock exchange would increase to over 9,000 which is more than the
number of companies listed in the US stock exchanges. The euro-area
domestic corporate bond market would also increase by over 60% as a
result of the integration of a country where corporations rely more on
capital markets than on banks for their financing. An enlarged Euroland
would also become the world leader in the foreign exchange and
derivatives market with a daily turnover that would be the double that of
the US market.
At a policy level, the on-going reform of the Euroland financial market
regulation framework – the so-called Financial Services Action Plan
(FSAP) – aims to make European financial markets fully integrated so
that the benefits of monetary union can be fully exploited. There is an on-
going conflict between the “continental”  dirigistic financial market
philosophy of Germany and France and the market-oriented philosophy
of the United Kingdom and Ireland. When the UK decided to stay out of
EMU, the liberal, market-oriented coalition in the EU was consequently
weakened. The eventual integration of the UK into EMU will reinforce
the market-oriented coalition within Europe, thus exercising more
influence on the on-going reform process.
The eventual entry of UK into EMU might be perceived as a
reinforcement of the European policies aimed at further liberalising
labour and product markets. Earlier in this chapter, we presented some
summary indicators that show how the UK resembles the US more than
continental Europe from a structural point of view. Should the UK decide
to join EMU, the elimination of the exchange rate risk is likely to boost
foreign investments in this country, thus putting further pressure on the
largest European countries to carry out badly needed reform in their
labour and product markets.
In addition to the labour market and welfare reforms carried out since the
1980s, the remarkable economic performance of the UK during the
second half of the 1990s was also due to two other key factors: a) fiscal
consolidation and the adoption of a medium-term-oriented fiscal
framework and b) the strengthening of the inflation-targeting framework.
The eventual integration of the UK’s into EMU will therefore represent
the integration of a country with a higher growth potential and an
apparently more effective fiscal and monetary policy framework than in
EMU. Given the current difficulties faced by the largest European
continental countries, some have called for reform of the Stability andTHE IMPACT OF THE UK’S ENTRY INTO EMU
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Growth Pact and the adoption of the so-called golden rule. In Section 4,
we noted that the UK’s remarkable economic performance does not
depend on its adoption of the golden rule but rather on the consolidation
of its fiscal deficit carried out through the 1990s. In the largest European
continental countries – on the other hand – fiscal consolidation slowed
down significantly after the introduction of the euro in 1999, which is the
main reason behind the current difficulties faced by these countries. An
eventual lifting of the SPG would decrease the pressure on these
countries to complete fiscal consolidation and carry out more radical
structural reforms. The golden rule would become an obstacle to further
deficit and debt reduction in high-debt countries.
The final issue we address is how the eventual integration of the UK into
EMU could affect the euro/dollar exchange rate. Since predictions about
exchange rate behaviour are very difficult to make, we simply try to
identify some factors that seem to have been correlated with changes in
the euro-dollar and sterling-dollar exchange rates during 1990-2001. The
variables that seem statistically correlated with the euro/dollar and
sterling/dollar bilateral exchange rates are productivity differentials,
interest rate differentials, oil price changes, expected growth rate
differentials and capital net flows into the US (particularly net corporate
bond flows).
Trends in these explanatory variables might explain why sterling has
performed relatively better than the euro versus the dollar. As far as the
effect of oil price changes are concerned, the UK is less dependent than
Euroland on oil imports (in fact, the UK is a net oil exporter). Therefore,
the doubling of oil prices during 1998-2001 is likely to have had a
smaller effect on the sterling/dollar exchange rate. Being outside EMU
(and in a different economic cycle position), the UK could adopt a higher
interest rate than the EMU countries during 1995-2001, and this might
have contributed to supporting the British currency. In the last few years,
the UK economic performance has also been better than that of Euroland
(as reflected in the positive expected growth differential UK-EMU in
1995-2001) reflecting a less regulated institutional environment, which
makes investments into the UK more attractive than in continental
Europe. However, the better performance of the UK has not matched that
of the US, and the UK has also suffered a net outflow of capital into the
US, which has weakened sterling, albeit less than the euro. The
sterling/dollar exchange rate is likely to have been affected by the
differentials in stock exchange returns, which might reflect the large
capital movements existing between the US and the UK and the role
played by London in international financial markets.THE EURO AT 25
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The eventual integration of the UK into EMU would affect some of the
possible factors driving the euro/dollar exchange rate. The UK’s entry
will make EMU less dependent on oil price shocks, could raise EMU’s
expected economic growth and could slightly lower the Euroland
inflation rate. These changes in the underlying fundamentals of the
euro/dollar exchange rate could contribute to an improved performance of
the euro against the dollar.  Capital flows between EMU and the US,
however, also seem to have played some role as a driving factor in the
euro/dollar exchange rate. With the integration of the UK into EMU,
bilateral capital flows between the US and the enlarged EMU will
represent (based on end 2001 data) about two-thirds of total world capital
flows into the US. Therefore, the euro/dollar exchange rate is likely to
become even more sensitive to trends in capital flows across the Atlantic.
Capital flows are mainly determined by the expected return on capital,
which depends on the productivity performance and the relative degree of
attractiveness of direct and portfolio investments of one area versus
another. Accordingly, the future performance of the euro versus the dollar
is likely to depend on the ability of Europe to make investing in Euroland
more attractive to investors. According to recent OECD estimations, the
gap in the return on capital between the US and Europe has increased
from 10% in 1990 to 15% in 2001. It should come as no surprise that the
share of US investments financed by foreign investors increased from 7%
in 1995 to 25% in 2001.
Given the high level of foreign investment flowing into the UK, the
integration of the UK into EMU should raise the relative degree of
attractiveness of foreign investment into Euroland. By integrating the UK
into Euroland, EMU will attract more capital from third countries thus
improving the net capital position of the area and ultimately supporting
the euro/dollar exchange rate. The UK’s high degree of attractiveness of
foreign investment is mainly determined by its favourable regulatory
environment. In terms of labour and product market regulations, the UK
is broadly similar to the US and the other English-speaking countries.
The UK entry into EMU will therefore be perceived as a shifting towards
the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism. As a result of the elimination of
the exchange rate risk, UK will attract an even larger share of foreign
investment flowing into Euroland and this is likely to increase the
pressure on other European governments to introduce more incisive
reforms in the labour and product market. The final outcome of this
process might be that Euroland will look more similar to US and other
English-speaking countries, thereby reducing the competitiveness gap
with US.THE IMPACT OF THE UK’S ENTRY INTO EMU
39
Annex 1
Econometric Tests on Euro/Dollar and Sterling/Dollar Bilateral
Exchange Rates
A.1 Data and econometric methodology
Economic literature usually focuses on multilateral exchange rates. In this
paper, we prefer to carry out the analysis on a bilateral basis for three
reasons. First, a lot of attention has been focused on the dollar/euro
exchange rate, which has become the most important bilateral rate in
international financial markets. Therefore, it makes sense to concentrate
the analysis on this bilateral exchange rate. Second, we want to stress the
relative performance of sterling in relation to the euro and the likely
effect of the integration of the British currency in EMU on the strength of
the euro against other world currencies. By comparing the trend in the
bilateral rates euro/dollar and sterling/dollar and associated explanatory
variables, we can identify major differences, particularly during the EMU
period (1999-2001). By using bilateral data, it will also be easier to
“isolate” the effects of the eventual entry of sterling on the key
explanatory variables identified in the analysis below.
The period covered in the analysis is 1990-2001. This is a period long
enough to capture major changes in economic fundamentals and compare
the 1990-95 period (which was characterised by relative stability of the
euro/dollar exchange rate) with the 1995-2001 period when the dollar
appreciated vis-à-vis most of the world’s currencies. As far as the pre-
EMU euro/dollar and euro/sterling exchanges are concerned, we use a so-
called “synthetic” value of the euro extended to 1990. Before 1999, the
exchange rate is based on the values of the constituent currencies. Recent
empirical work shows that the use of a synthetic euro does not lead to
biased results when compared, for instance, to the use of the Deutsche
mark/dollar rate for the pre-EMU period (Meredith, 2001). All data sets
are quarterly.
From an empirical point of view, the co-determination of most of the
factors underlying movements in the exchange rate demands
sophisticated statistical methods. Several approaches can be adopted
depending on the time horizon under consideration. The estimation of the
effects of the UK entry into EMU on the euro/dollar exchange rate would
require a model that measures the changes in the fundamentals following
EMU's enlargement and their interrelation with the euro exchange rate.
Such an approach has been used for instance by Barrel (2002) to assess
the likely effects of the UK’s entry into EMU on volatility in economicTHE EURO AT 25
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growth and inflation in the UK and in EMU countries. Simulations show
that joining EMU reduces price-level variability and raises output
variability in the UK whereas EMU output, inflation and price-level
variability are reduced. The results for the UK mainly reflects the
removal of shocks to the euro sterling exchange rate and the UK's
adoption of the ECB “two-pillar” ECB monetary policy approach. Final
results are also dependent on the assumption that the UK economy is
more sensitive to interest rate changes so that if the UK enter EMU, any
change in interest rate by the ECB would produce a larger deviation from
trend.
An alternative and more simplified approach is to use a variable-by-
variable analysis to identify the variables that are statistically significant.
Subsequently, we can test whether the correlations of interest still hold in
a mutivariate regression. We will also carry out some tests in terms of
stability. The analysis of the relationship between the euro/dollar
exchange rate and possible explanatory factors will suggest potential
directions for the development of the exchange rate. This will make it
easier to analyse the effects of the UK’s entry into EMU on the euro by
looking at the changes in each individual fundamental following the
integration of the UK into Euroland. For instance, a lot of emphasis has
been put on the role played by financial flows from Euroland to the US to
explain the recent weakness of the euro versus the dollar. Should the UK
join EMU, what would be the effect in terms of capital flows from the
enlarged Euroland to the US and how would the change affect the
exchange rate euro/dollar?
A.2 Potential determinants of bilateral exchange rates
According to the variable-by-variable approach, in Table A.1 we present
the list of bilateral variables that have been used as potential determinants
of the euro/dollar and sterling/dollar bilateral exchange rates. In order to
avoid “spurious” results in the regressions due to the some series being
I(1), we have worked with the first differences of variables or with
growth rates that are stationary according to standard significance levels.THE IMPACT OF THE UK’S ENTRY INTO EMU
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Table A.1.1 Unit root tests, 1990:1-2001:4
ADF Test Statistics*
EMU/US UK/US
Level First
Difference
Growth
Rate
Level First
Difference
Growth
Rate
1. Dependent
Variable
Bilateral Exchange
Rate
-0.71 -4.11 -3.89 -1.68 -4.72 -4.44
2. Explanatory
Variables
Price Differentials
(1)
-2.18 -4.18
Bilateral Current
account (2)
0.22 -2.34 -6.21 1.05 -3.19 -4.98
Productivity
differentials (3)
-1.44 -3.90 -1.47 -3.47
Oil  price (4) -4.28 -3.04 -4.28 -3.04
Short-term interest
differential (5)
-1..38 -2.09 -2.52 -2.39
Long-term interest
differential (6)
-1.38 -4.23 -1.13 -2.73
Net Treasury Bond
Flow (7)
-1.73 -3.81 -2.28 -4.13
Net Corporate Bond
Flows (8)
-1.57 -3.80 -0.87 -4.24
Net Agency Bond
Flows (9)
-1.59 -3.93 0.03 -4.50
Net Corporate Stock
Flows (10)
-1.05 -4.30 0.82 -3.99
Net Bond Flows
(11)
-2.36 -3.84 -2.27 -3.20
Net FDI (12) -1.35 -3.75 -1.87 -4.23
Stock Return
Differential (11)
-3.59 -4.53
Stock Capitalis.
Differential (12)
-1.97 -2.89 -1.96 -4.57
Relative expected
growth  (12)
-3.67 -2.04 -3.44
* ADFstatistic with constant including 4 lags of first difference. Coefficients in bold indicate
significance at the 5% MSL. (1) Differential in the CPI growth rate between EMU/US and UK/US
(2) Bilateral current balances EMU/US and UK/US (USD bn) (3) Differential in growth rate of
labour productivity EMU/US and UK/US (4) Crude il price index (1995=100) (5) Differential in
three month interest rate EMU/US and UK/US; (6) Differential in 10-year bond interest rate
EMU/US and UK/US; (7) Net Treasury Bond Flows to US from EMU and UK, (8) Net corporate
bonds Flows to US from EMU and UK (9) Net Agency Bond Flow to US  from EMU and UK;  (10)
Net Corporate Stocks flows to US from EMU and UK; (11) Net Total Bond Flows to US from EMU
and UK; (12) Net FDI to US from EMU and UK (11) Quarterly change in the differential of stock
indexes EMU/US and UK/US; (12) Stock  Capitalisation (% of GDP) Differential EMU/US and
UK/US; (13) Expected growth rate differential according to Consensus Forecast data in US, EMU
and UK (Expected growth rates  are calculated by taking a weighted average of the expected current
and future year growth rate from the Consensus Forecast)THE EURO AT 25
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A.3 Identification of significant and correctly signed determinants
of bilateral exchange rates euro/dollar and sterling/dollar in
1990-2001
In this section we present the results of the regressions of the bilateral
exchange rate euro/dollar and sterling dollar on the explanatory variables
illustrated above. Each equation regresses the change in the logarithm of
the bilateral exchange rate on a constant term and the contemporaneous
value of the explanatory variable. We carried out regressions for three
sample periods: 1990:1-2001:4, 1995:1-1995:4 and 1995:1-2001:4. The
sub-periods have been selected according to trends in the euro/dollar and
sterling/dollar exchange rates. In 1995, the euro/dollar and sterling/dollar
exchange rates did not appear to be too overvalued by historical
standards. Most of the appreciation of the dollar with respect to the other
world currencies took place during the second half of the 1990s.
Unfortunately, we cannot assess whether the relationship between
exchange rate and explanatory variables changed after the launch of the
euro because of the insufficient number of observations in the sub-period
1999:1-2001:4.THE IMPACT OF THE UK’S ENTRY INTO EMU
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Table A.1.2 Bilateral exchange rate euro/dollar*
1990:1 - 2001:4 1990:1 - 1995: 4 1995:1-2001:4
Coefficient R
2 Coefficient R
2 Coefficient R
2
Inflation Differentials
EMU-US -6.230 0.15 -9.94 0.33 -3.65 0.058
(-2.86) (-3.22) (-1.27)
Current Account 0.012 0.033 0.008 0.017 -0.02 0.053
(1.24) (0.670 (-1.207)
Prod. differential US-
EMU (lagged 4 Q) -0.008 0.118 -0.009 0.018 -0.009 0.208
(-2.487) (-0.932) (-2.61)
Oil Price (lagged 3 Q) -0.167 0.237 -0.147 0.180 -0.186 0.231
(-3.59) (-2.06) (-2.80)
Short-term Interest
Differential  US-EMU 0.0013 0.060 -0.0065 0.098 0.015 0.17
(0.417) (-1.51) (2.34)
Long-term interest
differential  US-EMU -0.008 0.066 -0.007 0.0066 -0.0108 0.10
(-1.89) (0.387) (-1.97)
Corporate bonds flows -0.021 0.026 -0.025 0.277 -0.013 0.04
(-1.11) (-2.33) (-1.139)
Agency Bonds flows 0.0806 0.075 -0.016 0.0006 0.0826 0.17
(1.73) (0.116) (2.368)
Corporate stock flows -0.062 0.004 -0.01 0.001 -0.0417 0.071
(-0.769) (0.181) (-1.410)
FDI -0.003 0.08 -0.018 0.049 -0.0015 0.005
(-0.638) (-1.047) (-0.367)
Expected Growth
Differential US-EMU 0.011 0.071 -0.0082 0.037 -0.053 0.32
(-1.87) (-1.124) (-3.33)
Stock Return Differential
US-EMU 0.1224 0.017 0.217 0.043 0.0019 0.015
(0.868) (0.972) (0.121)
Stock Capitalization
Diffe.  US-EMU -0.0157 0.008 -0.012 0.002 -0.023 0.032
(-0.57) (-0.205) (-0.94)
*Coefficient in bold are statistically significantTHE EURO AT 25
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Table A.1.3 Bilateral exchange rate sterling/dollar*
1990:1 - 2001:4 1990:1 - 1995: 4 1995:1-2001:4
Coefficient R
2 Coefficient R
2 Coefficient R
2
Inflation Differentials
(UK-US) -0.853 0.02 -1.274 0.052 0.559 0.101
(-1.08) (-1.27) (0.77)
Current Account -0.007 0.001 -0.014 0.002 -0.0039 0.003
(-0.21) (-0.205) (-0.097)
Productivity differential
(lagged 4Q) 0.0024 0.003 0.00267 0.003 -0.0033 0.021
(0.402) (0.250) (0.756)
Oil Price (lagged 3Q) -0.102 0.111 -0.108 0.097 -0.091 0.196
(-2.27) (-1.393) (-2.51)
Short-term Interest Diff.
US-UK -0.042 0.33 -0.060 0.48 -0.015 0.102
(-4.81) (-4.49) (-1.72)
Long-term interest diff.
US-UK -0.0057 0.01 -0.026 0.001 0.014 0.03
(-0.260) (-0.600) (0.999)
Corporate bonds flows -0.0008 0.005 -0.0009 0.28 -0.0004 0.006
(-1.515) (-2.51) (-0.179)
Agency Bonds flows -0.0125 0.009 -0.042 0.027 -0.00508 0.011
(-0.663) (-0.768) (-0.545)
Corporate stock flows -0.0014 0.002 -0.051 0.12 0.0009 0.006
(-0.301) (-1.72) (0.403)
FDI -0.0005 0.0321 0.037 -0.00147 0.02
(-0.155) (0.908) (-0.737)
Expected Growth
Differential US-UK -0.0216 0.10 -0.0318 0.183 -0.0123 0.06
(-2.714) (-1.79) (-1.57)
Stock Return Differential
US-UK -1.21 0.330 -1.48 0.373 -0.34 0.048
(-4.55) (-3.95) (-1.108)
Stock Capitalization
Differential 0.0045 0.003 0.0034 0.002 0.007 0.008
(0.389) (0.200) (0.479)
*Coefficient in bold are statistically significant
A.4 Confirmation of results in a multivariate framework and
stability test
According to the results illustrated above, the economic and financial
variables associated with the fluctuation of the euro/dollar exchange rate
are oil price changes, productivity differentials, capital flows EMU-USTHE IMPACT OF THE UK’S ENTRY INTO EMU
45
and expected growth differentials. In order to confirm our results, we
present in the table below the results of the regression of the log change
of the euro/dollar bilateral exchange rate on its identified determinants.
The results are quite robust considering that:
1.  The significance levels of the coefficients remain relatively good; and
2.  The sign of the coefficients do not change compared to  univariate
regressions used for the identification of the key determinants of the
euro/dollar exchange rate.
Table A.1.4 Regression euro/dollar exchange rate
Dependent Variable: Log of euro/dollar exchange rate
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1992:1 2001:4
Included observations: 40 after adjusting endpoints
Convergence achieved after 11 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
Constant 0.017 0.012 1.426 0.163
Oil Price Change -0.179 0.071 -2.517 0.017
Productivity Differ. -0.009 0.003 -2.807 0.008
Net Capital Flows* -0.001097 0.000754 -1.454765 0.1549
Expected Growth Diff. -0.020 0.007 -2.713 0.010
AR(4)** 0.255 0.133 1.914 0.064
R-squared 0.405     Mean dependent var -0.010
Adjusted R-squared 0.318     S.D. dependent var 0.042
S.E. of regression 0.035     Akaike info criterion -3.753
Sum squared resid 0.041     Schwarz criterion -3.500
Log likelihood 81.06     F-statistic 4.637
Durbin-Watson stat 2.631     Prob(F-statistic) 0.002
*Net purchase of corporate  stocks + corporate bonds + treasury bonds by EMU residents
(in US$ bn); ** AR(s) is the autoregressive error term according to the following formula:
y = f(x) + ut where ut = fut-s + jt
One of the key assumption of our results is that there is no structural
break following the introduction of the euro. The stability of our results is
good considering that:
1.  Running the same multivariate regression for different sub-periods
(including 1990-98 and 1999-2001), does not lead to large changes in
significance levels and the sign of the coefficients.THE EURO AT 25
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2.  In the table below we report the results of the Chow test for stability
which indicates that there is no structural break following the
introduction of the euro in Q1 1999.
Table A.1.5 Results of Chow test for stability
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1999:1
F-statistic 0.187     Probability 0.978
Log likelihood ratio 1.568     Probability 0.955
Chow Forecast Test: Forecast from 1999:1 to 2001:4
F-statistic 0.404     Probability 0.946
Log likelihood ratio 7.971     Probability 0.787
As far as the sterling/dollar exchange rate is concerned, we already
mentioned that the results are less satisfactory than in the case of the
euro/dollar exchange rate. However, as far as the variables identified to
be significant for the sterling/dollar exchange rate – oil price changes,
expected growth differentials and stock return differentials – are
concerned, we present in the table below the results of the multivariate
regression. Once again, the results are quite robust both in terms of
significance level and expected signs.
Table A.1.6 Regression sterling/dollar exchange rate
Dependent Variable: Log of sterling/dollar exchange rate
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1991:1 2001:2
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
Constant 0.006 0.007 0.993 0.327
Oil Price Change -0.099 0.041 -2.440 0.020
Expected Growth Diff. -0.015 0.007 -2.004 0.052
Stock return Diff.UK-US 0.882 0.294 2.995 0.005
R-squared 0.372     Mean dependent var -0.008
Adjusted R-squared 0.323     S.D. dependent var 0.041
S.E. of regression 0.034     Akaike info criterion -3.827
Sum squared resid 0.044     Schwarz criterion -3.661
Log likelihood 84.36     F-statistic 7.511
Durbin-Watson stat 2.333     Prob(F-statistic) 0.00047
CHAPTER 2
THE CEECS’ ROAD TO THE EURO AREA
1.  Introduction
This chapter examines the likelihood that the candidate countries of
Central and Eastern Europe will join the euro. Over the last decade, these
countries have come a long way. Eight of them (the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and
Slovenia) are likely to join the EU in 2004. The two remaining Central
and East European countries (CEECs), Romania and Bulgaria, will not be
able to join in 2004, but they are not lagging far behind, and 2007 seems
now a realistic date for their accession. This implies, as explained in more
detail below, that by the end of this decade all 10 CEECs could have
joined the euro area, which is then likely to have more than 20 members
and potentially as many as 25.
When could the euro area expand to the east? EMU membership requires
compliance with the Maastricht convergence criteria, which includes
membership of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) for at
least two years. Thus, even if the candidate countries became members of
the EMR II upon their entry in the EU, they would still have to wait for at
least two years after joining the EU before they could start distributing
euro notes and coins to their citizens. The first enlargement of the euro
area to the East could thus be in 2006.
Membership of the Economic and Monetary Union is an integral part of
the acquis communautaire, and the candidate countries have accepted this
as a political commitment with all its implications. This means they are
bound to become members of the eurozone at some point in time. Until
then, they will be EMU members with a derogation for introducing the
single currency. From a legal point of view, they would be in the same
category as Sweden at present. No candidate has requested an opt-out
clause as did Great Britain and Denmark.
However, the soon-to-be new members still have to make a number of
crucial decisions towards making their way to the euro. What would be
the right moment to join the ERM II in order to achieve the optimum
balance between the costs and benefits of introducing the single
currency? How can they make sure that the way is smooth? Answers to
these questions are far from easy since opinions on these issues vary
widely.THE EURO AT 25
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Thus, membership in EMU involves a number of complex issues of
timing. Many have voiced fears concerning the premature adoption of the
euro. The group of “early-euro” sceptics includes such prominent EU
players as the European Central Bank and the European Commission,
whereas the academic community seems to be split on this issue.
This chapter addresses the prospects of the candidate countries to become
member of the eurozone and identifies potential pitfalls along the way. It
is organised as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the latest
macroeconomic developments in the candidate countries, while section 3
assesses their progress towards real convergence. Section 4 considers
issues of external stability of the candidate countries that might become
highly relevant during the transition to the euro area. Section 5 explores
the level and prospects of nominal convergence as defined by the
Maastricht Treaty. And finally, structural issues, relating mainly to
financial markets, are dealt with in Section 6.
2.  Latest macroeconomic developments and prospects in the
CEECs
The growth performance of the candidate economies over the last few
years suggests that they can withstand adverse external developments and
that they might continue with moderate but stable growth rates even if the
EU is close to stagnation. As long as the EU economy does not pick up –
which currently takes two-thirds of their exports – economic growth will
have to be driven by domestic demand.
Considerable current account deficits, often above 5% of GDP, have over
the last years accompanied the transformation process. In 2001, the
average deficit was slightly below 5% of GDP, and this level seems to be
sustainable provided the strong capital inflows continue (see below for an
analysis of potential problems). The overall level of current account
imbalances is not expected to deteriorate in the coming period, despite
the negative effect of the global slowdown on exports of the candidate
countries, due to the lower price of imported commodities and especially
oil. Rapid development in the export of services, especially tourism, is
another factor working to reduce the current account imbalances.
In line with the slowdown in growth, inflation rates have continued to
decline in most CEECs (the average inflation rate declined from 12.3% in
2000 to 9.2% in 2001). The average inflation rate for the 8 CEECs
scheduled to accede in 2004 would actually be around 6%. Most
candidate countries are thus already close to price stability, but they
might find it difficult to achieve further reductions in inflation due the so-
called Balassa-Samuelson effect according to which the process ofTHE CEECS’ ROAD TO THE EURO AREA
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catching-up implies higher inflation even at constant exchange rates (for
more see below).
Table 2.1 Basic indicators of the candidate countries (2000)
Popula-
tion GDP per head Inflation Unem-
ploym.
Gross
capital
form.
FDI
Millions Curr.
prices PPS % % % of
GDP
Stock
per
capita
Net
inflow %
of GDP
EU-15 378.4 22,520 22,400 2.1 8.2
Bulgaria 8.2 1,600 5,400 10.0 16.4 16.2 239 7.1
CR 10.3 5,400 13,500 3.9 8.8 28.3 2213 9.0
Estonia 1.4 3,800 8,500 4.0 13.7 23.4 1980 8.0
Hungary 10.0 5,000 11,700 9.8 6.4 22.9 1790 2.9
Latvia 2.4 3,300 6,600 2.6 8.0 24.6 934 5.7
Lithuania 3.7 3,300 6,600 1.0 15.4 18.7 683 3.4
Poland 38.6 4,400 8,700 10.1 15.0 25.3 671 5.3
Romania 22.4 1,800 6,000 45.7 10.8 18.5 317 2.8
Slovakia 5.4 3,900 10,800 12.0 18.6 30.0 1000 10.8
Slovenia 2.0 9,800 16,100 8.9 7.0 27.8 1348 1.0
Table 2.1, cont.
Share of agriculture
Exp to EU
(% of total)
Trade
balance as
% of GDP
Share of
industry
(% of gross
value added)
% of gross
value added
% em-
ployment
Bulgaria 51.2 -9.9 25.1 14.5 NA
CR 68.6 -6.2 36.0 3.9 5.1
Estonia 76.5 -15.8 14.6 6.3 7.4
Hungary 75.1 -4.4 26.9 4.8 6.5
Latvia 64.6 -14.9 16.3 4.5 13.5
Lithuania 47.9 -9.8 22.8 7.6 19.6
Poland 69.9 -7.8 29.0 3.3 18.8
Romania 63.8 -4.6 27.6 12.6 42.8
Slovakia 59.1 -4.7 25.8 4.5 6.7
Slovenia 63.8 -6.2 27.7 3.2 9.9
Sources: European Commission and EBRD (share of industry).THE EURO AT 25
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Despite much higher growth rates than in the EU (still 3% in 2001, after
3.7% in 2000), the region is characterised by high unemployment rates.
The average unemployment rate exceeded 13% in 2001, which is one
percentage point higher than the preceding year and thus similar in
magnitude to the slowdown in growth. The increase in unemployment
despite continuing growth of around 3% suggests that labour productivity
is increasing rapidly, at around 3% p.a. This is exactly how the catching-
up process should work. But the higher level of unemployment (even
higher than in the EU) indicates that the labour markets of candidate
countries also suffer from a high degree of structural rigidities. We
provide further evidence on this below.
3.  Real convergence and fitness for EMU
This section looks at the candidate countries’ prospects to integrate into
EMU. It starts with a brief look at “real convergence” (defined as
catching up in terms of output and productivity). The discussion will then
turn to the question how to determine whether or not the candidate
countries would benefit from joining the euro.
3.1  Catching up
One of the major objectives of the EU, imbedded in the treaties, is the
achievement of real convergence between its members. The forthcoming
enlargement is going to pose a serious challenge to the successful
fulfilment of this objective, as the candidate countries are scheduled to
join soon starting from a substantially lower level of economic
development than a vast majority of the current EU-15. According to the
neo-classical growth theory, the candidate countries that are characterised
by lower income levels and capital to labour ratios are expected to grow
at a faster rate than the current, more developed EU member countries.
This argument is encouraging.
But experience suggests that convergence might not be that easy. First, it
has to be stressed that catching up is not a fast process. The weighted
average per capita GDP expressed in PPP reached 40.5% of the EU
average in 1995. In 2000, it increased to 43% which means only 2.5
percentage points of improvement. After excluding Romania and
Bulgaria, the increase was 3.5 percentage points (from 42.5% to 46%).
Also the pattern of convergence was rather uneven among the candidate
countries. The largest increases were experienced by Slovenia, Estonia,
Hungary, Poland and Latvia. For some other EU candidates, the recent
transition experience is not very encouraging indeed. The Czech
Republic, Romania and Bulgaria even experienced real divergence.THE CEECS’ ROAD TO THE EURO AREA
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Table 2.2 GDP per capita as a percentage of the EU average
BL CR EE HU LI LA PO RO SI SL
1995 32.5 62.4 32.6 46 31.4 25.1 34.4 27.9 62.9 44.1
2000 28 58.8 38.5 51.1 33.3 30 39.4 23.3 69.4 47.9
Source: Own computation on the basis of AMECO data.
In terms of broad indicators of economic structures, it is difficult to find
strong systematic differences between the candidates and the poorer
member countries. The share of agriculture in GDP is still somewhat higher
than in the EU, but in absolute terms, it is already rather low in most of the
eight candidates for membership in 2004. In terms of the share of industry
in GDP it is also difficult to argue that the candidates are different from
current member countries. The fundamental reason why it is so difficult to
make any firm judgement about systematic differences in economic
structure is that there are large differences even among the present EU
members. For example, the share of industry in GDP varies considerably
even among the so-called Club Med
1 countries. In both Portugal and Italy,
the share of industry is rather high, at around 30% of GDP. This cannot be
considered a sign of high (or low) level of development since Italy’s GDP
per capita is slightly above the EU average and Portugal’s is the poorest
member country. By contrast industry is relatively much less important in
Spain and Greece, providing only around 15% of GDP. As all four of these
countries are already successful members of the euro area, there is
apparently a very large range of economic structures that are compatible
with membership in EMU. On the basis of the limited data that are
available, it appears that the candidates do not fall outside this range.
In terms of employment, the differences in economic structures would
appear to be larger, particularly with respect to Romania, Bulgaria and
Poland where a huge part of the labour force is officially employed in
agriculture. However, while this will undoubtedly create social problems
in these countries and problems for the Common Agricultural Policy, it is
less relevant for the issue of EMU membership since value added in this
sector is such a small part of GDP.
Moreover, one cannot avoid questioning the reliability of the data and of
the definitions used for identifying farmers, particularly concerning
Poland. Many who are classified as farmers exercise this activity only on
a part-time basis and it appears that their average age is close to 60, so
                                                                
1 Portugal does not have a coast on the Mediterranean Sea, but it is nevertheless
usually counted as an honorary member of Club Med.THE EURO AT 25
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that their numbers will shrink rapidly over the next years in any event. A
comparison with the Club Med is again instructive. The average share of
agriculture in employment for this group of southern member countries is
actually not far from that of most candidates and the Club Med countries
share the characteristic of many applicants that the relative productivity is
particularly low in agriculture (the share in GDP is only a fraction of the
share in employment). As shown in Pelkmans et al. (2000) Portugal had
at the beginning of the 1990s actually almost the same employment
structure as Poland now. The concerns regarding the large shares of the
employment in agriculture for the candidates are thus likely to be
overstated when one discusses how quickly these countries should joint
the euro.
The candidate countries usually achieve higher growth rates of GDP than
the incumbent EU members and it is often expected that they will retain
higher growth during the forthcoming period. Is this enough to achieve
higher real convergence? Figure 2.1 suggests that the answer is yes. The
countries with higher real GDP growth have achieved higher convergence
in terms of per capita GDP levels expressed in purchasing power parities.
The countries that reported negative average growth in the period
between 1995 and 2000 – Bulgaria, Romania and the Czech Republic –
indeed experienced an increase in the differences between levels of
economic development.
Figure 2.1 Candidate countries: Real convergence and growth
y = 0.33x + 0.3037
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In general, the relationship between the relative real GDP growth and the
level of development defined as per capita GDP in PPP (as a percentage
of the EU average) does not have to be that straightforward. The changes
in the relative levels of economic development can thus be caused not
only by the real growth but also by the changes in international relative
prices and exchange rates. The European Commission (2001b) suggests
that the changes in international relative prices favoured all of the CEECs
with the exception of Slovakia. Hence, they caught up more (or diverged
less) than would have been the case had only the growth rates been taken
into account.
Real convergence in the narrow economic sense is not a precondition for
successful functioning of the monetary union as the experience of the
current member states amply demonstrates. Nevertheless it is certain that
achieving a higher level of output levels accompanied by convergence of
economic structures would make it easier to manage the euro area.
Therefore, some observers have called for the introduction of an
additional criterion for euro area membership, namely to have passed a
certain threshold in terms of GDP per capita as a % of the EU average
(75% has been proposed).
Introducing any additional convergence criteria based on the narrow
concept of real convergence would anyway not be compatible with the
Treaty. Moreover it would de facto imply a standstill to eurozone
enlargement. As mentioned above, the catch-up process must be expected
to be slow. As the candidates gained only less than 4 percentage points
over 5 years (1995-2000) as documented above, it is clear that the
experience so far does not suggest that the candidates will catch up very
quickly. At this rate it would take them a generation, about 25 years, to
reach 75% of the EU-15 average. This would be more than 75% of the
EU-25 (or EU-28+ by then?) because the candidates will lower the EU
average once they join. But even to reach more than 75% of the EU-25
average is likely to take more than a decade.
3.2  Standard optimum currency area indicators
The costs and benefits of establishing a monetary union are often judged
using the optimum currency area (OCA) theory. Unfortunately, the
quantification of the OCA criteria is rather controversial, and therefore, it
is not certain that such an approach can provide an unambiguous
indication of whether a country is “ripe” to give up its currency and join a
monetary union. Since it is the most widely used methodology, however,
it might provide some useful insights into the core issues.THE EURO AT 25
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The following standard six indicators from the optimum currency area
approach are used:
1) Intra-industry trade. This is an indicator of the extent to which two
countries exchange similar goods. The higher this indicator the lower
should be the likelihood that trade is affected by asymmetric shocks.
Technically we use the Grubel-Lloyd index on the basis of the 2-digit
CN-level of trade structures. This index is calculated as one minus the
sum of the absolute value of net exports of each CN 2-digit sector
over the sum of total exports and imports (2000 data).
2) Trade structure similarity. The more similar the trade structure, the
lower should be the likelihood that trade is affected by asymmetric
shocks. The measure used here is the correlation coefficient between
the shares of about 100 products (at the 2-digit CN-level) in overall
intra-European exports and in the exports of each EU member to other
EU members (2000 data).
3) Real GDP growth correlation. Correlation coefficient between real
GDP growth in the EU-12 and the respective country from 1993/4-
2000.
4) Industrial growth correlation. Same method as above.
5)  Unemployment rate (changes) correlation. Correlation coefficient
between the unemployment rate of EU-12 and the candidate
countries, 1994-2001.
6) Exports to EU-15. Expressed as a percentage of GDP (2000).
The first two indicators capture the differences in economic structures
that are supposed to measure the potential for asymmetric shocks.
Indicators 3 to 5 measure the extent to which the economies of individual
countries have tended to move together to converge on the EU average
over the observed period. The last indicator measures the importance of
trade with the rest of the EU and is thus a measure of the expected
benefits from EMU.
In Table 2.3, the values of the indicators for the CEECs and for some of
the current EU members, both the “euro” and “non-euro”, are provided.
2
It is important to stress that the absolute value of the indicators should not
be taken at face value in order to determine whether a country is suitable
for joining a monetary union, as it is difficult to say what magnitudes are
still acceptable. Rather, one should look at the relative ranking of the
                                                                
2 Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2001) also present correlation coefficients of GDP
growth based on quarterly data and arrived at approximately same results.THE CEECS’ ROAD TO THE EURO AREA
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countries. Moreover, the start of the transition process in the late 1980s
and early 1990s was marked by substantial “transitional recession” which
was caused by the switch from centrally planned economic systems to the
market-based economies.
3
Table 2.3 The traditional OCA indicators
Intra-
industry
trade
Trade
structure
similarity
Real GDP
growth
correlation
Industrial
growth
correlation
Unemploy
ment rate
correlation
Exports to
EU-15
CR 74 92 7 30 -20 39
Estonia 56 51 14 44 -19 58
Hungary 76 91 89 75 -30 43
Poland 59 84 16 16 -58 13
Slovenia 72 86 39 82 40 32
Bulgaria 40 23 43 43 -49 23
Romania 42 29 -20 -38 -25 19
Latvia 22 10 30 29 28 24
Lithuania 36 27 -4 -12 -61 18
SR 68 88 14 72 -30 33
Average 54.5 58.1 22.8 34.1 -22.4 30.2
GER 95 77 68 90 85 14
GRE 22 26 64 56 64 5
Source: Own calculations based on AMECO data.
The OCA indicators provide rather mixed evidence. The value of the
structural variables is on average quite high. Also the value of exports to
the EU countries as a percentage of the GDP is high pointing to the fact
that the candidate countries are strongly tied to the EU market and thus
would significantly benefit from joining the euro area. On the other hand,
the indicators of business cycle co-movement score rather poorly and in
the case of changes in unemployment rate, the correlation is even slightly
negative. Therefore, one could prematurely conclude that the candidate
countries hardly form an optimum currency area, at least in the traditional
sense. However, several caveats have to be made.
The overall picture hides huge differences between the candidate
countries themselves. As for the structure of trade, the most advanced
countries can be easily compared with the EU economies. The Baltic
                                                                
3 For this reason the analysis is restricted to the period from 1993/4 to 2000.THE EURO AT 25
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states (perhaps with the exception of Estonia) and the South Eastern
candidates still have very different compositions of trade compared to the
EU both in terms of their general structure and their share of intra-
industry trade. In the case of the Baltic states, it might be their small size
that contributes to the extremely low values of indicators of intra-industry
trade and trade similarity. They have no choice but to specialise in a
limited number of industries. The structure of export industries thus does
not provide a very comforting picture. Wood industry and textiles
account for almost 50% of Latvian exports. Lithuanian exports are
dominated by mineral products, textiles and machinery. Estonia seems to
be less vulnerable to industry-specific shocks as its economy is more
diversified with machinery as a major export article. Nevertheless, their
high degree of openness makes the Baltic states interested in joining a
large currency area. The advantage they will derive from EMU
membership will also depend on EMU’s size when these countries join.
For instance, the current exports of Lithuania to the EU countries account
only for 48% of GDP. If the euro area also comprised Poland and
Lithuania’s Baltic neighbours, the share would rise to roughly 70%.
The data on business cycle developments show that, with the notable
exception of Hungary, the CEEC cycle is clearly out of sync with that of
the eurozone. This may be to a large extent caused by the unsettled
economic features of the candidate economies and a series of country-
specific crises, e.g. the Czech Republic went through a recession in 1997
and 1998. Economic growth in the country resumed only recently and
continues even despite the sharp slowdown in the EU. The Baltic states
suffered deeply as a consequence of the Russian crisis at the end of
1990s. Also Bulgaria witnessed a severe crisis in 1997.
The relatively unfavourable values of the indicators that are supposed to
embody the costs of adoption of a common currency do not necessarily
need to lead to the conclusion that the CEECs are not suitable candidates
for EMU membership. As Frankel and Rose (1998) note, some of the
OCA indicators are endogenous and are bound to change once the
countries join the monetary union.
4 It is thus possible that the indicators
                                                                
4 Frankel and Rose (1998) apply the Lucas critique argument by saying that the
establishment of a monetary union (in our case accession of the candidate
countries to EMU) is bound to significantly change the nature of the business
cycles in the member countries through an increase in intra-EMU trade and the
impact of a common monetary policy. They put stress on the role of trade flows,
which will according to their evidence lead to greater synchronisation of the
business cycles. “Thus cyclic correlation is endogenous with respect to trade
integration.” Note, however, that Eichengreen (1992), Kenen (1969), andTHE CEECS’ ROAD TO THE EURO AREA
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of co-movement in macroeconomic variables such as GDP growth,
industrial growth and unemployment rates will adapt and become more
synchronised with the EU average. Therefore, we can argue along these
lines that countries like the CEECs would not satisfy the OCA criterion
of a high correlation with the core countries as long as they stayed
outside, but that they would satisfy this criterion once they had been
inside EMU for some time. Moreover, the business-cycle indicators have
been heavily influenced by the fact that the candidates have undergone
the process of transition.
Obviously, this point concerns the relative development of business
cycles which can to a certain extent be considered as policy-induced, but
the trade structures would not likely be much affected by EMU
membership as they depend on structural characteristics that change only
very slowly over time.
3.3  Correlation of business cycles: A caveat
What can one conclude from the observation that the correlation between
real GDP growth rates over a certain period in the recent past has been
positive?
Is it unambiguously better to consider joining EMU if the correlation of
shocks has been positive? An example should be enough to illustrate a
conceptual problem that is almost always neglected. Assume that
(domestic) demand shocks have positive spill-over effects in EMU so that
a positive shock to demand in the euro area would increase demand also
in the country in question (and vice versa, but this is less important in this
context). It can be shown that in this case it might well be better for the
candidate for EMU if the correlation between the demand shocks (at
home and in the euro area) is negative.
To illustrate this point, simply consider what happens if the correlation is
positive (say, at the limit equal to 1). In this case, the foreign (=euro area)
demand shocks will tend to come at the same time as domestic ones. As
the spillover effects were assumed to be positive, it follows that domestic
booms (and busts) will be reinforced by the spillover effects of the euro
area booms and busts. It could thus be better for a country considering
membership of EMU if the correlation between the demand shocks was
negative (under the hypothesis that the spillover effects are positive).
Berger, Jensen and Schielderup (2001) use a standard model to analyse
                                                                                                                                                 
Krugman (1993) for example believe that trade integration will result in greater
specialisation of the economies and thus the correlation of business cycles could
actually decline if supply shocks were to prevail.THE EURO AT 25
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the ramifications of this idea. They seem to have been the first to draw
attention to this line of reasoning.
The standard reasoning would be different; it would emphasise that the
common monetary policy of the euro area will not be appropriate for the
candidate country if the correlation is negative. Consider the case of a
strong negative correlation between domestic and foreign demand shocks.
In this case, the ECB is likely to tighten monetary policy when the home
country is experiencing negative shocks. This is clearly not appropriate
from the point of view of the home country, but how important is it? The
negative correlation implies that a negative shock in the home country is
likely to happen when there is a positive shock in the euro area. As long
as the spillover effects are positive, this implies that a negative demand
shock at home will usually be mitigated by the stronger demand coming
from the euro area so that negative domestic demand shocks will not lead
to severe downturns. Hence, it might not matter that much that the
common monetary policy is not entirely appropriate for the country in
question.
Another factor that influences whether a negative correlation of shocks is
an indicator of potential problems with joining the euro is the
effectiveness of monetary policy. If monetary policy does have a very
strong influence on output (compared to the spillover effects resulting
from foreign shocks discussed above), the monetary policy stance could
become decisive in determining output in the home country. In this case
the home country might suffer from a common monetary policy that is
based on the euro area developments if the correlation of the shocks is
negative.
These considerations imply that one should be careful in jumping to the
conclusion that countries for which the correlation coefficient (between
national and euro-area data) of GDP growth (or other business-cycle
indicators) is positive are automatically better qualified for EMU than
countries for which the correlation coefficient is negative. Moreover, it
would also seem inappropriate to conclude that a higher correlation
coefficient is necessarily better.
The discussion so far has identified two key factors: the sign and size of
spillover effects and the effectiveness of monetary policy in stabilising
output. There is very little one can say about systematic cross-country
variations of the latter as very little is known about which factors in
reality influence the monetary transmission channel. Only little more is
known about the size and sign of the spillover effects of demand shocks.
But there is a general presumption that they are positive and sizeable.THE CEECS’ ROAD TO THE EURO AREA
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Gros and Hobza (2001) show that this might not be the case for the larger
EU countries. However, one would presume that for the very small and
open economies of the smaller candidate countries (e.g. Estonia or
Slovenia) the spill-over effects from an expansion of euro area demand
could be positive and sizeable; or, at least, greater than for the larger
candidates, e.g. Poland. This implies that one should evaluate the
traditional OCA indicators somewhat differently for the smaller candidate
countries.
3.4  Identification of demand and supply shocks through VAR
The correlation coefficients of GDP and industrial growth may not be
considered as the most appropriate measure of co-movement of business
cycles
5 and thus the likelihood of occurrence of asymmetric shocks. A
more refined method might be required. Therefore, Fidrmuc and
Korhonen (2001) estimated the correlation of the supply and demand
shocks between the candidate countries and the euro area using a
structural VAR model. Supply and demand shocks were recovered with
the help of the decomposition developed by Blanchard and Quah (1989).
6
Their findings once again underline the heterogeneity of the group of EU
candidates. Hungary and Estonia in particular are characterised by a
relatively high degree of correlation of both supply and demand shocks
with the euro area.
7 The other candidates, including the most advanced
                                                                
5 At least because high values of the coefficient only show that the GDP (or other
indicators) move in the same direction but fail to provide information on the
actual magnitude of the movements. Further, it is not possible to distinguish
between the impact of supply and demand (permanent/temporary) shocks.
6 The decomposition of the reduced form error terms to supply and demand
shocks is the main point of criticism of this approach. The identification of the
reduced form VAR model is based on the assumption that demand shocks do not
have permanent effects on output, whereas supply shocks do. As Minford notes
in his Discussion of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), this is doubtful. The
temporary shocks could, for example, reflect temporary supply shocks,
temporary effects of monetary and fiscal policies or effects of the exchange rates.
Similarly, the permanent shocks reflect not only the supply factors but also the
permanent responses to them (both fiscal and monetary). It is thus difficult to
distinguish the nature of the shocks which then reduces the validity of the
conclusions. If the exchange rates are found to be effective in dealing with a
certain type of shock, it would be useful to be able to isolate these shocks. But
then, it would be desirable to distinguish between shocks and the responses to
them, which the VAR methodology does not allow.THE EURO AT 25
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Slovenia and the Czech Republic, show little correlation of shocks. Some
of them have even negative correlation of the demand shocks. An
interesting case is Lithuania, which reported a negative value also in the
case of correlation of the supply shocks. This might be caused by the
highly specific structure of its economy.
Fidrmuc and Korhonen also updated the analysis of Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1993) and found that, interestingly, some of the countries
that had been marked by the latter as peripheral have converged
significantly. Thus Italy, Spain and also Portugal achieved a rather high
correlation with the euro-area shocks. This seems to support the
hypothesis of the endogeneity of the OCA criteria. Therefore, it appears
that during the period of preparation for EMU and its early years, the
increased interaction between the economies has led to a synchronisation
of their business cycles. This would be good news for the candidate
countries.
Boone, Maurel and Babetski (2002), also using a VAR model, found that
the level of demand-and-supply-shock symmetry in the CEECs is
approximately at the same level as the symmetry of shocks in countries
such as Spain and Portugal at the time of their accession to the EMU.
Further, they discovered some evidence on demand shock convergence
with the EU/Germany.
8 According to their evidence, however, supply
shocks have hardly converged during the first decade of transition, which
might be due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Unlike Fidrmuc and
Korhonen, they do not report any convergence of the economic shocks in
the EMU “periphery”.
3.5  Labour market flexibility
The threat of diverging economic developments in the candidate
economies which would pose a challenge to the formulation of economic
policies in both the eurozone and at national level can be mitigated if the
labour markets are flexible enough to act as an efficient adjustment
mechanism. The labour markets of most of the current EU members are
usually considered to be too rigid and calls for greater flexibility are often
heard. Where do the candidates stand in this respect?
                                                                                                                                                 
7 The correlation of the demand shocks was in general lower than that of the
supply shocks. This might be a result of different economic policies followed by
the national governments and as such could be expected.
8 With the use of the time-varying estimation (Kalman filter), they computed
“time-varying correlation coefficients” of the development of shocks.THE CEECS’ ROAD TO THE EURO AREA
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Riboud et al. (2002) attempted to assess the flexibility of the labour
market institutions in six CEECs (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia). In order to compare them with developed
economies, they made use of the OECD methodology applied in its Jobs
Study (1994) and Employment Outlook (1994 and 1999). According to
their findings, these countries fall somewhere in the middle of the
flexibility scale compared to the OECD countries. Although they do not
reach the level of flexibility of the UK, Ireland and Denmark, they still
exhibit much greater flexibility than the rather rigid Club Med countries,
France and Germany (see Table 2.4 and Figure 2.2).
9 As regards
unemployment insurance systems, the CEECs seem to be less generous
that the OECD or EU countries. They also spend less on both passive and
active employment policies. In terms of the role of unions in the wage
negotiation process, the candidates fall somewhere in the middle,
although they have extremely high payroll and also other taxes which
significantly exceed the highest levels in the EU.
Table 2.4 Labour market flexibility in the CEECs
Employment protection
legislation***
Unemployment
insurance
Taxes
Regular
empl.
Tempo-
rary
empl.
Collec-
tive dis-
missals
EPL
strictness
****
Benefit
replace-
ment ratio
Benefit
duration
(months)
Payroll
tax rate
(%)
Total tax
rate (%)
CR 2.8 0.5 4.3 2.1 50 6 47.5 73.4
Estonia 3.1 1.4 4.1 2.6 10 3-6 33.0 63.3
Hungary 2.1 0.6 3.4 1.7 64 12 44.0 81.5
Poland 2.2 1 3.9 2 40 12-24 48.2 80.0
Slovakia 2.6 1.4 4.4 2.4 60 6-12 50.0 81.0
Slovenia* 3.4
(2.9)
2.4
(0.6)
4.8
(4.9)
3.5
(2.3)
63 3-24 38.0 69.1
CEEC
average
2.7 1.2 4.1 2.4 48 43.4 74.7
EU
average**
2.4 2.1 3.2 2.4 60 23.5 53.0
OECD
average
2.0 1.7 2.9 2.0 58 19.5 45.4
* Numbers in brackets refer to the new labour code if approved.
** EU average without Luxembourg and Greece.
*** 1: minimum protection, 6: maximum protection.
**** Weighted average of the first three columns.
                                                                
9 In terms of employment protection legislation, however, Slovenia belongs
among countries with the highest degree of inflexibility. This status could change
somewhat if the new proposed labour code, introducing much more flexible
provisions for both permanent and temporary contracts, is approved.THE EURO AT 25
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Table 2.4, cont.
Passive policies Active policies Unions
% of
GDP
Spending
per un-
employed
% of
GDP
Spending
per un-
employed
Union
density
(%)*
Union
coverage
index**
Coordi-
nation:
unions
Coordi-
nation:
employers
CR 0.31 0.04 0.19 0.02 42.8 2 1 1
Estonia 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.01 36.1 2 2 1
Hungary 0.56 0.06 0.40 0.04 60.0 3 1 2
Poland 1.71 0.12 0.49 0.03 33.8 3 2 1
Slovakia 0.54 0.05 0.56 0.05 61.7 3 2 2
Slovenia 0.89 0.11 0.83 0.11 60.0 3 3 3
CEEC
average
0.68 0.06 0.42 0.04 49.0
EU
average
1.73 0.26 1.16 0.16 44.4
OECD
average
1.43 0.23 0.92 0.14 39.6
* Percentage of salaried workers who belong to a union.
** 1: less than 25% of salaried workers are covered by collective agreements; 2: between 26 and 69%
are covered; 3: 70% or more are covered.
Source: Riboud et al. (2002).
Labour market institutions are usually found to have played a limited
role, however, in the transition economies (Boeri and Terrell, 2002 and
Figure 2.2: Flexibility of employment protection legislation
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Riboud, 2002). As these countries have undergone a fundamental
systematic change, the evolution of the labour markets was largely
shaped by general approaches to transition such as macroeconomic
stabilisation or structural reforms. At the beginning of transition,
candidate countries suffered a large drop in their economic output. This
was (with an exception of the Czech Republic) followed by a rapid
increase in the unemployment rate and a decline in labour market
participation (which had been unusually high for some population groups
during the communist regime). Interestingly, the unemployment rates
have not come down until now (the Czech one rose after the recession in
1998), although output has recovered substantially. The labour market
institutions might have somewhat contributed to this persistence in
unemployment (Riboud et al., 2002).
The CEECs thus generally opted for labour market institutions similar to
those found in Western Europe. One explanation may be that the
candidate had to align their legislation with the acquis communautaire,
which includes several provisions regarding labour market regulations.
Having the same degree of labour market distortions as the old EU-15
might indicate the new members will,  ceteris paribus, not have more
problems than the old ones. But this is certainly also not a desirable
situation. Previous CEPS reports have documented that Europe’s rigid
labour markets carry considerable costs as they stymie growth and slow
down the adjustment to shocks.
In order to cope with the challenges posed by monetary integration the
candidate countries, like the old member countries, would benefit from
having more flexible labour markets. Then, an adverse demand shock to a
country or a region could be compensated by the appropriate adjustment
in real wages and/or a speedy reallocation of labour from one sector to
another. Therefore, the key for the candidates would be to focus on
introducing mobility-friendly labour market reforms. This does not
necessarily entail an across-the-board minimising of all the labour market
institutions, however. For example, Boeri and Terrell (2002) point out
that the CEECs put greater emphasis on non-employment benefits and
thus imposed floors to declines in wages whereas the former Soviet
Republics preferred higher (downward) flexibility of wages throughout
the transition process. The fact that output and productivity have
recovered so much better in the CEECs (compared to the CIS) suggests
that the “less flexible” approach of the CEECs was in the end more
conducive to structural reform than the supposedly “flexible” approach of
the CIS. The candidates should thus be careful in terms of the reforms of
labour markets they introduce.THE EURO AT 25
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4.  Assessing the stability of the candidate countries
4.1  Current accounts
Current account deficits are usually presented as a percentage of GDP,
which is useful if one wants to focus on the capacity of a government to
service foreign debt. However, if one wants to have an idea of the
exchange rate adjustment required to re-establish current account
equilibrium, one should relate the deficit to overall export receipts (goods
and services). Under certain reasonable conditions, one could actually
argue that the deficit as a percentage of export receipts gives directly the
percent depreciation required to eliminate the deficit without a
contraction in domestic demand. For example, a deficit equivalent to 20%
of exports would require a devaluation of about the same magnitude.
10
Table 2.5 Current account deficits (as a % of export receipts)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Bulgaria 0.2 7.1 -3.3 -16.1 -10.1 -10.5
CR -13.0 -11.5 -4.1 -4.7 -6.5 -6.6
Estonia -13.7 -15.6 -11.5 -6.1 -6.7 -6.8
Hungary -9.7 -4.6 -9.5 -8.3 -5.2 -5.0
Latvia -10.7 -12.0 -20.7 -22.0 -15.1 NA
Lithuania -17.2 -18.8 -25.6 -28.2 -13.2 -7.8
Poland -4.7 -14.5 -14.8 -21.1 -19.2 -15.8
Romania -26.8 -21.7 -31.3 -14.4 -10.8 -16.6
Slovakia -18.2 -15.5 -15.2 -8.1 -5.0 -9.9
Slovenia 0.2 0.1 -1.3 -7.5 -5.5 -2.6
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Portugal -0.8 -3.3 -0.8 1.0 -8.6 -0.4
Spain -21.5 -22.2 -21.6 -6.2 -6.4 0.4
Source: Own computations based on European Commission data.
On this account, there is relatively modestly divergence in the data
between the CEECs. Most of them seem to have been able to stabilise
their current accounts (see Table 2.5). Out of the first-wave countries,
Poland experienced the highest current account deficit, amounting to
                                                                
10 The conditions are that imports are relatively price inelastic and that the
demand curve for exports has an elasticity of one, which is not far from typical
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more than 15% of export receipts. However, Poland managed to decrease
the ratio from values of above 20% and thus get under the values
experienced by Spain during the early 1990s. (Portugal had only
negligible deficits during this period.) This ratio has been much lower in
Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Hungary. The two
latter countries succeeded in achieving significant reductions in the
current deficits in recent years. Bulgaria, whose deficit stays at levels of
about 10%, was joined by Slovakia, which experienced a sharp
deterioration of the current account balance. The problems of external
balance appear to be largest in Romania with very little hope for early
stabilisation.
These data imply that a country such as Poland would require a very large
depreciation, over 15%, should it ever need to achieve a balanced current
account quickly. It is usually argued, however, there will be no need for
this because the deficit is financed by stable flows of foreign direct
investment. This argument was also frequently used prior to 1992 in the
case of Spain and Portugal. In comparison, countries such as Hungary
and the Czech Republic are in a much more stable monetary
environment, as their need for devaluation would be much smaller.
4.2  Foreign direct investment
Table 2.6 below shows that Portugal and Spain also had rather large
inflows of FDI, again measured as a percentage of export receipts. For
Spain, FDI flows averaged over 10% of exports during the pre-crisis
period, and for Portugal they were only somewhat smaller.
For Poland the FDI flows in relation to export receipts have been
considerably more important, financing most of the current account
deficits. In all the other candidate countries, the current account deficit is
to a larger or lesser extent covered by FDI flows too. In the Czech
Republic, FDI inflows represent almost double the current account
deficit.
The key question is thus for how long can the candidate countries count
on inflows of this magnitude. In recent years, the CEECs have
experienced rather stable flows. But can this go on forever? The
experience of Spain and Portugal is again instructive in this respect. FDI
flows to Spain halved in the year after the first attack (1993) and have
since considerably fallen again after the second major attack (1995). By
1997, Spain became a net exporter of FDI, and later Portugal as well.
With swings in external flows of this size it is not surprising that a large
adjustment in the real exchange rate of the peseta was needed.THE EURO AT 25
66
Table 2.6 FDI flows (balance of payments data) as a % of export receipts
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Bulgaria 8.0 9.7 14.7 14.2 9.1
CR 4.3 11.2 19.1 13.7 11.8
Estonia 7.4 13.9 7.5 8.4 10.9
Hungary 10.5 8.6 7.8 5.9 7.4
Latvia 18.2 11.4 11.5 12.5 5.0
Lithuania 6.8 18.3 11.5 7.4 7.7
Poland 13.4 14.3 17.9 19.0 10.9
Romania 11.8 20.7 10.2 8.2 n.a.
Slovakia 1.5 4.3 3.2 15.1 8.4
Slovenia 3.6 2.2 1.7 1.6 3.1
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Portugal 9.2 5.0 6.1 3.9 0.0
Spain 9.0 11.1 5.9 5.1 1.9
Source: Own computations based on European Commission data.
Figure 2.3 Foreign direct investment as a percentage of exports in Portugal and Spain
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4.3  Savings and investment: Capital mobility and the candidate
countries
Large current account deficits could be justified if they finance the build-
up of strong capital stock, whose returns can later finance debt service.
Unfortunately, this mechanism does not seem to be the main driving
force for current accounts in Central and Eastern Europe. This evaluation
might appear to be surprising in view of the importance of the flows of
foreign direct investment into the CEECs. Indeed, for most countries FDI
flows are large enough to cover the current account deficits. But the key
question is whether FDI is in addition to domestic investment. Here the
evidence is not conclusive. Across countries there is only a rather weak
tendency for countries with higher FDI to have also higher investment
rates. Moreover, the countries with the largest current account deficits are
not the ones with the highest investment ratios.
Another way to evaluate the driving forces behind the capital flows into
the CEECs is to look at the relationship between the changes in current
accounts and investment ratios across countries as depicted in Figure 2.4.
It is apparent that countries that recorded large increases in the current
accounts (as a % of GDP) were also mostly the ones with the highest
increase in investment-to-GDP ratios. If one applies the Feldstein-
Horioka criterion, this suggests that capital mobility is already rather high
in Central and Eastern Europe.
How should one evaluate this apparent contradiction? It seems that
capital is mobile at the margin (for the CEECs), but enormous differences
exist among these countries as to their overall propensity to save. The
poorer countries (e.g. Bulgaria and Romania) seem to have the lowest
national savings rates (they have low investment rates, but still sizeable
current account deficits). The large current account deficits make sense in
an inter-temporal context, if one assumes that they help the country to
accumulate capital faster than it could if it relied on national savings
alone. But unfortunately the poorer countries do not seem to be the ones
that grow faster, which is not surprising in light of their lower investment
ratios. This points again to a risk: namely that some countries accumulate
large foreign debts that finance an unsustainable rate of consumption. A
protracted crisis is likely to result when capital markets discover that the
country has difficulties servicing its debt because not enough capital
(physical and human) was invested in the tradables sector. Hungary has
been in this situation for most of the past decade. It emerged from the
over-indebtedness trap only after a long period of belt-tightening which
was politically and economically very painful (Poland extricated itself
from a similar situation at the end of the 1980s thanks to a combination ofTHE EURO AT 25
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large-scale debt forgiveness and rapid growth). At present it appears that
the CEECs are no longer in this situation, but the danger remains for the
laggards, i.e. Bulgaria and Romania.
4.4  Real appreciation and competitiveness
During the early 1990s, there was a lively discussion whether the Club
Med currencies were overvalued. There was no general agreement,
because the judgement depended, as usual, on the indicator and the base
period used. The two indicators most often used to measure
competitiveness are (and were then) the real exchange rate deflated by the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) and by Unit Labour Costs (ULC). These two
usually give different indications, now and then (see Table 2.7).
In the case of Spain, it was argued that there was no need for a large
exchange rate adjustment because there was no real overvaluation – but
only if one used ULC as the competitiveness indicator and 1980 as the
base period. Not surprisingly, this was the position taken by the
authorities. A similar argument was used in the case of Italy, where there
was also a large discrepancy between the ULC- and the CPI-based
measures.
The candidate countries today present a very similar picture. Depending
on the base period and the indicator chosen, it can be argued that their
currencies are overvalued by a very small margin or, on contrary, by a
Figure 2.4 Relationship between Changes in Investment and the Current account between
1995 and 2000 (as a percentage of GDP)
-10.0
-8.0
-6.0
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
-6.0 -4.0 -2.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0
Investment
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
tTHE CEECS’ ROAD TO THE EURO AREA
69
very large margin. In the case of the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Estonia, the potential overvaluation is relatively small across most
indicators and base periods. Poland and Lithuania report much higher
levels of real appreciation. In Romania, the CPI-deflated exchange rate
indicates a considerable overvaluation, whereas the ULC-based one
points to an undervaluation. In the future, further trend real appreciation
of the candidate countries is expected. Recent strong appreciations have
occurred, especially in the Czech Republic (from December 2001 to April
2002 by more than 10%), Poland and also in Hungary (after the country
widened the Forint fluctuation band).
Table 2.7 Appreciating real exchange rates (percent appreciation relative
to the indicated base period)
2001 relative to 1996 2001 relative to 1999
CPI ULC CPI ULC
CR 22 22 12 10
Estonia 21 20 5 -3
Hungary 24 9 13 9
Latvia 39 34 12 7
Lithuania 53 84 16 9
Poland 37 40 27 27
Romania 60 -13 17 -43
End-1991 relative to 1980 End-1991 relative to 1987
CPI ULC CPI ULC
Italy 31 -1 11 9
Spain 24 2 26 28
Sources: Gros and Thygesen (1998), p. 216, for Club Med relative to Germany.
For candidate countries: own calculations on the basis of AMECO data,
CPI relative to EU-12, ULC total economy.
The argument used by the CEECs that their currencies cannot be
overvalued because the exports of most of the countries keep growing
fast was also used in the case of Spain, where exports had actually
doubled in dollar terms in the five years prior to the attack of 1992. This
is typical of countries that have recently opened up to trade, such as the
transition countries today or Spain in 1992, when it dismantled its last
tariffs within the, then, EC. In such cases both exports and imports tendTHE EURO AT 25
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to grow strongly, and whatever the exchange rate, more and more sectors
are exposed to international competition.
11
These data suggest that sooner or later an exchange rate adjustment might
be needed.
12 What does this imply for the exchange rate policies pursued
by these countries?
For example, Poland and the Czech Republic officially follow a floating
exchange rate, accompanied by domestic inflation targets. They are thus
in a different situation than Spain and Italy in the early 1990s, which
were members of a fixed exchange rate adjustment, the ERM. In theory,
an exchange rate adjustment could thus come about gradually and
without disruption.
However, experience has shown that large adjustments do occur, causing
almost always some disruption in financial markets. This was the case
even for Spain, which in 1992 actually had rather large room for
manoeuvre under the ERM (Spain had margins of ±6%). A sudden large
depreciation usually forces the central bank to increase interest rates to
limit the domestic inflationary pressures that would otherwise worsen
inflation. Moreover, the terms of trade shock (deriving from the
depreciation) in combination with higher interest rates might initially lead
to a contraction in demand (as in Italy and Spain). This in turn puts
pressure on the budget, leading to higher deficits, which then might
undermine confidence and thus aggravate the depreciation.
Such a negative spiral does not need to develop. The case of Greece
shows that a smooth “glide path” to EMU is possible. But it could be
potentially dangerous for the candidate countries operating flexible
exchange rate regimes to enter into an ERM-type arrangement that would
tie their currencies to the euro before they have a clearer view of whether
the current exchange rate levels are sustainable in the long run. The case
of Greece, which successfully engineered a one-step surprise devaluation,
is instructive in this regard.
Nevertheless, the real appreciation, which is a natural consequence of the
transition and catching-up process, does not necessarily have to be
damaging for the candidate countries. If it comes through the Balassa-
Samuelson effect, it does not imply any loss of international
competitiveness (see section 5.1 below). Moreover, real appreciation may
                                                                
11 For an analysis of the experience of transition countries, see De Broeck and
Slek (2001).
12 For further discussion of the potential for real appreciation in the transition
economies, see Halpern and Wyplosz (2001).THE CEECS’ ROAD TO THE EURO AREA
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also reflect further trade integration and elimination of non-quality-
related price differences. Finally, it may generate pressure on the
exporters to increase their productivity and improve performance and
thus eventually lead to an increase in competitiveness. Figure 2.5
demonstrates that despite considerable real appreciation, the
competitiveness (measured by real labour units costs) has even increased
in some of the candidate countries relative to the EU.
5.  Nominal convergence à la Maastricht
The ultimate condition for membership in EMU is to achieve a certain
degree of nominal convergence with the other members as stipulated by
the Maastricht criteria (see also Box 2.1). The EU institutions have so far
made it clear that the criteria will have to be fully adhered to by the
candidate countries in their run-up to monetary union.
The motivation behind the formulation of the Maastricht convergence test
was three-fold. First, the EU countries wanted to create a stable, low-
inflationary and growth-friendly environment – hence, the stress on the
level of inflation and interest rates. Second, the founders of EMU wanted
to eliminate the risk of free-riding behaviour and thus they introduced the
conditions limiting the size of budget deficits and government debt. And
eventually, the condition regarding the exchange rates was intended to
Figure 2.5 Real labour unit costs (1996=100)
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test the stability of the currency in question and the appropriateness of the
level of exchange rate vis-à-vis the other ERM countries.
Box 2.1 The Maastricht criteria
Article 121 (ex. Article 109j) lists the criteria according to which the degree
of sustainable convergence necessary for EMU entry is assessed:
-  The achievement of a high degree of price stability: this will be apparent
from a rate of inflation that is close to that of, at most, the three best
performing member states in terms of price stability.
-  The sustainability of the government’s financial position: this will be
apparent from having achieved a government budgetary position without
a deficit that is excessive as determined in accordance with Article
104(6).
-  The observance of the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the
exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary System, for at least
two years, without devaluing against the currency of any other member
state.
-  The durability of convergence achieved by the member state and of its
participation in the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary
System, as reflected in the long-term interest-rate levels.
A Protocol to the Treaty specifies the criteria by stating that a member state
has a to achieve price performance that is sustainable and an average rate of
inflation, observed over a period of one year before the examination, that
does not exceed by more than 1.5 percentage points that of, at most, the three
best performing member states in terms of price stability. Further, over a
period of one year before the examination, a member state has to have an
average nominal long-term interest rate that does not exceed by more than 2
percentage points that of, at most, the three best performing member states in
terms of price stability. In terms of stability of public finances, the general
government deficit of a member state may not exceed 3% of GDP, or should
be falling substantially or only be temporarily above though still close to this
level, and the gross government debt may not exceed 60% of GDP at market
prices, or must at least show a sufficiently diminishing rate and approaching
the reference value at a satisfactory rate. And finally, a member state has to
respect the normal fluctuation margins (in the case of ERM II ±15%)
provided for by the exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary
System without severe tensions for at least the last two years before the
examination. In particular, the member state shall not have devalued its
currency’s bilateral central rate against any other member state’s currency on
its own initiative for the same period.THE CEECS’ ROAD TO THE EURO AREA
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Despite the fact that the Maastricht criteria had been heavily criticised,
they proved, at least in terms of the stabilisation of public finances, rather
successful. Indeed the EU countries managed in the run-up to EMU to
bring the public deficits under control and those with substantial
government debts succeeded in reducing them to more acceptable levels.
On the basis of their early experience, at least it can be expected that the
current eurozone countries together with the ECB and the European
Commission will insist on “stringent”
13 adherence to the original wording
of the criteria. But many economists in this context have called for some
tailoring of the criteria so that they are more suited for the candidates’
specific situation (Pelkmans et al., 2000, Halpern and Wyplosz, 2001,
Buiter and Grafe, 2001 and Rostowski, 2002). They voice concerns that
attempts to comply with the criteria in a relatively short time might prove
destabilising for the CEECs and could potentially lead to a real
divergence instead of a catching up.
14
Let us first examine where the candidate countries now stand in terms of
the values of the Maastricht indicators. The evidence is apparently mixed.
They are doing quite well regarding the volume of general government
debt. It is only Bulgaria that somewhat exceeds the stipulated threshold.
Hungary also is uncomfortably close to the limit, but it has a promising
record of having been able to push down the ratio from about 90% in the
beginning of 1990s to the current 53.1%. In 2001, only one-half of the
candidate countries managed to keep their budget deficits under 3% of
GDP. These were the Baltic states, Slovenia and also Bulgaria. In terms
of monetary indicators, the performance of the CEECs is lagging. The
inflation criterion was, despite good progress towards achieving price
stability by a vast majority, fulfilled only by Lithuania. The (unweighted)
                                                                
13 In the sense that no formal changes to the criteria will be allowed. The
interpretation of the criteria in the case of the incumbent EMU members was
however a different story as a rather flexible approach was adopted. From this
point of view, one could also expect a relatively benevolent approach towards
the present candidates (or at least the candidate countries can use this fact in
negotiations on entry). This time, however, the situation will be to a certain
extent different. It can be assumed that the EMU membership of the current
candidate countries will not be such a politically dominated issue as was the
launch of the EMU in 1999 and therefore it is likely that more attention will be
devoted to the economic aspects. This is also indicated by the rather cautious, if
not discouraging, stance of the ECB in terms of the timing of the new members’
entry into the eurozone.
14 Note that the EU uses the same line of reasoning but arrives at completely
different conclusions: the enlargement of the eurozone to the East should be
postponed.THE EURO AT 25
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average of 8.7% highly exceeded the threshold value, which stood at
3.3% in 2001. Even if Romania and Bulgaria were excluded from the
sample, the resulting 5.6% inflation is still substantially higher. The
interest rate criterion is likely to be violated too.
15
The candidate countries are not entering the eurozone today, however,
and thus it makes sense to assess their preparedness in a more forward-
looking manner. Hence one can compare the performance of the current
EU/EMU candidates with that of the “weakest” EU countries aspiring to
adopt the euro in late 1990s – the so-called Club Med (Portugal, Spain,
Italy and Greece).
As already mentioned, the earliest possible date for the current candidate
countries to join the eurozone seems to be 2006. In such a case, the final
decision on accession would be made in 2005 on the basis of 2004/05
data. Therefore, in order to assess where the candidates stand today in
comparison to the Club Med countries at approximately the same time
before EMU entry, one should use the data for Spain and Portugal from
1993 and for Greece from 1995, as it joined EMU two years later. Table
2.8 presents the results of such a comparison.
In this context, it is immediately apparent that the candidate countries are
in much better shape than were the Club Med countries five years before
their entry into the eurozone. Thus, the candidates will not necessarily
encounter problems in fulfilling the qualification criteria for becoming
fully-fledged EMU members.
However, the European Commission’s forecasts (2002c) for 2004
indicate that the CEECs could still find it somewhat difficult to comply
with the convergence criteria. Budget deficits and inflation are likely to
cause the most problems.
This brings us again to the fact that early fulfilment of the convergence
criteria might not be easy. Does this mean that the candidate countries
should wait or is there something wrong with the criteria? Are they really
suitable in their present form to generate the desired stability and
favourable economic environment for real convergence in the candidate
economies?
And indeed many economists argue that the criteria are not appropriate
for the candidate economies. There are some inherent features of their
economies that make it difficult for them, if not impossible, to comply
                                                                
15 Moreover, interest-rate convergence will result from a stable exchange rate.
Therefore, the exchange-rate stability criterion can also be viewed together with
the criterion on interest rates.THE CEECS’ ROAD TO THE EURO AREA
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with the criteria in the short- to middle-term, but that at the same time do
not pose a risk to their overall stability and thus do not contradict the
overall conditions for membership in the eurozone.
Table 2.8 Maastricht criteria – Candidate countries and Club Med
Budget deficit
(2001)
Debt (2001) Inflation
(2001)
Long-term
interest rates
(2001)
Bulgaria 0.4 66.3 7.4 5.0
CR -5.2 23.7 4.7 5.4
Estonia 0.5 4.8 5.8 6.8
Hungary -4.1 53.1 9.2 6.6
Latvia -1.6 16.0 2.5 10.2
Lithuania -1.9 23.1 1.3 6.3
Poland -3.9 39.3 5.3 8.4
Romania -3.3 23.3 34.5 49.2
Slovakia -5.4 44.1p 7.3 7.7
Slovenia -2.5 27.5 8.5 n.a.
Average -2.7 30.8 8.7 11.7
Average-B,R -3.0 26.8 5.6 7.3
1993/5 data
Portugal -5.9 61.1 6.9 9.5
Spain -6.7 58.7 5.3 10.1
Italy -9.4 118.2 5.5 11.1
Greece -10.5 108.7 8.9 n.a.
Average -8.1 86.7 6.7 10.2
p = Provisional.
Source: Own computations on the basis of Eurostat data.
5.1  Inflation: The Balassa-Samuelson effect
The candidate countries have in most cases a rather impressive record in
bringing inflation down. All of the countries except Romania managed to
achieve one-digit inflation rates and forecasts indicate that the
stabilisation of price-level growth will continue in the years to follow. As
is also apparent from the forecasts, however, inflation is expected to
decline only modestly and stay at higher levels that those common in the
EU and also the eurozone. This might have potentially important
implications regarding the timing and strategy of accession of the
candidate countries to EMU.THE EURO AT 25
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When looking for causes of such an inflation inertia, one has to resort to
the theoretical framework of the Balassa-Samuelson effect explaining
trend appreciation of the real exchange rates in terms of productivity
differentials in the tradable and non-tradable sectors of an economy.
16
The catching-up process in the candidate countries can be characterised
by trend appreciation of their real exchange rates. Why is this so? The
labour productivity in the candidate countries rises in most cases at a
higher pace compared to the EU economies, and the large gap in price
and productivity levels between the CEECs and the EU countries coupled
with strong FDI inflows indicate that the faster productivity growth might
be preserved in the future as well. However, the high degree of trade
integration implies that most of the increases are experienced in the
tradable sector. The non-tradable sector benefits from increases in
productivity only to the extent the non-traded goods and services enter
the production of the traded goods as intermediate inputs, thus facing
indirect competition. As the marginal product of labour in the tradable
sector increases and prices are kept at the world level due to international
competition, wages in the sector also tend to rise.
The basic assumption of the model is that the wages in the economy tend
to be equalised. First, there exists, although this in reality is somewhat
limited, labour mobility between the sectors and thus the workers would
move to better paid jobs in the tradable sector thereby generating pressure
towards equalisation. Furthermore, trade unions also tend to make sure
that the wage developments in the whole economy are more or less
synchronised (Halpern and Wyplosz, 2001).
Thus, the increase in wages in the tradable sector results in equivalent
increases in the non-tradable sector. However, the profitability of the
non-traded sector facing rising wages and limited productivity increases
cannot be retained without upward adjustment of prices of the non-traded
goods and services. Hence, inflation in the non-traded sector tends to
overtake inflation in the traded sector.
17
                                                                
16 Another reason might be the still considerably high share of goods and
services in the consumer basket whose prices are not fully determined by free
market forces (in Poland the share is estimated at almost 15% (Durjasz, 2001).
This might be due to direct regulation or structural weaknesses. The case of
regulated prices will not be further dealt with as it is reasonable to expect that the
prices will have been deregulated by the time the candidate countries enter the
EU/EMU.
17 The magnitude of the effect also depends on the demand-side effects. Rising
increased productivity leads through increasing income and wealth to increasesTHE CEECS’ ROAD TO THE EURO AREA
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Then, the evolution of the real exchange rate due to the Balassa-
Samuelson effect can easily be depicted by several equations. The real
exchange rate can be written as:
p p e - + =
*
r s
where å is the rate of expected depreciation of the nominal exchange rate,
and ð and ð* are the inflation rates (based on the CPI index) in the
transition country and eurozone, respectively. The overall inflation rate
can be decomposed to inflation rate in the traded sector and inflation rate
in the non-traded sector, ð
T and ð
N, respectively. Also in this case the
asterisk will denote the eurozone. á will be the share of the tradables in
the CPI index and its composition is assumed to be the same in the
transition country and the eurozone. Thus,
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Due to international arbitrage, it must hold that the inflation rate of
domestic tradable goods is equal to the inflation of the eurozone tradable
goods plus the expected rate of depreciation. Therefore,
e p p + =
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.
Then we can find that
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From this follows that the real exchange rate will appreciate if the
difference between the excess inflation in the domestic non-tradable
sector over the tradable sector is larger than that in the eurozone. And the
higher differences in productivity levels in the transition countries
compared to the eurozone indicate that this will probably be the case. The
gap between the GDP per capita levels in the candidate countries and
their EU partners is very wide. Thus there is a large potential for
catching–up and productivity increases.
At this point it is important to stress that the Balassa-Samuelson (B-S)
effect is an equilibrium phenomenon that naturally occurs when an
                                                                                                                                                 
in consumption. If the demand for non-traded goods and services rises at a higher
speed than the demand for non-traded goods, as is usually assumed because of
their “superior” character, the price increases might be even further reinforced.THE EURO AT 25
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economy experiences economic growth. Through an adjustment in
relative prices in the economy an appreciation of the real exchange rate is
achieved. Therefore, higher inflation generated by this process is in no
way a threat to the monetary stability of a country or its international
competitiveness and there is thus no need to take counteracting economic
measures.
It is of course important to know what the magnitude of the effect might
be, or whether it occurs at all. ECB (1999) claims that a number of recent
papers found evidence in favour of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis.
18
Pelkmans et al. (2000) estimate that the inflation differential generated by
the B-S effect might amount to between 3.5% and 4%. Halpern and
Wyplosz (2001) arrived at a similar estimate of about 3.5%. Sinn and
Reutter (2001) also report high levels of inflation which might be
compatible with the Balassa-Samuelson effect. According to their
estimates, the candidates countries might have inflation rates that are
higher by between 3% to 7% than those in Germany, a country with the
lowest difference between productivity in tradables and non-tradables
sectors. Coricelli and Jazbec (2001) estimated the possible size of the
effect for 19 transition countries and arrived at the conclusion that under
the assumption of a yearly rate of real convergence between the transition
countries and the EU of 2%, the B-S effect will result in real exchange
rate appreciation of about 1%. The estimates of the UN (2001) vary
between 2% and 2.2%. The Bundesbank (2001) arrived at estimates
between 1.9% and 2.6%.
These numbers show large differences that are due to the different
methods applied, the various sizes of the samples and the periods
covered. Many are subject to reservations regarding the very short time
                                                                
18 Typically, these studies have used econometric techniques to detect the
existence of long-run relationships (co-integration) between relative price levels
and relative productivity. In this framework, the direction of the applied studies
has been two-fold. A first class of studies focuses on the relationship between
long-run changes in relative prices and productivity differentials across
countries, while a second set analyses the link between the productivity
differentials and inflation differentials across sectors within countries. The
general conclusion of the first approach is that there is evidence of a relationship
between the evolution of the relative price levels across countries and that of
productivity differentials. Following the second approach, a clear causality
between productivity growth in the traded goods sector and inflation in the non-
traded goods sector has been identified. Indeed, recent studies show that, while
some of the more restrictive assumptions of the hypothesis are not supported by
the data, there is still clear evidence that the B-S effect has been at work within
the euro area.THE CEECS’ ROAD TO THE EURO AREA
79
periods used in estimations, which in addition were characterised by large
structural changes. Also the division between the tradable and non-
tradable sectors is hard to determine in practise. As a result studies use
various techniques which make the results incomparable. Moreover, the
estimates of the impact of the B-S effect on CPI inflation might be further
distorted as most of the studies are using GDP value-added distinctions
which can be considerably different (Durajsz, 2001). Moreover, some
assumptions on which the estimates are based, such as full labour
mobility and a resulting wage equalisation, can be in reality to some
extent violated, which leads to an overestimation of the overall impact of
the B-S effect.
Even if these reservations are taken into account, it is obvious that the B-
S effect plays an important role. The estimated values in most cases
exceed the 1.5% limit set by the Maastricht inflation criteria. From this
point of view, insisting on a strict adherence to the criteria seems to be
capable of generating economic crisis rather than achieving the desired
stabilisation of the candidate countries. If a candidate country wishes to
adopt the euro in the shortest possible time, as many of them already
proclaimed they do, it will be forced to suppress the inflation under the
stipulated limit which could trigger a recession. Of course, it can be
argued that the effect will have a decreasing impact with the passage of
time, but given the large differences in economic levels between the
CEECs and the EU and thus also in productivity, it seems impossible that
the gap would close sufficiently during the four years time between now
and the desired “€-day” for some of them.
The inflation problem could certainly be solved, at least temporarily, with
the help of flexible exchange rates. The undesired, according to
Maastricht criteria, inflation differential could be compensated for by
proportional nominal appreciation of the exchange rate. This might
however breach the criteria concerning the stability of exchange rates
within ERM II. The relatively wide ±15% band could at times be too
tight and an adjustment might be needed (Halpern and Wyplosz, 2001). It
is worth noting, however, that this would mean a revaluation, whereas the
exchange rate criterion (see Box 2.1) only refers to a unilaterally decided
devaluation. The reasoning behind the Balassa-Samuelson logic would
thus advocate considerable flexibility regarding  revaluations. After the
entry into the eurozone, the change in relative prices would still be
needed in any event. As a result, inflation differentials will persist.THE EURO AT 25
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Box 2.2 What will be the cost of reducing inflation under the Maastricht
threshold?
It is important to find an answer to the one key question that is likely to arise
in reality rather soon: how much growth will have to be squeezed in the short
run in order to allow a country with a strong B-S effect to reduce its inflation
differential to the 1.5% allowed for by the Maastricht criteria.
In order to get a rough idea about possible magnitudes, one can perform a
simplistic econometric analysis with data from the euro area (1999-2001)
which should rather be taken as indicative than a precise estimate of the size
of the effects in question. In this analysis the difference between national
inflation rates and the euro-area average was explained by two variables: the
relative price level and the cyclical position of the country. The result of a
simple OLS regression was rather good in that the two explanatory variables
had a strong and clearly identifiable impact on inflation differentials. The
point estimate on the relative price level variable (defined as the ratio of per
capita GDP at current prices to per capita GDP at PPP) allows one to make a
prediction for the B-S effect for the candidates. For example, for Poland per
capita GDP evaluated at PPP is around 36% of the EU average, but evaluated
at current prices without purchasing power adjustment it is only 18% of the
EU average, implying a relative price level factor of 0.5. Given the estimated
point coefficient of around (minus) 3.6 this implies that inflation in Poland
should be 1.8 % higher than the eurozone average. The B-S estimates for
other candidate countries vary between 1.3% in Slovenia to 2.6% in
Bulgaria.
One reason why the estimate of the B-S effect is lower than that in most of
the previous studies might be that they just related inflation differentials to
relative prices for the early years of the eurozone. But during these years it so
happened that the poorer countries also were in particularly strong cyclical
position (basically because their growth was still being fuelled by the huge
interest-rate reductions that had taken place just beforehand). This means that
the relative price variable also picked up the effect of the cyclical position,
and was thus biased upwards. The introduction of the variable of cyclical
position controls for this effect.
Moreover, the estimates presented here also show that it will be rather costly
in terms of foregone growth to squeeze the economy for a while, just in order
to qualify for EMU. The point estimate on the cyclical position proxy is
around 0.3. This implies that one would have to reduce growth by 3.3% in
order to reduce the inflation differential by one full percentage point.
Source: Gros (2002).THE CEECS’ ROAD TO THE EURO AREA
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Moreover, some of the candidates have deprived themselves of this
possibility by fixing their exchange rates in a form of conventional pegs
or currency boards. Therefore, the appreciation of real exchange rates can
only be achieved through changes in relative prices. These countries then
have little possibilities to limit the overall inflation without resorting to
price controls and generating recession at least in some sectors of their
economies. From this point of view, an adjustment in the Maastricht
criteria would be desirable without running the risk of damaging the
commitment to price stability in the eurozone (Buiter and Grafe, 2001).
The EU and member countries’ officials have so far been opposed to such
proposals, arguing on the principle that there should be an equal approach
to all countries.
19 It is worth noting, however, that no official intervention
into the wording of the Treaty would be necessary as the quantification of
the criteria is done in a separate protocol (Pelkmans et al., 2000).
From the above, it is obvious that the B-S effect is not only a transition
specific phenomenon. SVR (2002) looked for the sources of relative price
changes (tradables/ non-tradables) in the euro area, whereas Fagan (2001)
looks directly at inflation differentials as a function, inter alia, of price
level differences. Both identify the B-S effect as an important factor that
could contribute to divergences in inflation rates.
Fagan (see Box 2.3 below), found that the price level differences are not
the only or even main factor explaining inflation in the EMU countries.
Indeed, the estimated coefficient is so low that differences in price levels
contribute to inflation differentials only modestly. Hence, other factors
also have to be found that would explain the actual and also expected
differentials. In other words, the fact that the candidate countries are poor
today does not automatically mean that they will have much higher
inflation in the eurozone. Some fear that the accession of the applicant
countries to the eurozone would endanger price stability. Ignoring the fact
that the weight of these countries is negligible and so is their influence on
the eurozone aggregates, it is important to realise that the higher inflation
rates are a natural phenomenon that concerns the current member
countries as well.
                                                                
19 This is not that surprising after all, since the EU institutions do not account for
the impact of the B-S effect on the interest rates differentials in the eurozone
countries (Sinn and Reutter, 2001).THE EURO AT 25
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Box 2.3 Fagan (2001) panel estimate of HICP inflation (1999-2001) in
the euro area
i t i t i t i t i dprod rp y 44 . 0 0 . 1 045 . 0 14 . 0 , 1 , , , + + - = - t p
ði,t - HICP inflation rate in country i in period t (1% to 10%)
yi,t  - Output gap (for EU: OECD estimate) (-2.5 to 2.5%*)
rpi,t-1  - Relative consumer price level  (0.4 to 0.5)
ôi,t   - Indirect tax variable
dprodi,t  - Relative productivity growth (traded/non-traded) (5% to 10%)
R
2=0.82 N=33
Note: Numbers in brackets are typical numbers for candidate countries.
* For candidate countries computed as a difference between actual growth and average for
1995-2000.
The general conclusion one can draw from this partial survey is that the
B-S effect exists. Therefore, if the inflation criterion remains without
change, the candidate countries that want an early membership at a fixed
exchange rate will have to accept a period of reduced growth in order to
reduce inflation temporarily. This might not be needed if they engineer
the appropriate appreciation just before joining. But at any rate they will
have to accept higher inflation later if the catch-up continues. The key
question is how much. The earlier estimates were quite high in this
respect. However, the new evidence trying to disentangle the relative
importance of various factors on the inflation differentials is somewhat
more modest as far as the absolute values of expected B-S effect are
concerned.
In any event, if the candidate countries decide not to push too much and
wait with the introduction of the euro, one good year might help them to
get under the magical limit and they would be in (Szapary, 2000,
Pelkmans et al., 2000). This could, however, take somewhat longer than
they would wish and could also bring along all the negative aspects of
unfulfilled expectations including financial market volatility, reverse
capital flows and increased pressure on their currency. On the other hand,
such an approach would require longer-term sound fiscal and monetary
policies that would generally support the overall stability.THE CEECS’ ROAD TO THE EURO AREA
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5.2  Inflation: Maastricht criterion in need of adjustment
Apart from the specific problems that the candidate countries might incur
due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect, there are also other reasons why one
should have a closer look at the inflation criterion.
The Maastricht Treaty stipulates that the inflation rate in a prospective
euro area member must be lower than the average of three best
performing members plus 1.5 percentage points.
The first point to note is that the Treaty just speaks about member
countries. This means that the benchmark for the euro area entry may be
based on inflation not only in “euro” countries but EU members in
general. And indeed, in the last three years there was always at least one
non-eurozone country in the group of best performers (see Table 2.9
below). It is difficult to see why membership in the euro area should
depend on data of a country that stays outside.
Moreover, the criterion was originally devised because there was a clear
need for a benchmark to start EMU with a group of low-inflation
countries. In the absence of an absolute benchmark, the Treaty drafters
devised the concept of three best performing countries. However, now
that the euro area exists, a suitable benchmark is available – the average
euro-area-wide inflation rate. It makes sense to judge the readiness of the
candidates to join the euro area by comparing them to this indicator.
Furthermore, since the business cycles in the EU are not perfectly
correlated, there is always a possibility that the benchmark will be driven
by a small number of (potentially small) countries that by chance
experience abnormally low inflation (e.g. because of a local recession or
tax changes) even in a generally expansionary environment. This was the
case in 2000, when the three member countries with the lowest inflation
rate averaged 1.3%, implying an inflation criterion of 2.8%. During the
same year, Ireland, a happy euro-area member country, had an inflation
rate of over 5%, whereas a candidate country with an inflation rate of e.g.
3% would have failed to satisfy the inflation criterion. Something similar
has actually happened every year: the difference between the average of
the three best performers and the highest eurozone national inflation was
always above 1.5%.
Moreover, keeping the criterion without changes even after the EU
enlargement would in reality mean to make it much stricter because with
an increasing number of member states it becomes more and more likely
that the three best performers are outliers, which are way below the
eurozone average. This can be demonstrated in a straightforward way.
Let us assume, for simplicity, that the inflation rate in all memberTHE EURO AT 25
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countries has the same (normal) distribution. The mean does not interest
us in this context, but the variance becomes decisive. Over the last years
the standard deviation of inflation has, by chance, been very close to 1
(%). One can then calculate the probability that the average of the three
best performers falls in a certain range, given a certain number of
member states. The simple value for the standard deviation found above
implies that enlarging the EU from 15 to 25 members means that the
probability of the average inflation rates in the three best performing
countries would fall below the mean by more than 1.5 standard deviations
doubles from about 30% to almost 60%. This implies that with an EU of
25 members it becomes 60% likely that the Maastricht criterion on
inflation is actually below the euro-area average. This would lead to an
absurd situation: unless the criterion is changed one might have to
exclude a country from eurozone membership when its inflation rate is
actually below the eurozone average.
Table 2.9 Inflation: The EU and the candidate countries
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
EU
Eurozone 1.6 1.1 1.1 2.3 2.5
Average 3 best
performing EU
countries
1.2 0.7 0.6 1.3 1.8
Maastricht criterion 2.7 2.2 2.1 2.8 3.3
Highest inflation 5.4 4.5 2.5 5.3 5.1
3 best performing
countries
At, Fr, Ir At, De, Fr At, Fr, Se Fr, Se, UK Dk, Fr,
UK
Country with highest
inflation
Gr Gr Ir Ir Nl
Candidates
Average (unweighted) 10.3 8.6 5.2 6.6 5.4
Countries fulfilling
criterion
0 0 CR, Lt, Lv Lt, Lv Lt, Lv
Countries with lower
inflation than EU
highest
0 La CR, Lt, Lv
CR, Ee,
Lt, Lv CR, Lt, Lv
5.3  Fiscal challenge
Most of the candidate countries do not have any particular problems with
fulfilling the debt criterion. In this respect the performance of the Baltic
states is also striking with a public debt amounting to only 6% and 9% of
GDP for Estonia and Latvia respectively. Bulgaria, which so far highlyTHE CEECS’ ROAD TO THE EURO AREA
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exceeds the stipulated framework, is planning substantial reductions of
the debt. Also Hungary which is now approximately at the level required
by the Maastricht criteria is expecting a considerable consolidation of its
debt position until 2004. What might be worrying is the dynamics of the
public debt in some other candidate countries. It is especially the case of
the Czech Republic, Slovakia and to some extent also Poland. The major
reason is the necessary cleansing of their banking sectors which were
troubled by several crises during the last couple of years. The data on bad
loans in the economies (see below) indicate that a large part of this
problem has already been solved, and thus no further large increases in
the level of government debt should be expected. However, in the short-
to medium-term, the d ebt-to-GDP ratios might still increase, but the
process will presumably be over before the EU accession. Further pressure
on public finances from this side should thus be limited.
20 Moreover, in
most of the candidate countries, strong growth combined with relatively low
deficits should lead to rather strong downward pressures on the debt-to-
GDP ratio so that some debt assumption could take place without
jeopardising the debt criterion.
A much greater problem seems to be the fulfilment of the deficit
criterion. This is especially the case in a majority of the CEECs. In 2001,
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary and also Romania greatly
exceeded the 3% threshold for budget deficits. It is also worrying that no
significant improvements are envisaged by some of them. The impact of
expansionary fiscal policies could to a certain extent be limited by the
fact that the higher deficits still reflect the costs of banking-sector
restructuring.
Achieving a fiscal deficit below 3% is essentially a question of political
will. But the will seems to be withering in some of these countries. In the
short-term they have often a very limited scope for reductions in deficits as
a large part of the budgets is composed of mandatory expenditures.
Moreover, tax collection is sometimes relatively inefficient, thus
contributing to an increase in tax arrears and exerting further pressure on the
balance of public revenues and expenditures. Therefore, substantial fiscal
reforms are needed in order to provide the desired fiscal discretion. And it
takes some time to phase-in such reforms. The conflict of political
proclamations and lack of will or perhaps ability to take appropriate
measures is especially apparent in Poland, which wants to adopt the euro as
early as possible yet has failed to come up with a programme for the
necessary reductions in budget deficits. The need for fiscal reforms in the
                                                                
20 See Pelkmans et al. (2000) for more details.THE EURO AT 25
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candidate countries is generally acknowledged, but their execution is very
sensitive politically. Suhrke (2001) found that people in the transition
economies exhibit a clear preference for more income equality compared to
their West European counterparts. This “egalitarian” spirit might effectively
prevent any attempts for larger reforms of public expenditure as they would
most probably entail reductions in social transfers. Such an effect is likely to
be much stronger in the wake of elections. On the other hand, the objective
to join EMU which is positively accepted by the public in most of the
candidate countries and which is conditional upon following healthy fiscal
policies, could act as a catalyst for the reforms.
In this context, one can also ask whether it is only the structure of public
expenditures that is not suitable for the transition economies. It might also
be that the size of government is too big given their level of economic
development. This would further support the argument for radical fiscal
reforms. Figure 2.6, relating per capita GDP measured in PPP and size of
the government for 88 countries, attempts to provide at least a partial answer
to this question. And indeed, it seems that all of the candidate countries lie
above the regression line, which would mean that they cannot afford to have
such an extensive public sector at their level of development. Several
caveats have to be made, however. The fit of the regression is rather loose.
And further, if only the EU and the CEECs are taken into account, there
seems to be hardly any relationship between the size of government and per
capita output.
Figure 2.6 Size of government and economic development
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A crucial question for the future shape of fiscal policies in the candidate
countries is whether there are any longer-term (probably transition-related)
factors that would urge the candidate countries to continue running large
budget deficits? It is often argued that such pressure might arise from the
need to build a modern infrastructure in the candidate economies, plus the
pressure on their underdeveloped social systems. Thus according to Wagner
(2001), an effort to comply prematurely with the budget deficit criteria
might lead to real divergence. He argues that there is a trade-off between
real and nominal convergence stemming from the need for the candidate
countries to support their catching-up process by building an appropriate
infrastructure. He goes even further by saying that some of the transition
countries might “lag behind more and more, so that the other EU countries
will politically be forced to bail these countries out. As soon as the financial
markets assign high enough probability to this scenario, this may result in a
significant EU-wide increase in interest rates and thus, at the worst, lead to
an anticipatory recession.” (Wagner, 2001, p. 31). However, these concerns
seem grossly overestimated as the reliance on government investment as a
prerequisite for economic growth is clearly doubtful.
Moreover, one also needs to know the extent to which the candidate
countries are lagging behind the EU in terms of infrastructure. Public
infrastructure in the CEECs is certainly less developed than in the current
EU members. The candidates have fewer motorways and paved roads per
inhabitant and square kilometre, fewer fixed telephone lines, etc., but this
does not immediately imply that they therefore need more investment in
this area. What they have might actually be adequate for their level of
development.
21 Poland for example has actually a larger stock of
infrastructure than one would expect given its income per capita. It is thus
difficult to argue that public infrastructure is the main impediment to
growth.
22 Moreover, once the CEECs join the EU they will be eligible for
support under the regional policy of the EU, which is designed to finance
this type of expenditure.
                                                                
21 See Gros and Suhrcke (2000).
22 There are more reasons to doubt the need for large public infrastructure
spending: Within the EU one actually does not find any link between public
investment and growth in GDP. Ireland, by far the fastest-growing economy of
the EU in recent decades, has a somewhat below-average ratio of public
investment to GDP. Moreover, given the changes in financial markets that have
taken place over the last decade, it is now generally recognised that most
infrastructure projects could also be financed and sometimes even operated with
substantial private sector involvement. Major projects, such as motorways, are
already being undertaken on a mainly private sector basis in the candidates.THE EURO AT 25
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In the EU it is also often argued that the candidate countries have an
underdeveloped social security system. It is true that pension
expenditures figure prominently in the current debate over the budget
crisis in Poland. But the same could be said of most EU countries as well.
Indeed, most of the indicators that should signal pressure for spending in the
social sphere show little difference between the EU and the CEECs.
For example, there is no significant difference in the age profiles between
the EU and most of the candidates. The ageing problem is thus not worse
for the new members. Poland actually has somewhat less of a greying
problem than the EU. In terms of public spending on health and education
(as a percentage of GNP), there is also little difference between the
candidates (around 5%) and the EU average (below 6%).
On the other hand, there will be considerable costs of complying with the
EU standards (especially environmental). A further “burden” on the
candidate countries’ budgets will be the requirement to provide a part of the
funding of projects under the EU structural and cohesion programmes
(Eichengreen and Ghironi, 2001). This could either prevent the candidate
countries from making maximum use of the available funds or cause them
to seek savings in other areas that could be efficiency decreasing. Thus, in a
recession the candidates could be deprived of EU sources of financing, as
they would not be able to provide their required part. Therefore,
Eichengreen and Ghironi advocate increasing the 3% limit on budget
deficits given by the Growth and Stability Pact.
23 An alternative solution
would be a change in the rules concerning the provision of the financing
from the EU Structural Funds.
Fiscal policy will undoubtedly be one of the crucial factors in the CEECs’
quest to join the eurozone. If managed properly, it can smooth the way; if
not, the way can become quite bumpy.  All in all, it appears that the
pressure on budgets should be manageable over the medium run in all the
CEECs, allowing them to achieve the required remaining reductions in
deficits. This, however, will require some effort and in some case even more
profound fiscal reforms.
                                                                
23 They further argue in favour of increasing the limit on budget deficits by
saying that the new member states will be able to grow considerably faster than
the current members did in 1990s when the criteria were designed. The candidate
countries are also likely to experience “larger shocks, either of the business cycle
variety or one-off disturbances like a banking problem”.THE CEECS’ ROAD TO THE EURO AREA
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5.4  Exchange rate regimes
The candidate countries have a whole range of exchange rates regimes in
place with differing degrees of flexibility. On the one hand, Bulgaria,
Estonia and Lithuania operate currency boards and on the other Slovakia,
Slovenia, Romania, the Czech Republic and Poland introduced managed
floating or freely floating exchange rates. The present situation is a result
of a longer-term development during which the candidates adapted their
exchange rate regimes according to the needs of monetary policy
management or, at times, as a consequence of currency crises. Some
economists (Begg et al., 2001, Buiter and Grafe, 2001 and Tullio, 1999)
have put forward the idea of hollowing out the middle ground of the
exchange rate regimes. It is based on the observation that, whereas at the
beginning of transformation most of the post-communist countries
operated exchange rate regimes with reduced flexibility (mostly pegs);
they later shifted to either fixed regimes or rather to flexible regimes.
Such a tendency has been found also in the case of other emerging
economies in general (Fischer, 1999). The underlying reason is the
increasing role of capital flows in the international economy.
Consequently, small open economies that have dismantled the barriers to
free movement of capital find it increasingly difficult, if not impossible,
to operate exchange rate regimes with an intermediate degree of
flexibility.
Before the candidate countries may enter the monetary union, they will
have to pass three stages (EC, 2000):
1)  The pre-accession stage;
2)  The accession phase, covering the period from the date of accession
to adoption of the single currency (this stage can be subdivided into
the period before adopting the ERM II regime and the membership in
the mechanism); and
3)  The final phase of the adoption of the euro.
In the current pre-accession stage, the choice of the exchange rate regime
is left fully to the discretion of the candidate countries. After numerous
pledges from both representatives of the candidate countries and the EU
member states, it seems probable that, if no unforeseen difficulties arise,
the accession negotiations will be concluded by the end of 2002. Thus the
target set at the Göteborg European Council aiming for 2004 as the date
of entry of the most advanced candidates into the EU can reasonably be
achieved. Furthermore, the so-called big-bang scenario has become ever
more probable after ten out of the current twelve candidates (leaving
behind Bulgaria and Romania) were marked as capable of concluding theTHE EURO AT 25
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negotiations by the set term at the Laeken European Council summit.
Thus it seems that the pre-accession period might soon be over for the
majority of the CEECs.
The second stage, starting at the moment of EU membership, will not
change much. Representatives of the EU have confirmed on several
occasions that the new member states cannot hope for an opt-out from
participating in the single currency as received by Great Britain and
Denmark. They will become members of the EMU with a derogation for
introducing the euro.
24 The new members will be able to keep their
current exchange rate arrangements. The only limitation will be that they
will be obliged, according to Article 124 of the Treaty, to consider their
exchange rate policies as a matter of common interest. The ECOFIN
Council further specified this by stating that the smooth functioning of
the single market must not be distorted by competitive devaluations.
According to the Maastricht criteria, a country has to prove the stability
of its exchange rate before it can adopt the euro. In practise it means that
a country has to become a member of the EMR II and comply with its
rules for at least two years (see the Box 2.4 on ERM II below). Thus the
ERM II membership will be the ultimate stage before entry into the
eurozone and according to many economists also the most critical one.
The candidate countries are not in any way bound as to the timing of their
entry into ERM II. Those who are willing to adopt the euro in the shortest
possible time will aim to introduce the ERM II upon their entry into the
EU. Those who stick to the more cautious approach can follow the
example of Sweden and postpone it for quite some time. Most of the
candidate countries, however, do not seem extremely excited at the
prospect of operating fixed exchange rates, even with a rather wide
fluctuation band, as it can very likely generate exchange rate risk. It is
thus to be expected that the countries will adopt this regime for only the
required two years – if everything goes well.
In terms of the exact form of the exchange rate, the ERM II is rather
benevolent. According to the European Commission (2000), the only
exchange rate regimes that are incompatible with the ERM II are regimes
                                                                
24 This means that all the EMU-related legislation would have to be implemented
even before EU entry. The envisaged measures include complete liberalisation of
the capital movements (Art. 56); prohibition of any direct public sector financing
by the central bank (Art. 101) and of privileged access of the public sector to the
financial institutions (Art. 102); alignment of the national central bank statutes
with the Treaty, including the independence of the monetary authorities (Arts.
108 and 109). (European Commission, 2000).THE CEECS’ ROAD TO THE EURO AREA
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without a mutually agreed central rate to the euro, crawling pegs, and
pegs to currencies other than the euro. This means that a large number of
the candidate countries will have to, at this point, adapt their exchange
rate regime to make it compatible with the ERM II (for an overview of
the current exchange rate arrangement, see Table 2.10).
Table 2.10 ER and plans for participation in ERM II/EMU
Country Current ER
regime
MP
framework
PEP (EMU
target date)
Plans for
EMU entry
ERM II
Bulgaria CB (euro)
from 1997
Goal:
nominal
convergence
until EU
accession
Yes (national
accession
strategy)
Keep CB
CR Managed
floating
Inflation
targeting
No No ±15%
Estonia CB (euro)
from 1992
IMF
supported
No Target date
not set till
2003
Keep CB
Hungary Crawling
bands
(±15%)
Inflation
targeting
ASAP Yes (mon.
policy aimed
at EMU in
2006-7)
2 years
(possibly
narrower
bands)
Latvia Fixed peg to
SDR
IMF
supported
No Yes (national
accession
strategy)
Lithuania CB (in Feb
switched
from USD
to euro)
IMF
supported
No Join ERM II Keep CB
Poland Independent
floating
Inflation
targeting
No Yes (2006) After
accession,
Romania Managed*
floating
IMF
supported
No Meet Maastr.
in MT
Switch to
euro as a
reference
currency
Slovakia Managed
floating
No specific
anchor
ASAP
taking into
account real
convergence
Slovenia Managed
floating
Monetary
aggregate
target
No Yes (Central
Bank –
2006)
ASAP
after
accession
* The de facto exchange rate regime of Romania differs from the de jure one. In reality, the
exchange-rate regime is an informal crawling peg to the US dollar linked to inflation.
Sources: IMF, EC (2002b) and Lorenzen (2001).THE EURO AT 25
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It is especially the case of the countries operating floating exchange rates
and Latvia, which has kept the peg of its currency to SDR. In practise, the
switch from floating to ERM II does not have to be that profound a
change in some of the countries as they manage their exchange rates quite
heavily and the exchange rate is in general quite stable (e.g. Slovenia).
Latvia will have to adjust its peg and attach the lat to the euro. However,
the central bank is willing to do this only once the county enters the EU.
Despite the fact that Latvian trade has reoriented towards the EU
significantly, only 36% of the value of the transactions take place in euro.
Also the private sector in Latvia is quite resistant to using the euro. Only
10% of foreign currency deposits are denominated in euro. The rest is
dominated in dollars (Repse, 2001). Lithuania has successfully repegged
the litas from the dollar to the euro on 2 February 2002. Hungary, willing
to give further boost to disinflation, increased the fluctuation bands of the
Forint to ±15% in May 2001. This can also be seen as a preparation for
the entry into the ERM II.
Until recently the countries with currency boards were concerned about
the possible implications of participation in the ERM II. They were afraid
that after having operated the very fixed exchange rates for a couple of
years, they would have to abandon the firm peg and introduce some
degree of flexibility in the form of an ERM II fluctuation band. The
Commission and the ECOFIN Council acknowledged, however, that such
a solution would not bring the desired stability and voiced their opinion
that currency boards were compatible with the ERM II regime as long as
the ECB and the respective country agreed on the central parity. By
contrast, the EU (EC, 2000) has resolutely refused any attempts at
unilateral euroisation as it would reportedly run counter to the logic of
demonstrating sustainable convergence as stipulated by the Treaty.
Box 2.4 Exchange Rate Mechanism II
The Exchange Rate Mechanism II replaced the European Monetary System
after EMU was established on 1 January 1999. The rules of the ERM II were
set in two legal Acts:
1)  The resolution of the European Council on the establishment of an
exchange rate mechanism in the third stage of economic and monetary
union (16 June 1997) and
2)  The Agreement between the European Central Bank and the national
central banks of the member states outside the euro area laying down the
operating procedures for an exchange rate mechanism in stage three ofTHE CEECS’ ROAD TO THE EURO AREA
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Economic and Monetary Union (1 September 1998 and amended on 14
September 2000).
According to these documents, the exchange rates between the euro area and
the non-euro area EU countries are governed by the following principles:
•  The non-euro area countries are required to treat their exchange rate
policy as a matter of common interest. The functioning of the single
market should not be endangered by real exchange rate misalignments or
excessive exchange rate fluctuations, which would disrupt trade flows
between member states.
•  The ERM II should not endanger the primary objective of the ECB to
maintain price stability. Thus, any adjustment should be made in a
timely fashion in order to avoid fundamental misalignments.
•  The EU countries participate in the ERM II on a voluntary basis.
However, a country with a derogation for the introduction of the euro is
expected to join the mechanism.
•  The ERM II is based on central rates of the national currencies against
the euro. Any decision on the rates will be taken by mutual agreement of
the ministers of the euro area member states, the ECB and the ministers
and central bank governors of the non-euro area member states
participating in the ERM II. The procedure also involves the European
Commission and the Economic and Financial Committee. The ministers
and governors of the central banks of the member states not participating
in the ERM II will take part but will not have the right to vote in the
procedure. All parties to the mutual agreement, including the ECB, will
have the right to initiate a confidential procedure aimed at reconsidering
central rates. The central rates will, however, remain the focus for the
non-eurozone countries participating in the ERM II through the
implementation of stability-oriented economic and monetary policies.
•  The standard fluctuation band around the central parity will be ±15%.
Interventions at the margins will in principle be automatic and unlimited,
with a very short-term financing available (up to 3 months). The ECB
and participating central banks can suspend the interventions only if the
primary objective of price stability is endangered. After mutual
agreement between the ECB and the respective central bank of a non-
eurozone country, an intramarginal intervention can be undertaken.
•  A narrower fluctuation band than the standard one can be agreed upon at
the request of the non-eurozone member state concerned. Such a
negotiated fluctuation band would in principle be backed by automatic
intervention and financing. The decision on the fluctuation band would
follow the same procedure as in the case of central rates.THE EURO AT 25
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Despite the immense progress achieved by most of the CEECs, they are
still considered as being transition economies. As such they are more
vulnerable to various shocks and crises. Therefore, the choice of the
exchange rate regime can potentially play an important role in the process
of joining EMU. Many economists have devoted a great deal of attention
to the question of which exchange rate regime the candidate countries
should adopt during the transition period before full EMU membership to
be able to cope with any problems they might encounter along the way.
This research is useful for identifying potential sources of instability, but
the original question about the optimal choice of exchange rate regime
seems to be of limited practical use as most of the candidate countries
seem to be satisfied with their current arrangements and are planning to
retain them until their entry into ERM II or even the eurozone. Any
substantial changes in exchange rate regimes that might be undertaken
will, therefore, most probably be a consequence of an actual crisis not a
precaution against one.
6.  Specific structural issues: The banking system and financial
markets
The candidate countries still have to address a considerable number of
structural issues. Despite the vast differences among the candidate
countries, the most pressing issues are very similar. Most of them wish to
finalise the privatisation and liberalisation process (there are usually
backlogs in privatising large enterprises, especially telecoms and
utilities). Furthermore, new legislation on competition and bankruptcy
usually needs to be introduced and implemented. Tackling all these issues
will be crucial for future development towards stable and healthy
economic climates, which will be indispensable for a smooth transition to
the euro. Since these issues are of general interest and do not pose any
immediate implications for the process of monetary integration, however,
they will not be treated explicitly. Instead, attention will be directed
towards an area that will be of utmost importance in the transition to the
euro – financial markets, including their structure, vulnerability to crises
and legal framework.
Given all the risks inherent in the monetary integration process, there will
be a great need for stable and healthy banking sectors and capital markets
in the candidate countries. They should be able to cope with the
challenges brought about by large capital inflows or contagion effects of
financial crises in world markets – the financial markets of the candidate
countries are after all still considered as emerging markets. Furthermore,
the financial markets are essential for attaining a higher level of realTHE CEECS’ ROAD TO THE EURO AREA
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convergence since the necessary restructuring and dynamic development
of the enterprise sector can hardly be possible without sources of
financing. Therefore, stable institutions intermediating domestic savings
to investment are needed.
Banking systems and capital markets could also become a cause of crises
themselves. If, for example, the banking system proved to exhibit
substantial deficiencies in terms of regulations or their application, or
alternatively, if a string of bad loans got out of hand without the
authorities intervening in time, investor confidence could be shattered
and a crisis could potentially follow. The latest empirical research
suggests a strong link between currency crises and banking crises (e.g.
Kaminski, 1999). Currency crises are often preceded by, or coincide with,
banking crises. Therefore, it is essential for the candidate countries to
have sound banking systems in order to be able to cope with large capital
inflows that are in some cases already occurring and that are expected to
further strengthen due to the so-called “convergence play” in the run-up
to the eurozone accession. In this respect, Demirguc-Kunt and
Detragiache (1998) find that the probability of a currency crisis depends
negatively on the number of foreign banks operating in the country. The
fact that EU banks already dominate the CEECs’ banking systems (see
below) should thus provide some protection against banking crises.
Another reason why the banking systems of the candidates might
constitute less of a potential for crisis is their small size in comparison to
their EU counterparts. As a measure of banking system development and
its ability to intermediate savings into investment, one can use the share
of domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP (Table
2.11). The comparison unveils an immense difference between the
candidate countries and developed economies. Whereas the share stands
at roughly 120% in the latter group, the best performing candidates – the
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia – find their values at about 40%.
In Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Latvia, the domestic credit as a
percentage of GDP is roughly 20%. The last group of countries with very
low values slightly exceeding 10% comprises Lithuania, Bulgaria and
Romania.
Not only is the domestic credit very low in the candidate countries but its
development over time is hardly encouraging as it exhibits very little
progress and significant instability. Very few countries experienced a
substantial rise in the indicator throughout the transition process. Thus
only Slovakia has made considerable progress. Positive developments can
also be observed in the case of Estonia, Slovenia and to a certain extent
Poland. All the other countries more or less stagnated or evenTHE EURO AT 25
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experienced sharp reversals that usually coincide with periods in which
the countries were hit by economic crises. As a consequence, the
domestic credit in the Czech Republic has declined from its peak of about
60% in 1995 to slightly over 40% at the end of the decade.
Table 2.11 Domestic bank credit to the private sector as % of GDP
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Bulgaria 35.6 12.6 12.7 14.6 12.5
CR 57.4 54.7 48 43.8 38.2*
Estonia 18 25.5 25.2 25.9 25.9
Hungary 18.7 20.4 20 20.7 23.6
Latvia 7.2 10.7 15.2 16 19.6
Lithuania 10.7 9.6 10 10.7 14
Poland 15.9 18.1 17.6 18.8 18.8
Romania 11.5 13.7 16.6 10.5 n.a.
Slovakia 24.9 42.1 43.9 40.5 37.6
Slovenia 28.7 28.6 32.8 35.8 n.a.
Germany 108.8 112.8 118.2 117.4 120.3
UK 120.7 120.9 120.2 123.5 135.1
* Provisional figure for December.
Source: EBRD.
The poor performance in terms of lending activity of the candidate
countries’ banking sectors points to structural problems with channelling
savings of the population to private investment. The gross saving rates of
the candidate economies are on average close to that in the EU – 21%
compared to 22%.
25 However, the per capita bank deposits in PPP terms
reach only 18% of the EU average. As the major part of savings in the
candidate countries is deposited with banks, the part that is invested in the
securities markets can hardly explain the huge discrepancy. A possible
reason might be the low banking tradition and unwillingness of people to
save. Also the trust in the banking sectors is still at a low level due to a
                                                                
25 Though, it is often argued that the candidate countries should strive to achieve
substantially higher levels of savings if they want to catch up successfully with
their EU counterparts. But also in this case the data hide a highly differentiated
picture. Whereas the Czech Republic and Hungary save 31% of their GDP,
Bulgaria’s saving rate is only 7%.THE CEECS’ ROAD TO THE EURO AREA
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number of crises and bankruptcies. Thus, it seems that a significant
proportion of individual savings is still kept “under the mattress” instead
of being available for efficient investment opportunities.
Table 2.12 Banking sector indicators, 2000
Risk-weighted capital asset
ratio (in %)
Non-performing loans
(% of total)
Bulgaria n.a. 10.9
CR 14.9 19.3
Estonia n.a. 1.5
Hungary 13.5 3.1
Latvia n.a. 8.3
Lithuania n.a. 10.8
Poland 12.4 15.9
Romania n.a. 3.8
Slovakia 12.5 26.2
Slovenia 13.5 8.5
Note: Non-performing loans – excludes loans transferred to a rehabilitation agency or a
consolidation bank.
Source: EBRD.
How healthy are the (small) banking systems of the candidate countries?
In many cases they are still characterised by a high volume of bad loans,
currently estimated on average at about 15% of the total. Nevertheless,
given the very low share of the domestic credit as a percentage of GDP
the share of the non-performing loans in countries’ GDP is usually rather
limited and does not pose a significant threat to economy or public
finances.
The overall data on bad loans hide an uneven pattern. The most troubled
seem to be the Central European candidate countries (with the exception
of Hungary and partly Slovenia). On the other side, Estonia performs the
best. Some caution is necessary when looking at the data, however, as it
does not include bad loans that have been transferred to national
consolidation agencies or consolidation banks. Thus, for instance, the
Romanian figure declined sharply from its peak of almost 60% in 1998 to
roughly 4% two years later. In the Czech Republic the considerable
losses of the consolidation agency due to the clearing of the bankingTHE EURO AT 25
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sector prior to its privatisation
26 are included in the expenditure side of
the government budget, thus significantly increasing the resulting
deficits. This indicates that the price for stabilisation of the banking
system which has to be borne by the public sector can be substantial (e.g.
in Hungary the costs of recapitalisation and rehabilitation are estimated at
10% of GDP; see Wagner and Iakova, 2001). The latest estimates show
that the costs could be as high as 20% in the Czech Republic (EC,
2002a)). Bad loans thus remain a problem of public finances.
However, the vulnerability of the banking system might not be as severe
as generally perceived. During the 1990s, the candidate countries
proceeded with privatisation of banks, although at different speed.
According to the European Commission (2001c), bank privatisation has
been completed in Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and the Czech Republic.
Progress has been achieved in Lithuania, Romania, Poland and Slovakia,
whereas it is lagging in Slovenia.  The process of privatisation and
consolidation of the banking sector has resulted in strong foreign
presence of domestic banks. This is a beneficial process for the candidate
countries as strong strategic partners provide the domestic banks with
their banking know-how and also strengthen their capital positions.
A large majority of the new owners come from the EU countries, which
contribute, to further integration of the banking systems of the EU and the
future members. Thus, in the Baltic countries, characterised by a very
high degree of consolidation, the banking systems have become largely
integrated and connected to the Nordic members of the EU. In Estonia,
for example, the two largest banks with assets accounting for almost 85%
of the total assets of the sector – Hansbank and Uhisbank – are controlled
by two Swedish banks – Swedbank and SEB, respectively. Swedbank
also plays, through Hansbank, an important role in the banking systems
of the two remaining Baltic countries. SEB also controls crucial shares in
Latvian and Lithuanian banks. The banking sectors of the other candidate
countries are fragmented to a much larger degree (especially in Poland)
but important stakes are held by Western banks (see Table 2.13 for an
overview of foreign ownership of banking sector assets in the candidate
countries and, for comparison, in the EU).
                                                                
26 A considerable part of the loss was incurred by the bail-out of the already
privatised IPB Bank which collapsed in June 2000. This case also points to the
importance of creating appropriate incentive schemes for strategic investors. The
IPB Bank had been sold to the investment bank Nomura Europe in 1998.
However, the new owner failed to undertake the necessary restructuring which
led to a deterioration of bank’s balance during the recession in 1998 and 1999
and ended in a collapse.THE CEECS’ ROAD TO THE EURO AREA
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Table 2.13 Share of majority foreign-owned banks in total assets (in %)
Panel a) The CEECs
1998 1999 2000 2001
BL 74,4
CZ 25.7 28.1 65.5 90.1
EE 5.1 90 93 97.5
HU 58.9 61.8 62.9 65.5
LA 78.7 78.2 77.2 62.6
LI 51.8 38.3 57 83.9
PO 16.6 47.2 69.6 68.4
RO 20 47.5 50.9 55
SL n.a. 28.2 42.7 81
SI 20 47.5 50.9 55
Source: European Commission (2002a).
Panel b) The EU
Ireland 53.8 Netherlands 7.7
UK 52.1 Finland 7.1
Belgium 36.3 Italy 6.8
Greece 21.9 Germany 4.3
Spain 11.7 Austria 3.3
Portugal 10.5 Sweden 1.6
France 9.8 (1996) Denmark n.a.
Source: European Central Bank (1999).
Over the last decade, banking sectors in the candidate countries have thus
gone through a pronounced process of consolidation. Preparation for
impending EU membership has become another important factor
contributing to further this process, especially through the adoption and
application of stricter EU legislation concerning regulation and
supervision of the financial markets.THE EURO AT 25
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The positive impact of the increased competition and rising efficiency of
the banking institutions together with relatively stable and favourable
macroeconomic environments can be seen in the rapidly declining
interest spreads (lending rate minus deposit rate) in most of the candidate
countries. The most advanced countries are now approaching the EU
levels in this respect.
All in all, it appears that during the last couple of years the situation has
improved considerably and the banking sectors have undergone a process
of privatisation, restructuralisation and rehabilitation. A strong foreign
ownership of local banks has become a rule rather than an exception after
most of the candidate countries cast away the protectionist policies and
granted foreign investors full access to their banking institutions. Though
still somewhat weak, the banking sectors in most of the candidate
countries seem to be structurally healthy.
Therefore, the factors that troubled the banking sectors of the candidate
countries in the past, such as the non-performing loans, macroeconomic
instability and state interventions, should not be a factor of great concern
if one looks forward to EMU. Risks obviously remains, for example:
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, the large scale of private
capital flows, real exchange rate appreciation, the incidence of lending
booms, a lack of deep bond and derivative markets and weaknesses in the
accounting, disclosure and legal frameworks. This indicates that attention
need no longer focus on the fundamental structural issues but rather on
general improvements in the regulatory framework and its
implementation. Good regulation, healthy macroeconomic policies and
strategic foreign participation in the domestic banking sectors will be
essential to cope with large capital inflows and the potential volatility that
are likely to characterise the transition period before full EMU
membership.
7.  Conclusions
Ten of the thirteen candidate countries are proceeding quickly towards
EU membership, which formally also implies the right to membership in
EMU. However, these new EU members will initially have a derogation
for the introduction of the euro. When can and should this derogation be
lifted, i.e. when should the euro be introduced in these countries? And
how can one ensure that the transition period to the euro is smooth?
These are the key issues underlying the analysis presented in this chapter.
The time frame is now quite clear: The earliest possible date of entry into
the eurozone is the year 2006 (if the EU enlarges in the course of 2004).
A large number of the candidate countries have expressed a willingnessTHE CEECS’ ROAD TO THE EURO AREA
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to proceed to the eurozone as quickly as possible. It is thus possible that
by 2006 the membership of the eurozone will grow considerably. A brief
comparison with the Club Med countries (whose qualification for EMU
was also long in doubt) indicates that most of the candidate countries
could be able to satisfy the Maastricht conditions relatively quickly.
But many officials in the EU, especially in financial circles, are not
particularly excited about this prospect and call for prudence and a
slower-track approach. The objections are usually couched in terms of the
need to reach a higher level of real convergence. Although it is
acknowledged that a monetary union is fully compatible with income
differences among its members, too fast a compliance with the nominal
convergence criteria is sometimes portrayed as a threat to real
convergence.
The analysis in this paper suggests that fulfilment of the fiscal criteria
should not represent a problem for the candidates and cannot be said to
retard real convergence. However, this is not necessarily the case for the
inflation criterion (if viewed together with the exchange rate stability
criterion). The catching-up process can be expected to lead to
substantially higher inflation rates in the candidates if they fix their
exchange rate to the euro. Our analysis of this so-called Balassa-
Samuelson effect suggests that the magnitude of the problem might be
smaller than often feared, but the problem exists and poses a dilemma for
the candidate countries: either implement restrictive policies to squeeze
inflation during the qualification period for EMU, or accept a delay in
being able to join the euro.
In this limited sense one can argue that the Maastricht criteria do not take
into account the specific situation of the candidate economies. As a result,
the candidate countries willing to fulfil the inflation criterion might be
forced to follow sub-optimal economic policies. Therefore, there is a
strong economic case for a reappraisal of at least one criterion.
It is a generally accepted proposition that the most dangerous exchange
rate system combines capital mobility and “fixed but adjustable”
exchange rates. This is exactly the position the candidates will be in for at
least two years, when they have to qualify for EMU. What then should
the EU do to smoothen the way to the eurozone?
It seems that the best protection against speculative attacks during the
transition is to follow a clear path towards the euro. The candidates will
have to ensure that their public finances remain sound. The EU side
should make sure that the price stability criterion is applied in a sensible
way.102
CHAPTER 3
PREPARING THE ECB FOR ENLARGEMENT:
REPRESENTATION VERSUS EFFICIENCY?
1.  Introduction
The previous chapters have discussed the economic implications of
enlarging the euro area to the East and the West. It is by now widely
accepted that enlargement requires reform of the highest decision-making
bodies of the ECB. Without reform, the membership of the Governing
Council of the ECB would increase with each country that joins the
eurozone. The Governing Council is composed of the six members of the
Executive Board (henceforth EXB) and the president of the national
central bank (NCB) of each country that has joined the eurozone. If
“only” the three current “out” countries (the UK, Denmark and Sweden)
among the EU-15 were to join, the Governing Council would already
have 21 members. If (when?) all present 13 candidates for EU
membership join, the Governing Council would then have over 30
members – more like a mini-parliament than a decision-making body that
has to manage a global currency in fast-moving financial markets.
The essence of our proposal is to re-define the division of labour between
the Executive Board and the Governing Council. The Executive Board
should develop into a decision-making body in its own right, but so far its
powers have been fully controlled by the Governing Council. The tasks
of the Governing Council could be to set the direction for monetary
policy, decide on proposals from the Executive Board, constitute a
platform for the exchange of views on the eurozone economy and
monitor the work of the Executive Board. These tasks can be performed
efficiently even by a rather large body and the representation of all
member countries in the Governing Council provides the appropriate
legitimacy for such a controlling function.
In European monetary policy, the Governing Council can be regarded as
the “sovereign institution”. It derives its sovereignty from the fact that it
represents all the member states and pools expert knowledge from the
national central banks. All powers within the ESCB can eventually be
traced back to the Governing Council. This also applies to the Executive
Board, all of whose powers at present are directly delegated by the
Governing Council.PREPARING THE ECB FOR ENLARGEMENT
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Our proposal does not affect the primacy of the Governing Council – all
powers would continue to emanate from it. It does, however, reduce the
right of the Governing Council to control every single act of the
Executive Board. Thus the Executive Board could come to enjoy a
certain degree of discretion, which is justified by the fact that it represents
not just the aggregation of individual state interests but rather a “general
European monetary interest”.
2.  The state of the discussions so far
Recognising that a Governing Council of over 30 members would be
unwieldy, the European Council of Nice agreed on a simplified procedure
to make some changes in the membership of the ECB governing bodies
and asked the ECB to make concrete proposals.
1 This seems to have set in
motion a lively discussion within the Eurosystem about which very little
is known outside central banking circles.
The academic literature on this issue is scarce. (For a summary of ECB
reform proposals published so far, please see Annex 2.) Most of the
existing contributions start with assumptions about the differences in the
motivations of the presidents of national central banks versus those of the
members of the ECB Executive Board. They then proceed to discuss the
number of NCB presidents that should attend, or be able to vote, in the
Governing Council. The key problem of this literature is that the results
rely on assumptions about differences in motivations that are entirely
arbitrary. For example, Berger (2002) assumes that members do not have
a target level for output, whereas NCB presidents do. This has the
immediate implication that the best arrangement would be a Governing
Council without NCB presidents. Other contributions have made similar
assumptions. In addition, NCB presidents are often assumed to focus on
national economic developments while the Board is characterised as
having a more European perspective. But this is a separate issue that will
not be discussed here.
The key assumption that only NCB governors care about employment is
not well grounded. Within the Governing Council, NCB presidents and
members of the EXB are formally on an equal footing. The only formal
difference between them lies in the nomination process. The Board
members are nominated by a European body (the European Council),
                                                                
1 Once the Nice Treaty is in force, the relevant part (Art. 10.2) of the Statutes of
the ESCB can be amended upon a unanimous proposition from the Council and
enter into force after having been ratified by all the member states (see Annex 1
for the relevant excerpts from the Treaty).THE EURO AT 25
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whereas the NCB presidents are nominated at the national level. All these
nomination processes are subject to strong political pressures and are thus
a priori equally likely to result in personalities that represent the
preferences of the society in terms of employment, including a target
level for output. The nomination procedure for the EXB should in
principle produce candidates that are committed to represent area-wide,
rather than national interests. But the national vs. EU dimension is
completely independent (technically: orthogonal) to the issue whether the
ECB will try to influence output. A committed European is as likely (or
unlikely) to be a hawk as someone who has national loyalties. Moreover,
the row on the occasion of the nomination of the first EXB and in
particular the President of the ECB in 1998 shows that national interests
or pride have a strong influence even over nominations for membership
of the EXB. In this sense, much of the existing analysis seems to be
“barking up the wrong tree”.
This chapter abstracts from the issue whether Board members or NCB
presidents are more likely to have an output target, and also from the fact
that there are discrepancies between the economic weights of countries in
the eurozone and their “political” weights (which in principle would all
be equal on the assumption that Board members have no “nationality”).
See Box 3.1 and Berger (2002) for more detail on this issue.
This chapter emphasises instead one key difference between NCB
presidents and members of the Board that is more objective: i.e. their
respective information bases. Board members concentrate on area-wide
aggregates in their daily work and are likely to be in closer contact with
global financial markets than the NCB presidents. The latter perform a
wide variety of functions at the national level: they supervise the national
banking system, they are influential participants in national debates about
almost all economic policy issues, etc. By contrast the members of the
Board can concentrate almost exclusively on issues related to the
formulation of the common monetary policy stance.
This information advantage of the Board members is likely to be most
pronounced in the area of financial market developments. Area-wide data
on real economic variables, such as output, result essentially from the
summation of national data that become available at different points in
time and most of which contain small national idiosyncrasies. Financial
markets are much more integrated than the markets for goods in services
so that an observer at the centre does not need to have detailed local
knowledge. Some national idiosyncrasies persist in financial markets at
the retail level, but the movement towards a unified market is stronger for
financial services than for goods and most other services.PREPARING THE ECB FOR ENLARGEMENT
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Box 3.1 Enlargement and the difference between economic and political
weights
It is widely assumed that enlargement will increase the discrepancies
between economic and political weights within the Governing Council of
the ECB. Most of the present candidates are relatively small in economic
terms, but their representatives (the governors of the NCBs are often
perceived that way) would have the same weight as that of Germany,
whose economy is an order of magnitude larger.
Can this perception be quantified and verified? Economic weights could
be defined as GDP shares and the political weights could be defined as
being equal for all countries to 1/n, with the number of countries in EMU.
Using this definition it is not evident that the discrepancies that exist at
present will be worse in a larger EMU. Indeed, if one computes the sum
of the squared differences between the economic and political weights,
one arrives at the opposite result: the discrepancies between economic
and political weights are lower in a larger euro area than in the current
euro-12 club. Table 3.1 below provides the results of some illustrative
calculations. It is apparent that all larger euro area compositions
considered here actually lead to a lower discrepancy between economic
and political weights than the current euro-12 grouping. (See Annex 3 for
further details and additional calculations that take into account the
Executive Board.)
Table 3.1 Mismatch between economic and political weights
Sum of squared differences between economic and
political weights with economic weight measured by:
GDP Population ECB shares
EU-12 9,5 10,3 8,9
EU-15 7,4 7,8 7,1
EU-25 7,0 9,2 5,4
EU-27 7,2 9,4 5,7
EU-25-UK 8,0 10,8 6,1
Source: Own calculations. Each entry represents the sum of the squared
differences (times 100) between the political weights (defined as 1/n) and
one of the different economic weights used here. ECB shares are the
average of GDP and population weights.THE EURO AT 25
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By contrast, the markets for most goods and services retain some
distinctive national characteristics. For example, the average area-wide
inflation rate might be influenced by a change in indirect taxes or a re-
basing in one member country, which can at times produce an effect that
might not even be known outside the country and whose importance is
difficult to judge unless one knows the local situation in some detail.
This view implies that there might well be a natural division of labour
between the NCB presidents and the EXB members: the latter can
contribute their knowledge about the state of financial markets whereas
the former can contribute local knowledge about the real economy,
including prospects for output and employment. This division of labour
has one immediate consequence: financial markets move much more
quickly than the markets for goods and services, which in the final
analysis determine output and employment. Interest rates and stock
markets can collapse or soar in a matter of weeks, if not days, but a fall in
consumer demand usually takes months to develop (and to be recognised
as such). Supply-side shocks, such as an acceleration of productivity, take
place over an even longer time horizon.
The different comparative advantages of NCB presidents and members of
the EXB suggest a simple approach to the reform of the ECB in view of
enlargement. As the number of euro-area member countries increases, the
Governing Council, which would continue to comprise all the NCB
presidents, would meet less often and concentrate on strategic decisions.
To be concrete, the Governing Council might meet only once every
quarter. These meetings could involve a longer exchange of views on the
state of the economy, which would then allow the Governing Council to
formulate general, strategic guidelines for monetary policy, leaving the
day-to-day execution to the Board in Frankfurt.
2
This approach has the advantage that it maintains the representation of all
member countries in the highest decision-making body of the ECB. There
is a strong political demand for full representation, which should not be
dismissed. It also has a rational background: as argued above, local
information is essential to fully understanding the economic situation
even at the area-wide level. This same perception is also shared by the
wider public. Tough decisions by the ECB are thus more likely to be
accepted as necessary and legitimate if all countries are represented in the
governing body of the ECB that takes strategic decisions. In this context,
                                                                
2  Von Hagen (1998) and von Hagen and Süppel (1994) arrive at a similar
conclusion starting from the more usual assumptions about differences in
motivation.PREPARING THE ECB FOR ENLARGEMENT
107
strategic means those decisions that have a longer-run and more profound
impact on the economy.
During normal times the general public is unlikely to even notice the
week-to-week, or even month-to-month changes in monetary policy
interest rates. Monetary policy becomes an issue only when tough
decisions have to be taken. This is most likely to happen when output
falls and unemployment goes up but inflation remains high (as at
present). In such a situation, the choice takes on great political
importance. Should monetary policy become accommodating to sustain
employment or restrictive to achieve price stability?
3 These are the issues
that concern the general public rather then the question whether the
appropriate neutral stance implies an interest rate half a percentage point
higher, or whether rates should be cut in a month instead of today. This
type of decision can left to a smaller group even if it is not perceived to
be currently representative of all countries.
All rotation schemes face the same dilemma: while they may be fair on
average, this fact is irrelevant at any given moment in time. If a country
that is hit by a crisis does not have a representative on the ECB, the
public is unlikely to magnanimously accept its bad luck. Unpopular
decisions of the ECB could then quickly be perceived as illegitimate
because the ECB “does not even know what our problems are”. An
asymmetric rotation scheme that differentiate, for example, between
larger and smaller countries would reduce the likelihood that this would
happen for a large country, but it would raise the general suspicion that
ECB policy is being determined by the interest of the restricted group of
countries that happens to be represented at any one time in the Governing
Council.
The example of the US Federal Reserve Board, where there is an
asymmetry in the sense that the Governor of the NY Federal Reserve
District is the only one to have a permanent seat in the Open Market
Committee, does not constitute a counter argument. This asymmetry is
due to the importance of New York as a financial centre, not because the
New York District is in a different league in terms of population or GDP.
This implies also that the NY Fed Governor is more likely to represent
                                                                
3  The argument that it would be politically costly to exclude (or appear to
exclude) any one country from the decision-making process is likely to become
particularly relevant when one country experiences an extreme shock. As welfare
loss functions are usually assumed to be convex in the standard economic
variables, this implies that the contribution of the country concerned to the area-
wide loss in such a situation is likely to be particularly high.THE EURO AT 25
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the interests of the US financial sector (witness the rescue of LTCM)
rather than the interests of the Federal Reserve District of New York,
which encompasses a number of quite different states. In the case of the
ECB, the Board, based in Frankfurt, would subsume the role of the NY
Fed Governor. Moreover, Governors of Federal Reserve Districts do not
have the same prominent role in regional politics as do the presidents of
NCBs in Europe, partially because their constituencies encompass several
states (some Federal District boundaries even cut across states).
3.  Legal issues
How could the approach proposed here be implemented? In principle, it
could be done without changing the Statutes of the ESCB (as it is called
officially in the Treaty). Article 12.1 of the Statutes already allows for
this possibility:
The Governing Council shall formulate the monetary
policy of the Community including, as appropriate,
decisions relating to intermediate monetary objectives,
key interest rates and the supply of reserves to the
ESCB, and shall establish the necessary guidelines for
their implementation.
The Executive Board shall implement monetary policy
in accordance with the guidelines and decisions laid
down by the Governing Council. (...) In addition the
Executive Board may have certain powers delegated to it
where the Governing Council so decides.
It is thus difficult to decide whether the present text would allow for this
delegation. Hence, it might be useful to slightly amend this provision to
clarify that it should indeed be interpreted in this direction. For a legal
analysis, see Allemand (2002) and Louis (2002) who conclude that the
present text probably would not impede the type of delegation proposed
here.
In particular, Article 12 on the responsibilities of the decision-making
bodies might be changed in the following way (main changes in bold):
12.1  (First sentence unchanged) The Governing Council  shall
meet four times per year to discuss guidelines for the
implementation of the monetary policy of the Community
including, as appropriate, decisions relating to intermediate
monetary objectives, key interest rates and the supply of
reserves in the ESCB.PREPARING THE ECB FOR ENLARGEMENT
109
However, implementing even such a minor (formal) change is less
straightforward than seems at first sight. The decision taken at the Nice
Council to simplify the procedure for changing the statutes of the ESCB
applies only to the composition of the Governing Council, determined in
Article 10. Although, as argued above, a treaty change is not strictly
necessary for the approach taken here, it might still be useful to slightly
modify the Statutes. Since a new Treaty is now being elaborated in any
event by the Convention on the Future of Europe (to be completed
perhaps only after enlargement, but certainly before the  eurozone’s
membership increases), this should not be an insurmountable hurdle.
4.  Recent developments
The ECB recently published its own view of its accountability (ECB,
2002). For the purpose of this chapter, the interesting point is that the
ECB maintains that only the Governing Council is accountable, and this
only collectively. It is striking that the Executive Board does not seem to
matter for the ECB as it is almost totally neglected in the contribution,
which comes after all from the ECB itself.
It is also remarkable that the ECB has not yet used its right to make a
concrete proposal, as accorded under the Nice Treaty provisions
mentioned above. Nothing has been communicated officially, but we
assume that after long and controversial discussions, the Governing
Council must now be nearing agreement (which has to be unanimous) to
propose a rotational scheme with the following characteristics:
•  The composition of the Governing Council would not be changed.
•  All governors of national central banks would continue to attend its
meetings, but only a limited number of them would retain the right to
vote on interest rate decisions.
•  The number of NCB governors with the right to vote would not be
much different from the present, i.e. around 12.
•  These twelve would be determined on the basis of a rotation scheme
in which the governors of the NCBs of larger countries would either
not rotate at all, or rotate less frequently than those from smaller
countries.
If the ECB does make a proposal, the European Council is likely to
accept it without significant modifications. If the ECB does not make a
proposal, the Commission will have to make one. Little is known at
present on what position the Commission might take on this issue.THE EURO AT 25
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Box 3.2 Rotation: Does the US constitute an example to follow?
In the main decision-making body, the Federal Open Market Committee,
which meets every six weeks, the members of the Board vote together
with five of the twelve Federal Reserve Board Presidents, serving on a
differentiated rotation system. The US example might nevertheless be
misleading on several accounts:
1.  In the US, the Federal Reserve Districts encompass several states
(and sometimes parts of states), and therefore the regional Federal
Reserve Presidents do not in any way  represent regional interests.
This may a good thing, but it would run counter to the political
imperative of all EU institutions to give (or at least to appear to give)
all member countries a voice in the decision-making process.
2.  The (Executive) Board of Governors has seven members as against
five voting Federal Reserve Bank Presidents in the FMOC. The
Board – to the extent it is unanimous – has the preponderance in any
vote, whereas the opposite is the case in the ECB General Council as
presently composed and as envisaged under the rotation principle.
Furthermore, the role of the Board of Governors is reinforced by the
authority vested in it to change the discount rate (of lesser importance
today than in the past), to set and change reserve requirements and to
conduct the supervision of banks and major financial institutions.
3.  The importance of financial shocks was recognised in the US by
giving the New York Fed a permanent seat on the Open Market
Committee. Financial markets are much less concentrated in the EU,
and the most important financial centre actually lies outside the
present eurozone. It would be politically impossible in any event to
introduce any asymmetry in favour of London as the main financial
centre.
4.  Last, but not least, the distribution of resources is totally different.
Most of the research staff, which analyses recent developments and
prepares monetary policy decisions, reside in Washington. (See also
Bini Smaghi and Gros (2000).) This seems appropriate in an
environment in which macroeconomic statistics become available
first for the entire area. By contrast, in the euro area the area-wide
statistics become available only with a lag, i.e. after the last national
data have appeared.PREPARING THE ECB FOR ENLARGEMENT
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The proposal the ECB seems about to make seems to us to represent a
combination of drawbacks, rather than a sensible compromise. It appears
that the overall size of the “effective” Governing Council (i.e. those who
can vote on interest rates) will remain too large to allow for an in-depth
discussion. With 12 NCB governors plus the 6 members of the Executive
Board, a total of 18 would have to express their views. Even with each
member speaking for only 10 minutes, an initial tour de table would take
three hours. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the collective
accountability of the Governing Council can be maintained with a
rotational scheme. Would only those with the right to vote remain
accountable?
Finally, as has often been observed, differentiated rotation implies that
the governors from large member countries would be treated differently
than those from smaller countries. This could nourish the impression that
the function of governors from NCBs is to defend national interests.
Moreover, this unequal treatment would also puncture the argument, used
by the ECB itself, that the Governing Council can only be collectively
accountable because the NCB governors perform a “European” function
and cannot thus “render account” individually to their national
parliaments.
Some will undoubtedly argue that the official proposal to reform the
Governing Council of the ECB can be justified with reference to the US
example, which seems to point to (differentiated) rotation as the best
solution. This would be misleading in our view, however, as the main
decision-making body of the Federal Reserve has only 12 members.
Moreover, a majority of them (7) come from the centre, which also has
the best access to information about recent economic developments as
well as most of the research staff (i.e. the resources to provide an
analytical underpinning for monetary policy decisions). See Box 3.2 for
more details.
5.  Concluding remarks
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce one element that has so far
been absent in the discussion about reform of the ECB governing bodies
in view of enlargement. The contributions in the academic literature have
concentrated on differences in motivation between the members of the
Board and the presidents of the NCBs. These assumptions about
differences in motivation seem largely arbitrary. By contrast, we abstract
from differences in motivation and concentrate on differences in the
information basis that should result naturally from the differences in
functions and working environments. Board members are in relativelyTHE EURO AT 25
112
closer contact with fast-moving financial markets whereas the NCB
presidents are in relatively closer contact with the real economies of their
home countries.
Given that most shocks to the real economy occur less frequently and
take longer to evaluate than financial market shocks, one may assume
that the expertise of the NCB presidents is needed less often than that of
the Board. Hence it seems natural to conclude that the most efficient
arrangement might be one in which the full Governing Council meets
much less frequently than is the case today for in-depth discussions on
the state of the economy and the strategy for monetary policy. These
meetings would also be the occasion to establish general guidelines for
the management of monetary policy in the meantime. The task of the
Executive Board would then be to conduct monetary policy on a day-to-
day basis, in particular reacting to developments in financial markets. The
Board would then become the Management Committee of the ECB,
whereas the Governing Council would have the role of a Supervisory
Board in the private sector.
The best, or rather least bad, solution to solving the “numbers” problem
might thus be the arrangement we propose: to give the Executive Board
the authority to react quickly to financial market shocks when
implementing the medium-term guidelines for monetary policy set by the
large Governing Council at less frequent meetings.PREPARING THE ECB FOR ENLARGEMENT
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Annex 1
Excerpts of the Nice Treaty Referring to Reform of the
European Central Bank
TREATY OF NICE
AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION,
THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS
(2001/C 80/01)
Article 5
The Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and
of the European Central Bank shall be amended in accordance with the
provisions of this Article.
In Article 10, the following paragraph shall be added:
‘10.6 Article 10.2 may be amended by the Council meeting in
the composition of the Heads of State or Government,
acting unanimously either on a recommendation from the
ECB and after consulting the European Parliament and
the Commission, or on a recommendation from the
Commission and after consulting the European
Parliament and the ECB. The Council shall recommend
such amendments to the Member States for adoption.
These amendments shall enter into force after having
been ratified by all the Member States in accordance with
their respective constitutional requirements.
A recommendation made by the ECB under this
paragraph shall require a decision by the Governing
Council acting unanimously.’
Declarations adopted by the conference
19. Declaration on Article 10.6 of the Statutes of the European
System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank
The Conference expects that a recommendation within
the meaning of Article 10.6 of the Statutes of the
European System of Central Banks and of the European
Central Bank will be presented as soon as possible.THE EURO AT 25
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Annex 2
Review of Proposals for Reforming the ECB
The proposals that have been put forward so far for reforming the ECB
can be summarised under five main headings: 1) weighted voting, 2)
constituencies, 3) rotation, 4) nomination and 5) centralisation.
1)  Weighted voting
In this option, the Governing Council would include the six members of
the Executive Board plus all the central bank governors of the
participating member states. However, the votes of the non-board
members would be weighted by the countries’ shares in euro area GDP
(or by a combination of GDP and population shares). This option in
reality has not been endorsed by anyone because it is not perceived to
resolve the problem of “size”, since there would still be a large number of
Council members involved in the discussions.
2)  Constituencies
In this solution, countries would be grouped into constituencies, which
would send one representative each to participate in the Governing
Council. This would be a similar solution to the one adopted by the
Bretton Woods institutions. Giving each representative one voting right
would result in implicit weighting of the votes of the members of each
constituency. As pointed out by Berger (2002), this solution requires the
definition of a mandate for the representatives. A “restricted” or
“imperative” mandate, with votes determined at the group level, would
fail to contain the decision-making costs associated with enlargement.
For the reduction of these costs, some degree of delegation would be
required. The problem with this solution is that some countries would be
permanently deprived of participating in the decision-making process.
Another problem raised by Baldwin et al. (2001) is that this solution
would violate the total personal independence of the individual
participants, since each representative would have to represent the
interests of his constituency.
3)  Rotation
A rotation scheme would guarantee that all euro-area members would
have a seat in the Council at some point in time. It has been generally
agreed that a solution of this type must ensure that the Council members
selected by rotation account for a sufficiently large share of euro-area
GDP. Hence many argue that rotation schemes must be asymmetric. OnePREPARING THE ECB FOR ENLARGEMENT
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option to design the asymmetric scheme is to pool countries for rotation.
Fitoussi and Creel (2002) propose separating the countries into two
groups, the largest in one group and the remaining in another. They
propose forming a Council with 19 members: six Executive Board
members, two members chosen among the largest countries and 11
members chosen among the remaining countries, each with a five-year
mandate. The lower the number of governors in the ECB Council and the
longer the rotation period, the more opposition such a scheme will face;
therefore efficiency must be balanced with the probability of approval.
Berger (2002) proposes instead that the Governing Council be composed
of six Executive Board members and nine rotating central bank
governors. The number of constituencies and the number of seats
assigned to each should balance the percentage of governors holding
voting power in excess of their respective country’s economic weight and
ensure that on average the Council represents more than 60% of euro-area
GDP. Berger (2002) notes that there may be advantages in choosing
groups, not only by country size but also taking into consideration other
dimensions, to make the groups more homogeneous, for instance in terms
of business – cycle synchronisation or structural inflation. This could be
achieved without changing the average share of euro-area GDP
represented by governors and the percentage of governors holding voting
power in excess of their respective country’s economic weight, by
adapting the number of constituencies and the number of seats assigned
to each. It has been argued however that a rotation scheme would create
problems if a country whose central bank governor is not participating in
the Council were hit by a particularly negative asymmetric shock.
4)  Nomination
This option is defended by Fitoussi and Creel (2002) as the one that
would go the farthest towards eliminating the national dimension of the
Governing Council. In this solution the heads of government in the
European Council would choose among the national central bank
governors a number that it deems optimal for the Governing Council. The
Executive Board would remain unchanged with six members. The
authors claim that the potentially damaging horse-trading involved with
such nominations could be avoided if the selection and nomination
process is sufficiently well designed. Why not only the six Executive
Board members then?THE EURO AT 25
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5)  Delegation
In this alternative, monetary policy would be delegated to a group of
independent experts, such as the six current members of the Executive
Board. As with the other solutions, more than one form of delegation has
been proposed. Baldwin et al. (2001) defend the delegation of monetary
policy to a monetary policy committee, composed by six full-time
executive members and five non-executive members, chosen amongst the
most capable and experienced experts in Europe, and giving the national
central bank governors a consultative role. There are fears that such a
solution could worsen the EU’s democratic deficit and be politically
infeasible. Hence, Artus and Wyplosz (2002) propose instead that the
Governing Council retain the superior authority, setting the broad
guidelines for monetary policy, but delegating the day-to-day
implementation to the Executive Board. This solution would in his view
resolve the problem of size, not be affected by later enlargements,
strengthen the non-national character of the ECB and facilitate informal
exchanges between the monetary policy-makers.
Table A.3.1 Summary of some concrete proposals
Type of scheme Number of Council members
Fitoussi and
Creel (2002)
Rotation with two groups:
large and small
19: 6 board, 2 from large
countries and 11 from small
Berger (2002) Rotation with groups
selected by size or by
balancing size with other
economic characteristics
15: 6 board plus 9 rotating
(groups should ensure
representation and balance
voting power to economic
weight)
Baldwin et al.
(2002)
Delegation to a monetary
policy committee of
independent experts;
consultation role for the
NBCs.
11: 6 full-time executives
(current board members) plus
5 non-executives.
Artus and
Wyplosz
(2002)
Delegation of day-to-day
monetary policy to the
Executive Board; Council
remains supreme authority
and sets the broad
guidelines for monetary
policy.
31 for broad guidelines and 6
for day-to-day
implementation.PREPARING THE ECB FOR ENLARGEMENT
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Annex 3
Political/Economic Mismatch in the ECB Governing Council
under Alternative Assumption about the “Nationality” of
Executive Board members
In order to address the small vs. large countries dilemma, one could also
consider an alternative distribution of the votes in the ECB Governing
Council. For example, one should consider the possibility that the six
largest countries (as defined below) each have two votes in the Council
because they would have one “national” on the Executive Board (whereas
the remaining eurozone members would each have one vote).
The indicator of discrepancies between the economic and actual
(political) weight in the eurozone is computed, similarly as in the text, as
the sum of squared differences between the two. Economic weights are
based on GDP, population and countries’ shares in the ECB (computed as
an average of the GDP and population weights). The political weight is
defined as a number of votes in the ECB Governing Council divided by
the total number of votes.
The table below shows that taking into account the existence of the
Executive Board leads to a lower discrepancy between political and
economic weights. This table confirms that enlargement will not
necessarily make the problem any worse.
Table A.3.2 Indicator of discrepancies between economic and political
weights in the Governing Council
Standard voting
(one “country” – one vote)
Alternative voting
(6 largest countries 2 votes)
GDP Population ECB
weights
GDP Population ECB
weights
EU-12 9.5 10.3 8.9 6.9
a 5.7
b 6.2
c
EU-15 7.4 7.8 7.1 4.5
d 3.8
d 4.0
d
EU-25* 7.0 9.2 5.4 6.1
d 2.9
e 4.2
e
EU-27* 7.2 9.4 5.7 6.4
d 3.2
e 4.8
e
EU-25-UK 8.0 10.8 6.1 7.8
a 3.5
f 5.6
g
Source: Own calculations. Each entry represents the sum of the squared differences (times
100) between the political weights, defined as v/n (where v is the number of votes
in the ECB Governing Council, v˛{1,2}, and n is the total number of votes), and
one of the different economic weights used here. ECB shares are the average of
GDP and population weights.THE EURO AT 25
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Notes: a)Countries with 2 votes are: Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands,
Belgium.
b) Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Greece.
c) Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium.
d) Germany, UK, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands.
e) Germany, UK, France, Italy, Spain, Poland.
f) Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, Romania.
g) Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, Netherlands.
* EU-15+CEEC-10.
** EU-15+CEEC-10+Malta+Cyprus.119
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